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I. INTRODUCTION
The United States and Canada are dependent on each other
in security matters by virtue of their shared border. Many in the
United States believed widespread but false reports that some of
the 9/11 terrorists had entered the United States through Canada.
These reports were plausible because would-be millennium bomber
Ahmed Ressam was apprehended by an alert American customs
official in late 1999 entering the United States from Canada. Both
the Ressam case and the false reports about the 9/11 terrorists help
explain why part of the U.S. Patriot Act is entitled "Protecting the
Northern Border."' Both countries responded to 9/11 with new
antiterrorism laws, governmental reorganization, and increased
spending on security. Concerns about keeping the border open
but secure motivated a thirty-point Smart Border Declaration
signed by Canada and the United States in late 2001 that focused
1. Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools to
Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT) Act of 2001, H.R. 3162, 107th
Cong., tit. IV, subsec. A (2001).
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on better screening and preclearance of goods and people crossing
the border. It also led to the Safe Third Country Agreement that
generally prohibits refugee applicants present in either country
2
from applying to the other. A decade later, the two countries have
agreed to a new action plan for perimeter security.
Despite the close and intensified cooperation over the last
decade, there have been some major irritants that underline
differences between American and Canadian counter-terrorism
and have made Canada and the United States uneasy neighbors.
Maher Arar, a Canadian citizen born in Syria, was detained in the
United States in 2002 as he was returning home to Canada. He was
subsequently rendered to Syria where he was tortured and detained
for almost a year before being allowed to return to Canada. Arar
was exonerated in 2006 by a Canadian public inquiry conducted by
a respected judge4 and the Canadian government settled his civil
claim for $10.5 million. Arar became a national hero in Canada,'
but he remains on American watch-lists. His civil claim against
6
American officials has been dismissed by American courts, and a
heavily redacted Inspector General's report examining his
2. Canada-U.S. Smart Border Declaration: Building a Smart Border for the 21st
Century on the Foundation of a North American Zone of Confidence, FOREIGN AFF. & INT'L
TRADE CANADA (Dec. 12, 2001), http://www.international.gc.ca/anti-terrorism
/declaration-en.asp; see Safe Third Country Agreement, U.S.-Can., Dec. 5, 2002,
available at http://www.cic.gc.ca/english/department/laws-policy/safe-third.asp.
3. UNITED STATES-CANADA BEYOND THE BORDER: A SHARED VISION FOR
PERIMETER SECURITY AND ECONOMIC COMPETITIVENESS (2011) [hereinafter
PERIMETER SECURITYACTION PLAN], available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites
/default/files/us-canada btb action-plan3.pdf. In advance of this agreement,
Canada enacted a law allowing advance airline passenger information required by
the United States to be disclosed despite Canadian privacy legislation. See
Strengthening Aviation Security Act, S.C. 2011, c. 9 (Can.), available at
http://lawsjustice.gc.ca/eng/AnnualStatutes/2011_9/page-1.html.
4. COMMissioN OF INQUIRY INTO THE ACTIONS OF CANADIAN OFFICIALS IN
RELATION TO MAHER ARAR: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS (2006), available at
http://www.pch.gc.ca/cs-kc/arar/arar-e.pdf, [hereinafter COMMISSION OF INQUIRY
ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS]. The author served on the research advisory
committee of this inquiry.
5. He has won several awards and now runs an online magazine on security
matters at PRISM MAGAZINE, http://prism-magazine.com/ (last visited Apr. 14,
2012). Maher Arar received a nation-maker of the year award from Canada's
national newspaper in 2006 along with Sergeant Patrick Tower, a soldier
decorated for bravery in combat in Afghanistan. Rod Mickleburgh, Sgt. Patrick
Tower and Maher Arar, 2006, THE GLOBE & MAIL, Dec. 30, 2006,
www.theglobeandmail.com/news/national/nation-builder/sgt-patrick-tower-and-
maher-arar-2006/article862861.
6. Arar v. Ashcroft, 585 F.3d 559, 563 (2d Cir. 2009).
17032012]
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treatment makes no attempt at examining the merits of the
intelligence that identified him as a security threat.' The
contrasting approaches to Arar play into the stereotypes of Canada
being concerned about human rights to the point of being unable
to respond to perceived security threats and the United States
being vigilant about security risks to the point of abusing human
rights.8  The Arar story is not simply a difficult chapter in the
history of American-Canadian security relations. It has
considerable symbolic resonance in Canada in part because it
brings together Canada's concerns about human rights and
multiculturalism. The Arar story has become part of Canada's
security memory and perhaps even its constitutional culture.9 At
the same time, the American rendition and continued watch-listing
of Arar has not stopped the two countries from agreeing to
increased information sharing as part of the 2011 perimeter
10security agreement.
If the Arar case symbolizes Canadian unease about the forceful
unilateral nature of some American security policies, then the
Khadr family symbolizes American concerns about Canada being a
security risk. The Khadr family is a self-professed "al Qaeda
family"" that was headed by Ahmed Said Khadr, a close associate of
Osama bin Laden, until he was killed in a shootout in Afghanistan
in 2003.12 Although the Khadr family spent much of its time in
Pakistan and Afghanistan, the children were born in Canada. Two
7. DEP'T OF HOMELAND SECURITY OFF. OF INSPECTOR GENERAL, THE REMOVAL
OF A CANADIAN TO SYRIA. OIG-08-18 (2008).
8. A good accessible repository of cultural stereotypes about Canadians and
Americans was the 1990s syndicated Canadian television series Due South, which
featured an RCMP officer working in Chicago, who always abided by rules and was
very trusting to the point of being naive, and his American partner, a Chicago
Police Department detective who was very cynical, street wise, and prepared to
bend or break the rules to capture criminals. See Due South, WIKIPEDIA,
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Due-South (last visited Apr. 14, 2012).
9. For more information on the concept of Canadian constitutional cultures
that can both resist and be challenged and changed by developments such as the
increased emphasis on security, see David Schneiderman, Property Rights and
Regulatory Innovation: Comparing Constitutional Cultures, 4 INT'L J. CONST. L. 371
(2006).
10. An action plan released in December 2011 calls for "increased informal
sharing of law-enforcement intelligence, information and evidence through police
and prosecutorial channels consistent with the domestic laws of each country[."
PERIMETER SECURITY ACTION PLAN, supra note 3, at 3.
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of these brothers were captured in Afghanistan and detained at
Guantanamo Bay. One of them, Omar Khadr, was fifteen years of
age when captured in 2002. He pled guilty in 2010 before a
military commission to murder, attempted murder, conspiracy,
spying, and material support of terrorism. 3 The Supreme Court of
Canada twice held that Khadr's rights under the 1982 Canadian
Charter of Rights and Freedomsl 4  ("the Charter") and
international human rights law were violated when he was
interrogated by Canadian intelligence officials at Guantanamo.
Nevertheless, it stopped short of ordering Canada to request his
repatriation from the United States because of concern that such a
judicial remedy might interfere with the executive's conduct of
Canadian-American foreign relations. 15 The Canadian courts have
recently permanently halted an extradition request by the United
States for the oldest brother, Abdullah Khadr, on the basis that
extradition on material support of terrorism charges would
condone American misconduct when Abdullah Khadr was captured
and detained in Pakistan from 2004 to 2005 before being released
and allowed to return Canada. The courts rebuffed arguments
that its decision allowed a self-professed supporter of al Qaeda to
walk free by observing that Canada could prosecute Khadr
domestically. Abdullah Khadr, however, has not been charged
since his release in 2010. This raises the issue of Canada's troubled
history of terrorism prosecutions.
The close connection between American and Canadian
counter-terrorism makes it important to have a better
understanding of each country's distinct national security
traditions. Given the nature of national security matters, this
requires an understanding of each country's constitution,
including not only its text, but history and practice. Such
understanding will not avoid conflicts, but will assist in placing
13. See infra Part V.C.2.
14. Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act,
1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act, 1982, c. 11 (U.K.).
15. Khadr v. Canada (Prime Minister), [2010] 1 S.C.R. 44 (Can.); Khadr v.
Canada (Minister of justice), [2008] 2 S.C.R. 125 (Can.) (finding violations of
international human rights laws in order to apply the Charter extra-territorially to
interrogations conducted by Canadian officials at Guantanamo in 2003 and 2004).
16. United States v. Khadr, 2010 ONSC 4338 (Can. Ont. Sup. Ct. .J.), afffd
2011 ONCA 358 (Can. Ont. C.A.), leave denied, 2011 CarswellOnt 11811 (Can.)
(WL).
17. United States v. Khadr, 2011 ONCA 358, para. 77 (Can. Ont. C.A.).
2012] 1705
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them in a broader context. In the first part of this article, I briefly
provide some background information about both Canada and the
United States with a focus on the former, perhaps, in order to
compensate for the fact that traditionally Americans "are
benevolently ignorant about Canada, whereas Canadians are
malevolently informed about the United States."" In the second
part of this article, I provide an overview of the pre-9/11 history of
counter-terrorism in both the United States and Canada because of
the relevance of such histories in understanding present responses.
It is particularly important for Canadians who may be "malevolently
informed" about the United States to understand that in the
United States, terrorism has in part been seen, both before and
after 9/11, as an external threat requiring a military response
aimed at non-citizens, and that American constitutional doctrine
and culture defers to the executive power in responding to external
threats. The deference of American courts to these executive
efforts fits into a pattern of what I have described elsewhere as
American "extra-legalism,"' in which American law, through
various devices including the political question doctrine, narrow
standing, broad states secrets, and the Ker/Frisbie doctrine,20
protects executive action from judicial review even though the
executive action might be viewed as extra-legal in many other
democracies. Another dimension of American extra-legalism is
the use of military detention and commissions to deal with
suspected alien terrorists such as Omar Khadr. Although military
detention and commissions are far from lawless, they depart from
the reliance on criminal and administrative processes that most
other democracies use to deal with the threat of terrorism.
18. Frank Underhill, Canada and the North Atlantic Triangle, in IN SEARCH OF
CANADIAN LIBERALISM 255, 256-57 (1960).
19. KENT ROACH, THE 9/11 EFFECT: COMPARATIVE COUNTER-TERRORISM 164-65
(2011).
20. See United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 504 U.S. 655 (1992); Frisbie v.
Collins, 342 U.S. 519 (1952); Ker v. Illinois, 119 U.S. 436 (1886) (accepting
irregular extradition does not undermine jurisdiction of American courts).
21. Aharon Barak, Foreword: A judge on judging: The Role of a Supreme Court in a
Democracy, 116 HARv. L. REv. 16, 97-162 (2002) (outlining rejection of political
question doctrine, narrow standing, and restrictive remedial doctrines in the
context of Israeli law relating to national security).
22. Israel is probably the only other democracy that places as much reliance
on military detention and trials as the United States. See GLOBAL ANTI-TERRORISM
LAW AND POLICY 2D 597-654 (Victor V. Ramraj et al. eds., 2012); ROACH, THE 9/11
EFFECT, supra note 19, at 77-160.
1706 [Vol. 38:5
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The bulk of the article in the next two sections features
detailed case studies of the different treatment of Maher Arar and
of the Khadr family in Canada and the United States. Each case
study will provide concrete examples of how each country's distinct
approach to terrorism has played out since 9/11. An important
factor in the Canadian reaction to the American treatment of
Maher Arar, Omar Khadr, and Abdullah Khadr has been the role
of independent courts and independent judicial-led public
inquiries in examining these cases from a human rights
perspective. As will be seen, the three men had more trouble
receiving remedies from American courts which deferred to the
executive, the military, and Congress. American courts refused to
allow Maher Arar to litigate his civil claim on the merits because of
judicial deference to Congress on matters involving the separation
of powers, foreign policy, and national security. They could not
provide effective remedies for his continued watch-listing. They
denied Omar Khadr habeas corpus relief because of their
deference to ongoing military proceedings and their assumptions
that he would receive justice and remedies in that process. Finally,
American courts would not have provided remedies had attempts
to render Abdullah Khadr from Pakistan for trial in the United
States been successful. It will be suggested that all three cases are
examples of American extra-legalism in action where courts defer
to executive and congressional authority.
All three cases resulted in clashes between Canadian judicial
and quasi-judicial processes and American executive actions that
have not been closely reviewed by the courts. For Americans, these
case studies should reveal how deferential courts have been to
executive and congressional action in national security matters.
For Canadians, these cases should reveal how active courts and
quasi-judicial institutions have been in such matters. These
differences have helped make Canada and the United States uneasy
neighbors. Nevertheless, they have not undermined continued
cooperation between American and Canadian governments who
share similar security and economic interests. The last section of
this article will examine post-9/11 security agreements between
American and Canadian governments. The most recent
agreement, the 2011 security perimeter action plan, suggests that
executive cooperation between the two governments will intensify
23. See PERIMETER SECURITYAcTiON PLAN, supra note 3.
2012] 1707
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even with respect to informal information sharing that, in part, led
to American/Canadian conflicts over Maher Arar's rendition and
continued watch-listing in the United States.
II. CANADA AND THE UNITED STATES BRIEFLY COMPARED
There is a long tradition of comparative studies of the politics,
laws, and institutions of Canada and the United States. Much of
the literature has stressed traditional differences between Canada,
as a parliamentary democracy with conservative, socialist, and statist
traditions, and the United States, with its more diffused
congressional system, localism, populism, and greater opposition to
24
state power. These comparisons need to be updated to better
reflect the substantial impact of the 1982 enactment of a
constitutional bill of rights in Canada, the Charter, 1 as well as the
evolving nature of multiculturalism in both countries.
A. Attitudes Towards the State
Canada's more statist traditions have, in the past, produced
more judicial deference to state action than in the United States.
Canada has reacted strongly to emergencies; it not only interned
residents of Japanese descent during World War II, but even
deported citizens of Japanese descent to Japan after the war.
Right after the war, an inquiry run by two Supreme Court of
Canada Justices into a spy ring revealed by Soviet defector Igor
Gouzenko, Canadians suspected of spying were detained and
interrogated without access to the courts or counsel. Before the
Charter, Canadian courts traditionally refused to exclude evidence
because it was improperly obtained. It was not until 1985 that
Canadian courts finally recognized that they had the power to stay
proceedings as a result of abuse of the court's process and
24. See DAVID T.JONES & DAVID KILGOUR, UNEASY NEIGHBORS (2007); SEYMOUR
MARTIN LIPSET, CONTINENTAL DIVIDE (1990).
25. See Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution
Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act, 1982, c. 11 (U.K.).
26. See Co-operative Committee onJapanese-Canadians and Attorney-General
for Canada, [1947] 1 D.L.R. 577 (Can. P.C.) (upholding an order issued by the
Governor in Council for the deportation of Japanese nationals along with
naturalized and natural-born British people of the Japanese race).
27. Reg Whitaker, Keeping Up with the Neighbours? Canadian Response to 9/11 in
Historical and Comparative Context, 41 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 241 (2003).
28. Rothman v. The Queen, [1981] 1 S.C.R. 640 (Can:); The Queen v. Wray,
[1971] 1 S.C.R. 272 (Can.).
1708 [Vol. 38:5
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integrity. Until fairly recently, the differences between Canada
and the United States were captured in Canada's collectivist
emphasis on "peace, order and good government,",o in contrast to
the United States' more individualistic pursuit of "life, liberty and
the pursuit of happiness."31 As will be seen, however, these slogans
are no longer accurate. Canada now frequently places more
emphasis on judicially enforced rights than the United States,
where courts frequently defer to executive action designed to
achieve security.
The 1982 Charter ushered in what Michael Ignatieff has called
a "rights revolution"32 that has altered Canada's constitutional
culture. The Charter has made Canadian courts much less
deferential to both executive and legislative action that infringes
rights. The Supreme Court of Canada now enforces a number of
due process restraints on the state more robustly than the U.S.
Supreme Court. For example, the Court has Rrohibited
extradition to face the death penalty under the Charter. The text
of the Charter mandates the exclusion of unconstitutionally
obtained evidence if its admission would bring the administration
of justice into disrepute, as well as the right to obtain appropriate
35
and just remedies from courts. Canadian governments enjoy no
absolute or qualified immunity from damage claims for executive
violations of the Charter. 6 Canadian courts have rejected the idea
that some military and foreign affairs matters are non-justiciable
political questions under the Charter. Constitutional disclosure
29. R. v.Jewitt, [1985] 2 S.C.R. 128 (Can.).
30. Constitution Act, 1867, 30 & 31 Vict., c. 3, s. 91 (U.K.).
31. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776).
32. MICHAEL IGNATIEFF, THE RIGHTS REVOLUTION (2007).
33. KENT ROACH, DUE PROCESS AND VICTIMS' RIGHTS: THE CHANGING LAW AND
POLITICS OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE 3 (1999); Robert Harvie & Hamar Foster, Different
Drummers, Different Drums: The Supreme Court of Canada, American jurisprudence and
the Continuing Revision of Criminal Law Under the Charter, 24 OTTAwA L. REv. 39
(1992); Robert Harvie & Hamar Foster, When the Constable Blunders: The Law of
Police Interrogation in Canada and the United States, a Comparison, 19 SEATTLE U. L.
REV. 497 (1996).
34. United States v. Burns, [2001] 1 S.C.R. 283 (Can.).
35. Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act,
1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act, 1982, c. 11, s.24(2) (U.K.).
36. Vancouver v. Ward, [2010] 2 S.C.R. 28 (Can.).
37. Operation Dismantle v. The Queen, [1985] 1 S.C.R. 441 (Can.) (rejecting
the idea that the government's decision to allow the United States to test cruise
missiles in the Canadian north was a non-justiciable political question, but also
finding that the testing would not violate the Charter).
17092012]
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requirements in Canada are much broader than the United States.
They require the state to disclose to the accused all relevant, non-
38
privileged information-not just exculpatory information.
Canada also has more liberal standing 9 and state secrets doctrines40
than the United States.
Canada is a parliamentary democracy where the executive is
not directly elected but formed by those who have the confidence
of Parliament. Legislative power is focused on the House of
Commons where the prime minister and his ministers sit because
senators are appointed and not elected. Although the Charter has
emerged as an important restraint on Canadian national security
activities, Canada's parliamentary system, especially in situations
where the executive holds a majority in the legislature, facilitates a
legislative approach to terrorism in common with other
parliamentary democracies, such as the United Kingdom and
Australia. In response to 9/11, a Canadian government that held a
majority in Parliament was able to enact a massive new Anti-
Terrorism Act that created many new terrorism offenses, increased
police powers to include preventive arrest, and extended the
powers of Canada's Signals Intelligence Agency to include
warrantless spying involving citizens in a manner that in the United
States was initially done through secret, and arguably illegal,
. . 42
executive action. A new majority Conservative government in
Canada is poised to enact new legislation that will reenact
38. Compare R. v. Stinchcombe, [1991] 3 S.C.R. 326 (Can.), with Brady v.
Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963).
39. Amnesty International Canada v. Canada, 2008 FC 336, para. 329-49
(Can.), affd, 2008 FCA 401 (Can.) (holding that a public interest group not
directly affected by a practice was allowed to bring a constitutional challenge to
the actions of Canadian military forces in transferring detainees to Afghan
custody, but also holding that there is no Charter violation even if there was a
substantial risk of torture). See generally Kent Roach, The Supreme Court at the Bar of
Politics: The Afghan Detainee and Omar Khadr Cases, 28 NAT'LJ. CONST. L. 115 (2010).
40. Canada Evidence Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-5 § 38.06(2) (requiring a judicial
balance between competing interests in disclosure and non-disclosure even with
respect to material that if disclosed would harm national security, national
defense, or international relations). Note that the Attorney General of Canada
has a power to block ajudicial disclosure pursuant to section 38.13, but this power
has not yet been used. Id. § 38.13.
41. Compare Amnesty International Canada v. Canada, 2008 FC 336, para.
329-49 (Can.), affd, 2008 FCA 401 (Can.), with Arar v. Ashcroft, 585 F.3d 559, 563
(2d Cir. 2009).
42. See ROACH, THE 9/11 EFFECT, supra note 19, at 161-237, 361-425
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preventive arrest and investigative hearings, powers originally
enacted in the 2001 Anti-Terrorism Act, but that were not renewed
in 2007 when the Conservative government did not hold a majority
in the House of Commons. Although increasingly restrained by
judicial enforcement of the Charter, a majority government in
Canada can enact legislation much more easily than the American
government.
The United States is a congressional democracy where the
elected President has the ability to veto legislation enacted by
Congress. There is less party discipline in the United States than
Canada, and unlike the Canada Senate the U.S. Senate is elected.
All of these factors restrain legislative activism in the United States
and, in the national security context, can make it difficult to enact
controversial laws. The Patriot Act was enacted with overwhelming
majorities in both houses of Congress, and many of its provisions
have subsequently been renewed. Nevertheless, American political
culture, on both the right and the left, was very suspicious of the
legislative activism of the Patriot Act.43 A proposed Patriot Act II
was not enacted. The restraints of the American congressional
system mean that American counter-terrorism is focused more in
the executive realm than the legislature.4 Unlike in Canada,
judicial review of executive action in the United States is restrained
by political question, case and controversy, narrow standing, broad
state secrets, and absolute and qualified immunity doctrines. These
doctrines have meant that American courts have resisted reviewing
cases involving controversial policies such as targeted killing,
extraordinary rendition, warrantless spying by the National Security
Agency, and pretextual use of immigration law and material witness
warrants as forms of preventive detention.
As will be explored in the next section, the United States has a
long history of using military force to respond to and preempt
terrorism. The comparative militarization of American counter-
terrorism is related both to perceptions of the threat as primarily
external and an American reluctance or unwillingness to
experiment with counter-terrorism innovations in its domestic legal
system. For all the criticism it received, the Patriot Act did not go
as far as even Canada's post 9/11 legislation, and especially British
legislation, in pushing the boundaries of domestic counter-
43. MARK SIDEL, MORE SECURE LESS FREE? 61-64 (2004).
44. Daphne Barak-Erez, Terroism Law Between the Executive and Legislative
Models, 57 AM.J. COMP. L. 877, 885-86 (2009).
17112012]
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terrorism to include, for example, preventive arrests or laws
targeting speech associated with terrorism. 45 Privacy and anti-statist
traditions in the United States also explain why, even after 9/11,
there is no domestic intelligence agency, as there is in Canada and
many other democracies. Real and perceived restraints on explicit
domestic legislative measures encourage the United States to use
less-restrained measures abroad, including military and CIA
detention and targeted killing. It also encourages the pretextual
use of existing laws domestically. In the immediate aftermath of
9/11, immigration laws and material witness warrants were used
pretextually as a means to engage in preventive and investigative
detention and profiling in a manner that was not authorized in the
Patriot Act.
B. Multiculturalism
There is also a need to account for how Canada and the
United States have adapted to globalization and multiculturalism.
Significantly more Canadians (20.1%) than Americans (13.6%) are
foreign-born, with Canada having higher rates of immigration than
the United States.4 The Muslim populations of both countries are
diverse and growing, but Canada's population a pears to be
growing faster than that in the United States. Canada's
multicultural heritage is recognized in section 27 of the 1982
45. For arguments that the Patriot Act was comparatively mild and that it did
not authorize the pretextual use of immigration law, the abuse of grand jury
material witness warrants, military detention of citizens suspected of terrorism
(such as Jose Padilla), or warrantless spying by the National Security Agency, see
ROACH, THE 9/11 EFFECT, supra note 19, at 161-235.
46. For arguments about the pervasive pretextual nature of American
criminal law enforcement, see WILLIAM J. STUNTZ, THE COLLAPSE OF AMERICAN
CRIMINALJUSTICE 301-02 (2011).
47. For foreign-born statistics from the Organisation for Economic Co-
operation and Development (OECD), see Statistics From A to Z, OECD,
http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888932502904 (last visited Apr. 15, 2012).
48. Between 1991 and 2001, Canada's Muslim population doubled from
253,000 to 579,640. At present, Islam is the largest non-Christian religion in
Canada with an estimated 2010 population of 940,000, compared to an estimated
American population of 2.6 million. One estimate suggests that in 2030, Canada
will have a Muslim population of 2.7 million compared to an estimated 6.2 million
Muslims in the United States at that time. Kent Roach, Canadian National Security
Policy and Canadian Muslim Communities, in MUSLIMS IN WESTERN POLITICS 219, 220-
21 (2009); The Global Muslim Population, THE PEW FORUM ON RELIGION & PUB. LIFE
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Charter of Rights and Freedoms," which instructs Canadian courts
to interpret all Charter rights in a manner consistent with Canada's
multicultural heritage. Immigration in Canada has not been
viewed through the lens of illegal immigration as has often been
the case in the United States. There is some evidence that
Canadians view both immigration and multiculturalism more
positively than Americans. 0
III. THE PRE-9/11 EXPERIENCE WITH TERRORISM IN CANADA AND
THE UNITED STATES
In a recent comparative examination of counter-terrorism
practices in nine countries, I concluded that while 9/11 led to an
increased emphasis on security over liberty in all of them, there
were also strong continuities in each country's response to
terrorism before and after 9/11.5 This. finding suggests that it
would be a mistake to forget each country's different national
security traditions.
A. The Canadian Experience
Canada's experience with terrorism illustrates the dangers of
both over-reaction and under-reaction that remain relevant to this
day. The experience of over-reaction relates to the declaration of
martial law in October 1970 in response to two terrorist
kidnappings, an event that continues to influence Canadian
counter-terrorism to this day. The danger of under-reaction relates
to the planting of two bombs on Air India planes in 1985. These
bombings resulted in 331 deaths, the most deadly act of aviation
terrorism prior to 9/11. They also revealed failures and weaknesses
that continue to present challenges for Canadian terrorism
52
investigations and prosecutions today.
49. See Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution
Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act, 1982, c. II (U.K.).
50. Frank L. Graves, The Shifting Public Outlook on Risk and Secuity, 4 ONE
ISSUE, Two VOICES 10, 14 (2005), http://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files
/threats.pdf.
51. ROACH, THE 9/11 EFFECT, supra note 19, at 441-42.
52. 1 COMMissioN OF INQUIRY INTO THE INVESTIGATION OF THE BOMBING OF AIR
INDIA FLIGHT 182 (2010) [hereinafter COMMISSION OF INQUIRY REPORT, VOL. 1].
This inquiry contains five volumes, the first two examine the pre- and post-
bombing history, but the last three examine continued problems in managing the
relation between intelligence and evidence, conducting terrorism prosecutions,
countering terrorism financing, and achieving aviation security. Note that the
17132012]
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1. The October Crisis
In October 1970, the federal government declared martial law
under the War Measures Act 3 after two separate cells of the Front
de Liberation du Quebec (FLQ) kidnapped a Quebec politician
and a British diplomat. Troops filled the streets of Montreal and
exercised wide and warrantless search and arrest powers. The FLQ
was declared an illegal organization and membership in it was
made a crime subject to five years imprisonment. The courts
eventually dismissed a challenge to this law as a retroactive crime
and an infringement of judicial powers. Following British
practices in Northern Ireland, those suspected of being a member
or supporter of an unlawful organization could be detained
without judicial review or access to habeas corpus relief for up to
twenty-one days. 5 Almost 500 persons were detained and only
eighteen of these were ever convicted of an offense, including the
murder of one of the kidnapped victims.
The October Crisis left scars on Canadian society and has had
a lasting influence on Canadian counter-terrorism. It increased
support for the enactment of a constitutional bill of rights, the
Charter, in 1982. It also influenced an Emergencies Act that allows
Parliament to review executive declarations of emergencies and
requires the appointment of public inuiries to review executive
conduct during declared emergencies. Illegal activities by the
Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) against suspected
terrorists in the aftermath of the October Crisis led to the
appointments of both provincial and federal public inquiries. The
federal inquiry made recommendations which led to legislation
enacted in 1984 that removed national security intelligence
collection from the RCMP and transferred it to the Canadian
Security Intelligence Service (CSIS), a civilian security intelligence
agency that does not have law enforcement powers. CSIS is
reviewed by an independent review body, the Security Intelligence
Review Committee (SIRC), which has full access to secret
author served as director of research (legal studies) to this inquiry.
53. War Measures Act, S.C. 1914, c. 2 (Can.).
54. Gagnon v. The Queen, [1971] 14 C.R.N.S. 321 (Can. Que. C.A.).
55. Public Orders Regulation, SOR/1970-44 (Can.).
56. Dominique Clement, The October Crisis of 1970: Human Rights Abuses Under
the War Measures Act, 42J. CANADIAN STUD. 160, 167 (2008).
57. Emergencies Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. 22 (Can.); see Kim Lane Scheppele, North
American Emergencies: The Use of Emergency Powers in Canada and the United States, 4
INT'LJ. CONsT. L. 213, 231 (2006).
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information and can conduct audits as well as hear complaints
against CSIS.58
The memory of the October Crisis, in addition to concerns
about compliance with the Charter, help explain why Canada's
Anti-Terrorism Act 9 (ATA), enacted after 9/11, did not criminalize
membership in a terrorist organization. Although influenced by
British law, the ATA was more restrained. For example, the ATA
provided new powers of preventive arrests, but limited them to
seventy-two hours,60 as compared to British laws that topped out at
twenty-eight days but only after Parliament resisted calls by Prime
Ministers Blair and Brown to raise them to forty-two and ninety
61
days. Canada's ATA included an innovative and controversial new
criminal justice power-the investigative hearing-but balanced it
with use and derivative-use immunity protections broader than
those imposed on testimony that is compelled by American grand
juries. Canadian investigative hearings, unlike American grand
juries, provided for the safeguards of a presiding judge and counsel
being present while a person was compelled to testify. The
Supreme Court of Canada upheld these hearings under the
63
Charter in 2004. Perhaps in recognition of the prior abuses of
judicially compelled incommunicado questioning during Canada's
1946 Gouzenko spy inquiry,6 the Court ruled that investigative
hearings would be subject to the open court presumption despite
arguments by dissenting judges that publicity would undermine the
65
investigative value of the hearings. Despite these restraints,
58. Canadian Security Intelligence Service Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-23 Part III
(Can.).
59. Anti-Terrorism Act, S.C. 2001, c. 41 (Can.).
60. Criminal Code of Canada, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46, s. 83.3, amended by S.C.
2001, c.41 (Can.).
61. CLIVE WALKER, TERRORISM AND THE LAw § 4.47 (2011).
62. Criminal Code of Canada, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46, s. 83.28(10) (Can.). See
generally Kent Roach, The Consequences of Compelled Self-Incrimination in Terrorism
Investigations: A Comparison of American Grand Juries and Canadian Investigative
Hearings, 30 CARDozo L. REv. 1089 (2008).
63. In re An Application Under Section 83.28 of the Criminal, [2004] 2 S.C.R.
248, paras. 3-4 (Can.).
64. The Gouzenko spy inquiry was triggered by Canadian fears that nuclear
secrets, primarily American and British secrets, were leaked and featured
incommunicado detention of suspected spies who were required by two Supreme
Court judges to answer questions without the benefit of counsel or automatic and
derivative use immunity of their compelled statements. See ROBERT BOTHWELL &
J.L. GRANATSTEIN, THE GOUZENKO TRANSCRIPTS: THE EVIDENCE PRESENTED TO THE
KELLOCK-TASCHEREAU ROYAL COMMISSION OF 1946 (1982).
65. Vancouver Sun v. Canada (Att'y Gen.), [2004] 2 S.C.R. 332, paras. 4, 60.
17152012]
15
Roach: Uneasy Neighbors: Comparative American and Canadian Counter-Terro
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2012
WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW
Canadian investigative hearings, as well as preventive arrest powers,
were allowed to expire in 2007 subject to a statutory sunset, though
a new majority Conservative government is expected to soon
reenact them.
2. The Air India Bombings and Failed Terrorism Prosecutions
If the 1970 October Crisis was a lasting lesson about the
dangers of over-reacting to threats to national security, the 1985 Air
India bombings should have been a stark reminder of the dangers
of under-reacting. The twin Air India bombings, however, were not
fully internalized in Canada, because they were seen as events
involving Sikh terrorists aimed at government of India targets,
despite the fact that the two bombs were planted on planes in
Canada by Canadian citizens and most of the 331 people killed in
the bombings were Canadian citizens. The criminal trial of two
men alleged to have been involved in the bombings ended in
66
acquittals in 2005. In 2006, a public inquiry was appointed to
examine the bombings. Its five volume report is entitled A
Canadian Tragedy in order to emphasize Canadian responsibility for
failing to prevent the bombings and for the poor investigation of
the bombings. In a manner somewhat similar to the findings of the
9/11 Commission, the Air India Commission concluded that the
bombings might have been prevented had the intelligence held by
the police, Air India, CSIS (then Canada's brand new civilian
intelligence service), and Canada's Signals Intelligence Agency
been better distributed. It also documented how the post-bombing
investigation was marred by a lack of cooperation between CSIS
and the RCMP, including CSIS's routine destruction of wiretaps,
and the poor handling and protection of witnesses.
Canada has had a troubled history with respect to terrorism
investigations and prosecutions. The prosecution of the suspected
mastermind of the Air India bombings for conspiring to commit
acts of terrorism in India collapsed in 1987 when a judge ordered
that a wiretap warrant could not be sustained under the Charter
without the disclosure of information that would reveal the identity
of an informer. The judge stressed that the Charter provided the
accused with a right to disclosure. Even if the accused was engaged
in "a fishing expedition" in demanding disclosure of the
66. R. v. Malik, 2005 BCSC 350, para. 1345 (Can.).
67. COMMIsSION OF INQUIRY REPORT, VOL. 1, supra note 52, at 1-2.
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information used to obtain the wiretap, the court ruled that the
accused was fishing in "constitutionally-protected waters." 61 The
prosecution decided to drop the case rather than expose the
informer.6 Another case of an alleged conspiracy to blow up
another Air India 747 aircraft, this time one departing from New
York in 1986, resulted in a stay of proceedings because the
prosecution was unwilling to disclose the identity of an informer
who had acted as a police agent in cooperation with both the
RCMP and the FBI.
The Air India inquiry warned in 2010 that many problems in
translating intelligence into evidence and conducting terrorism
investigations persisted.I The Canadian government has, however,
refused to follow major recommendations of the inquiry relating to
increasing powers of the Prime Minister's national security advisor
to resolve disputes between the RCMP and CSIS (and other security
agencies), to create a specialized Director of Terrorism
Prosecutions with responsibilities for both prosecutions and secrecy
proceedings, and to allow trial judges as opposed to a specialized
part of the Federal Court to determine whether unused
intelligence must be disclosed to the accused. The 1985 Air India
bombing and its aftermath provides some support for American
concerns that Canada is a potential weak link in counter-terrorism.
68. R. v. Parmar, (1987) 61 O.R. 2d 132 (Can. Ont. Sup. Ct.).
69. See Kent Roach, The Unique Challenges of Terrorism Prosecutions: Towards a
Workable Relation Between Intelligence and Evidence, SSRN, 141-144 (May 1, 2010),
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1629227.
70. The Supreme Court of Canada affirmed the importance of disclosure in
R. v. Khela, [1995] 4 S.C.R. 201 (Can.). An attempt to conduct a third trial
resulted in a stay of proceedings on the basis that the prosecution refused to
comply with broad disclosure rules requiring information about informers to be
disclosed when they act as agents.
71. 3 COMMIsSION OF INQUIRY INTO THE INVESTIGATION OF THE BOMBING OF AIR
INDIA FLIGHT 182 REPORT 344-50 (2010) [hereinafter COMMISSION OF INQUIRY
REPORT, VOL. 3].
72. Gov'T oF CAN., AcTiON PLAN: THE GOVERNMENT OF CANADA RESPONSE TO
THE COMMISSION OF INQUIRY INTO THE INVESTIGATION OF THE BOMBING OF AIR INDIA
FLIGHT 182 (2010), available at http://www.publicsafety.gc.ca/prg/ns/ail82/_fl
/res-rep-eng.pdf [hereinafter RESPONSE TO THE COMMISSION OF INQUIRY]; see also
MINISTER OF PUB. SAFETY, CANADA BUILDING RESILIENCE AGAINST TERRORISM:
CANADA'S COUNTER-TERRORISM STRATEGY (2011), available at
http://www.publicsafety.gc.ca/prg/ns/fl/2012-cts-eng.pdf (neither response nor
plan contemplates enhanced role for the prime minister's national security
advisor, the creation of a Director of Terrorism Prosecutions or allowing trial
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3. The Ahmed Ressam Case
The case of Ahmed Ressam, the would-be Millennium bomber,
underlines American security concerns about both Canada's
immigration and criminal justice systems. Ressam entered Canada
in 1994 on a false passport but was released pending his refugee
claim. His refugee claim was denied in 1995, but no arrest warrant
was issued. In any event, there was a reluctance to deport people to
Algeria, Ressam's country of citizenship. He left Canada in 1998
for an al Qaeda training camp in Afghanistan, but subsequently
reentered Canada under a false passport and name. He was
apprehended by an alert American border official in December
1999 with fifty kilograms of explosives and false Canadian
identification. Ressam has subsequently been convicted of
terrorism in both the United States and France, but not Canada.
The judge who convicted Ressam in the United States and
sentenced him to twenty-two years imprisonment (a sentence
subsequently overturned on appeal as too lenient) stressed that the
conviction demonstrated the ability of the American criminal
justice system to convict terrorists "in the sunlight of a public trial.
There were no secret proceedings, no indefinite detention, no
denial of counsel."7 5 In contrast, Canada relied upon immigration
law and extradition proceedings with respect to other alleged
76
members of Ressam's cell with varying levels of success. The use
73. United States v. Ressam, 593 F.3d 1095, 1098-99 (9th Cir. 2010) (ruling
that a twenty-two-year sentence was too lenient). Another accomplice was
convicted of assisting Ressam and sentenced to twenty-four years imprisonment.
United States v. Meskini, 319 F.3d 88, 90-91 (2nd Cir. 2003). The United States
did not receive much help from Canada in the prosecution because CSIS had, in
accordance with its standard practices, destroyed 400 hours of electronic
surveillance on Ressam after making summaries. A CSIS agent was reluctant but
finally did testify at Ressam's trial. KERRY PITHER, DARK DAYs: THE STORY OF FOUR
CANADIANS TORTURED IN THE NAME OF FIGHTING TERROR 33-34 (2008). The same
CSIS policy resulted in destruction of wiretap recordings and other raw
intelligence in the Air India investigation and was found to violate the accused's
rights. See R. v. Malik & Bagri, 2005 BCSC 350, para. 1000 (Can.). The Canada
Supreme Court held in 2008 that the CSIS policy was based on an incorrect
interpretation of its enabling legislation and discounted the overlap between
intelligence and evidence. Charkaoui v. Canada, [2008] 2 S.C.R. 326, paras. 11,
60-64.
74. STEWART BELL, COLD TERROR: How CANADA NURTURES AND EXPORTS
TERRORISM AROUND THE WORLD 143 (2004).
75. Hal Bernton & Sara Jean Green, RessanJudge Decries U.S. Tactics, SEATTLE
TIMES,July 28, 2005, http://seattletimes.nwsource.com/html/localnews
/2002406378_ressam27m.html.
76. Immigration law was used in In re Ikhlef, [2002] F.C.T. 263 (Can.)
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of immigration measures meant that Canada could use secret
evidence that did not expose domestic and foreign intelligence to
disclosure. Canada's reliance on extradition meant that Canadian
courts deferred to executive requests and that the United States,
not Canada, prosecuted Ressam. It also meant that Canada did not
develop experience in terrorism prosecutions.
Counter-terrorism criminal investigations in Canada have
historically been difficult because of tensions between Canada's
(security certificate against alleged member of the terrorist cell found to be
reasonable); In re Charkaoui, [2009] F.C. 1030 (Can.) (security certificate against
alleged member of Ressam cell declared void after government withdrew
information rather than disclose it to the detainee); Fathi v. Canada (Citizenship
and Immigration), [2011] F.C. 558 (Can.) (alleged member of cell found to be
inadmissible for admission to Canada). The detainee in Charkaoui won two
victories in the Supreme Court which led to the creation of security-cleared special
advocates who can see and challenge secret evidence used in the case and the
retention of raw intelligence to enable adversarial challenge. Charkaoui v. Canada
(Citizenship and Immigration), [2007] 1 S.C.R. 350 (Can.); Charkaoui v. Canada
(Citizenship and Immigration), [2008] 2 S.C.R. 326 (Can.). Extradition was used
in France (Republic) v. Ouzghar, 2009 ONCA 69 (Can. Ont. C.A.) (alleged
member of Ressam's cell extradited to France on terrorism charges) and in the
Mokhtar Haoari case which resulted in terrorism convictions in the United States.
United States v. Meskini, 319 F.3d 88 (2d Cir. 2003). Another alleged member of
the Ressam cell, Ahcene Zemiri, who resided in Canada from 1994 to June 2001,
has been detained at Guantanamo Bay, and Canadian courts have rejected his
request for disclosure of material obtained from him at Guantanamo by Canadian
intelligence officials on the basis that he is not a Canadian citizen. Slahi v. Canada
(Minister of Justice), [2009] F.C. 160 (Can.). A Canadian citizen who knew
Ressam and testified for the prosecution in his American terrorism prosecution
has been ordered by Canadian courts to be allowed to return to Canada from
Sudan after Canada denied him travel documents. Abdelrazik v. Canada (Minister
of Foreign Affairs), [2009] F.C. 580 (Can.). The man, Abousfian Abdelrazik, was
delisted by the U.N. 1267 committee in December 2011 on the recommendation
of the Ombudsperson, with Canada taking no position on the delisting but leaking
intelligence reports that alleged that he discussed a terrorist plot in 2000 with Adil
Charkaoui, another associate of Abdelrazik. CSIS File Reveals Plot to Bomb Plane: La
Presse, CBC NEWS: POLITICS (Aug. 5, 2011, 10:06 PM), http://www.cbc.ca/news
/politics/story/2011 /08/05/pol-la-presse-plane-plot.html. The accuracy of these
untested intelligence leaks is not known, but Canada's failure to commence
terrorism prosecutions against Charkaoui, Abdelrazik, or any other associate of
Ahmed Ressam underlines Canada's reluctance and caution in using criminal
terrorism prosecutions.
77. Until 2001, when Canadian courts required assurances that the death
penalty would not be applied, Canadian courts took a deferential approach to
extradition requests. See Thomas Rose, A Delicate Balance: Extradition, Sovereignty,
and Individual Rights in the United States and Canada, 27YALEJ. OF INT. L. 183 (2002)
(examining Canada's changed stance on extradition in the context of American
extradition requests in terrorism cases). Compare In re Ng, [1991] 2 S.C.R. 858
(Can.), with United States v. Burns, [2001] 1 S.C.R. 283 (Can.).
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civilian intelligence agency, which has been concerned about
developing secret sources and methods, and police and
prosecutors, who are concerned about collecting and disclosing
evidence in prosecutions. These tensions resulted in a flawed
investigation of the 1985 Air India bombings.7 Although Canada's
use of immigration law as anti-terrorism law avoids some of the
disclosure problems of criminal prosecutions, it also results in
other problems, including successful Charter challenges about the
fairness of using secret evidence, and problems related to the
deportation of suspected terrorists to countries such as Egypt and
Syria where they may be tortured.79  Although Canada has had
more success in recent terrorism investigations and prosecutions,
most notably in relation to a terrorist plot in Toronto, many
challenges remain. In large part, the challenges are related to
Canada's status as a net importer of intelligences and its
consequent concerns about the disclosure of foreign intelligence
under broad disclosure rules that apply in Canadian criminal
trials."
B. The American Experience
As David Cole has argued when comparing American and
British counter-terrorism, 1 those outside the United States often
fail to appreciate that much American counter-terrorism both
78. COMMISsIoN OF INQUIRY REPORT, VOL. 1, supra note 52, at 1-2.
79. In addition to the use of immigration law against many of the persons
alleged to be part of the Ressam cell, immigration law was also used with respect to
four other non-citizens alleged to be associated with al Qaeda in the period
immediately before and after 9/11. One of these security certificates involving a
man from Syria has been declared to be unreasonable. In re Almrei, [2009] F.C.
1263 (Can.). In the other cases, the detainees have been released on a form of
house arrest. See Kent Roach, Canada's Response to Terrorism, GLOBAL ANTI-
TERRORISM LAW AND POLIcY2D 525-29 (Victor V. Ramraj et al. eds., 2012).
80. Charkaoui v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), [2007] 1 S.C.R. 350,
para. 68 (Can.); Ruby v. Canada (Solicitor Gen.), [2002] 4 S.C.R. 3, para. 44
(Can.).
81. R. v. McNeil, [2009] 1 S.C.R. 66 (Can.) (discussing the requirement for
the prosecutor to obtain relevant documents from third parties, which in
terrorism prosecutions could include the Canadian Security Intelligence Service);
R. v. Stinchcombe, [1991] 3 S.C.R. 326 (Can.) (discussing the constitutional
requirement to disclose all relevant non-privileged information held by the
prosecutor without regard to whether the information is incriminating or
exculpatory).
82. David Cole, English Lessons: A Comparative Analysis of UK and US Responses to
Terrorism, 62 CuRRENT LEGAL PROBS. 136 (2009).
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before and after 9/11 has focused on external enemies of the
United States and acts of terrorism outside of the United States."
This military tradition helps explain the post 9/11 reliance on
military detention at Guantanamo and other military venues, the
important role of targeted killings, and recent legislation giving the
executive the option of using military detention and trials against
non-citizens suspected of involvement with al Qaeda. As seen
above, Canada has also used the military in counter-terrorism
during the October Crisis, but this is generally seen as an over-
reaction. American reliance on the strong force of the military is
also related to the relative weakness of the American domestic state
in responding to terrorism within the United States. Terrorism
legislation, including the much-maligned Patriot Act, has stopped
short of criminalizing membership in a terrorist group or even
authorizing preventive arrests. The restraints placed on the
American state are, however, counterbalanced by a long tradition
of deferring to the executive in national security matters.
1. The Military Tradition
Although many Europeans and Canadians instinctively see
terrorism as a crime, there is a long tradition pre-dating 9/11 in the
United States of using military force to respond to terrorism. The
Reagan administration developed a doctrine of using military force
against terrorism after suicide bombings in Lebanon killed
hundreds of Marines and other Americans. Military force was
used against Libya in 1986 following a bombing of a German disco
and resulted in much international criticism.8 ' Twenty-three cruise
missiles were directed against Iraqi intelligence targets as a
response to a 1993 plot to assassinate President George H. W.
Bush." Similarly, as responses to al Qaeda's 1998 bombings of two
American embassies in Africa, Tomahawk missiles were launched
against sites in Afghanistan and Sudan and attempts were made to
83. Id.
84. Jackson Nyamuya Maogoto, Walking an International Law Tightrope: Use of
Military Force to Counter Terrorism-Willing the Ends, 31 BROOK.J. INT'L L. 405, 429-
30 (2006).
85. Stephen Erlanger, 4 Guilty in Fatal 1986 Berlin Disco Bombing Linked to
Libya, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 14, 2001, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2001/11/14
/world/4-guilty-in-fatal-1986-berlin-disco-bombing-linked-to-libya.html.
86. David Von Drehle & R.Jeffrey Smith, U.S. Strikes Iraq for Plot to Assassinate
Bush, WASH. PosT, June 27, 1993, at A01.
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kill Osama bin Laden. The military was used in 1979 in an
unsuccessful attempt to free American hostages held in Iran. " The
American emphasis on the use of the military as an instrument of
counter-terrorism is related to a perception of the threat as
primarily external to the United States. At the same time, however,
it is also related to perceptions that the domestic legal system
restrains the forcefulness of the response to domestic terrorism.
Thus the CIA is limited to external threats while the United States
lacks a domestic intelligence agency.
The American attraction to a war model of terrorism is in part
related to- perceptions of the limits on how far the crime model can
accommodate the challenges of prosecuting terrorism. There is
also a confidence that military responses to terrorism will not spill
into the domestic arena given the restraints of the Posse Comitatus
Act and a general reluctance to apply military options to
American citizens.90 The idea that terrorism is a threat primarily
located outside the United States also helps to explain provisions
that prohibit the transfer of Guantanamo detainees to the United
States.91
In Canada, there are still painful memories of troops
patrolling the streets of Montreal in an attempt to stop terrorism.
Moreover, there is a recognition that Canada's most significant
terrorist threats have come from Canadian citizens first in the
October Crisis and later in the Air India bombings and the post
9/11 Toronto terrorist plot. A comparison of American and
Canadian counter-terrorism highlights the importance of military
responses in the United States both before and after 9/11, as well
as Canadian aversion to military responses that were used
domestically in October 1970.
87. ROACH, THE 9/11 EFFECT, supra note 19, at 169.
88. Amos N. Guiora, Legislative and Policy Responses to Terrorism, A Global
Perspective, 7 SAN DIEGO INT'L L.J. 125, 128 (2005).
89. 18 U.S.C. § 1385 (2006).
90. But see Munaf v. Geren, 553 U.S. 674 (2008) (giving deference to military
transfer of American citizens to Iraqi authorities); Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S.
507 (2004) (allowing detention of a citizen under the AUMF). Some new
provisions providing for law of war detention and trial of al Qaeda or associated
force members do not apply to American citizens. National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012, H.R. 1540, 112th Cong. § 1022 (b)(1)
(2012).
91. H.R. 1540, §§ 1023, 1026-27 (2011).
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2. Successful Criminal Prosecutions
Although many fear that terrorism prosecutions are too weak
of an instrument in the United States, a comparison with Canadian
terrorism prosecutions underlines the strength of American
prosecutions. Before 9/11, convictions and long sentences-and
in the case of Timothy McVeigh, the death penalty-were obtained
in terrorism prosecutions. This can be compared to the failure of
Canada in the Air India and related Sikh terrorism prosecutions,
which in total only resulted in one man being convicted of
manslaughter and perjury in relation to both bombings. After
9/11, the United States has recorded many terrorism convictions
and guilty pleas in terrorism cases."' American courts have
engaged in both procedural and substantive innovations in these
terrorism cases including broad and creative conspiracy charges
alleging "global jihad" and material support charges based on
individuals providing themselves to terrorist groups. American
courts have also used extra-territorial criminal jurisdiction to
prosecute acts of terrorism committed outside the United States.94
The United States has also been prepared to use pretextual
terrorism prosecutions resulting in lower sentences than might be
expected for actual crimes of terrorism. In Canada, there is not
96the same tradition of pretextual charges. As will be seen,
92. R. v. Reyat, 2011 BSCS 14 (Can.), available at http://canlii.ca/t/2f6dv
(discussing a man sentenced for perjury in relation to his testimony in the trial
that acquitted two other men of the Air India bombings); R. v. Reyat, 2003 BSCS
254 (Can.), available at http://canlii.ca/t/5db6 (discussing how the same man
pleads guilty to manslaughter in relation to the 1985 mid-air bombing of Air India
Flight 182 that killed 329 people); R. v. Reyat, 1991 CanLII 1371 (Can. B.C.S.C.),
available at http://canlii.ca/t/1crh9 (discussing how the same man was convicted
of manslaughter in relation to planting the bomb in the 1985 Narita explosion).
93. For recognition of the difficulties of terrorism prosecutions, but also their
viability and resilience compared to the alternatives, see Stephen I. Viadeck,
Terrorism Trials and the Article III Courts after Abu Ali, 88 TEx. L. REv. 1501 (2010);
and see also United States v. Moussaoui, 382 F.3d 453 (4th Cir. 2004); United
States v. Abu Marzook, 412 F. Supp. 2d 913 (N.D. Ill. 2006).
94. Robert M. Chesney, Beyond Conspiracy? Anticipatory Prosecution and the
Challenge of Unaffiliated Terrorism, 80 S. CAL. L. REV. 425 (2007); Robert Chesney &
Jack Goldsmith, Terrorism and the Convergence of Criminal and Military Detention
Models, 60 STAN. L. REV. 1079 (2008).
95. Robert M. Chesney, Federal Prosecution of Terrorism Related Offenses:
Conviction and Sentencing Data in Light of the "Soft-Sentence" and "Data-Reliability"
Critiques, 11 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 851 (2007); Todd Lochner, Sound and Fury:
Pretextual Prosecution and Department of]ustice Antiterrorism Efforts, 30 LAw & POL'Y
168 (2008).
96. The only example of a pretextual terrorism charge in Canada failed in
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Canadian reluctance to use pretextual or terrorism charges
appeared to frustrate American officials in both the Maher Arar
and Abdullah Khadr cases. Canadian reticence in this regard helps
explain why the United States rendered Maher Arar to Syria and
attempted, without success, to have Abdullah Khadr rendered to
the United States for trial.
3. Executive Dominance and Extra-Legalism
Legislative responses to terrorism have not been easy to
achieve in the American congressional system. The legislative
response to the first World Trade Center bombing and the 1995
Oklahoma City bombings did not come until 1996 and only after
bills that had proposed to criminalize membership in a terrorist
organization had been defeated on the basis that they would violate
the First Amendment.9 Even though enacted by overwhelming
majorities horrified by the killing of 168 people in the Oklahoma
City bombings, much of the 1996 Anti-Terrorism and Effective
Death Penalty Act focused on immigration law and attempts to
restrict habeas corpus review. There were important expansions of
the crime of material support of terrorism including the repeal of a
prohibition on the investigation of activities protected by the First
Amendment. Nevertheless, this expansion of the capacity of the
criminal justice system to deal with terrorism did not stop
arguments that military commissions as opposed to Article III
courts should try terrorists in order to avoid Miranda and other
constitutional restrictions placed on the domestic legal system.
These calls were radical before 9/11, but have become more
mainstream after 9/11 and have gained ground with the National
Defense Authorization Act enacted at the end of 2011.-9 Rightly or
wrongly,'o perceptions about the weakness of the American
2010 when child pornography seized by CSIS from a terrorism suspect was
excluded under the Charter because CSIS had not properly obtained a warrant to
search a computer. R. v. Mejid, 2010 ONSC 5532 (Can.).
97. Roberta Smith, America Tries to Come to Terms with Terrorism: The United
States Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 v. British Anti-Terrorism Law
and International Response, 5 CARDOZOJ. INT'L & COMP. L. 249 (1997).
98. Spencer J. Crona & Neil A. Richardson, Justice for War Ciminals of Invisible
Armies: A New Legal and Military Approach to Terrorism, 21 OKLA. CHtY U. L. REv. 349,
384-85 (1996).
99. National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012, H.R. 1540, 112th
Cong. §§ 1023, 1026-27 (2012).
100. For recognition of the difficulties of terrorism prosecutions, but also their
viability and resilience compared to the alternatives, see Vladeck, supra note 93.
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criminal justice system in responding to terrorism help explain
recent congressional restrictions on the ability to transfer
Guantanamo detainees for trial in federal courts in the United
States.'0 ' Real and perceived restrictions on the American state and
legislative responses to terrorism have encouraged use of executive
action that is not specifically authorized or regulated by legislation,
102
and use of military and foreign policy responses to terrorism.
Many have been shocked by the use of extra-legal counter-
terrorism by the United States as most dramatically revealed by the
use of torture in interrogations and incommunicado detention at
off-shore sites. Without in any way condoning such abuses, it is
important to understand the deep roots of extra-legal conduct in
the American national security tradition. President Lincoln's
suspension of habeas corpus review without congressional
authorization has been defended as an "extra-legal approach,"" as
has President Roosevelt's unwillingness o0 to hand over German
saboteurs had the Supreme Court not ratified their military trial in
Ex parte Quirin.'0' Extra-legal measures, as defended by Oren Gross,
are acts that are done in knowing violation of legal restraints, but
are restrained by the possibility that a person who engages in such
measures may subsequently be held criminally or civilly liable.'
The prospect of subsequent prosecution or civil suit is meant to
restrain individual actions while the extra-legal approach means
that laws need not be permanently changed to accommodate
emergencies that may never end. A paradigmatic case might be the
actions of an interrogator who assaults, abuses, or tortures a
terrorist suspect to obtain information about the proverbial ticking
bomb, but in doing so is prepared to face the risk of subsequent
criminal prosecution. This may explain the situation in Israel
where there is no legislative authorization for enhanced
101. FIONA DE LONDRAs, DETENTION IN THE 'WAR ON TERROR': CAN HUMAN
RIGHTS FIGHT BACK? 124-27 (2011).
102. For arguments about the need for more counter-terrorism legislation in
the United States, see PHILIP BOBBITT, TERROR AND CONSENT (2008) and see also
LEGISLATING THE WAR ON TERROR: AN AGENDA FOR REFORM (Benjamin Wittes ed.,
2009).
103. RICHARD A. POSNER, NOT A SUICIDE PACT: THE CONSTITUTION IN A TIME OF
NATIONAL EMERGENCY 153-57 (2006).
104. JACK GOLDSMITH, THE TERROR PRESIDENCY: LAW AND JUDGMENT INSIDE THE
BUSH ADMINISTRATION 49-53, 102 (2007).
105. Ex Parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1 (1942).
106. Oren Gross, Chaos and Rules: Should Responses to Violent Crises Always Be
Constitutional?, 112 YALE L.J. 1011, 1111 (2003).
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interrogations and a ban on torture is maintained in the law, but
the courts have left open the possibility of a successful necessity
defense being raised after the fact. 0 7
An open willingness to engage in extra-legal conduct and risk
the consequences, however, does not capture the dynamic revealed
by the torture memos wherein the Office of Legal Counsel
narrowly and legalistically interpreted various restrictions on
torture and concluded that practices such as waterboarding were
not torture and were not illegal.' 8 This phenomenon is better
captured by what I have described elsewhere as extra-legalism. o0
Extra-legalism refers to the use of legalism so that what is in essence
illegal activity, such as torture, is preauthorized and masked by
claims of legality that also continue to serve to defeat meaningful
accountability for the conduct. Extra-legalism also covers other
legal doctrines such as political question, narrow standing, broad
state secrets, and absolute and qualified immunity that shelter
arguably illegal actions from meaningful judicial review. This
process helps explain why lawyers have played such a central role in
American counterterrorism policy."o It also helps to explain why
there have been so few successful attempts to hold officials
responsible for arguably extra-legal actions ranging from
extraordinary rendition, targeted killing, pretextual uses of
material witness warrants, immigration detention, military
detention, and warrantless spying.
The political question doctrine supports extra-legalism by
rendering some security related decisions legally immune from
judicial review. In addition, the broad states secret doctrine and
narrow standing doctrine also support extra-legalism by similarly
hindering judicial review of many security actions and civil lawsuits,
most notably the use of extraordinary renditions and targeted
killing. In 1992, the U.S. Supreme Court affirmed the Ker/Frisbie
doctrine by ruling that irregular rendition of a fugitive would not
107. HCJ 5100/94 Pub. Comm. Against Torture v. Israel, 53(4) PD 817 [1999]
(Isr.), available at http://elyonl.court.gov.il/fileseng/94/000/051/a09
/94051000.a09.pdf. Even in such instances, however, the restraints of the extra-
legal approach depend on the willingness to prosecute officials.
108. See Memorandum from Jay S. Bybee, Assistant Attorney General, to
Alberto R. Gonzales, Counsel to the President (Aug. 1, 2002), in THE TORTURE
PAPERS: THE ROAD TO ABU GHRAIB 172 (KarenJ. Greenberg &Joshua L. Dratel eds.,
2005).
109. ROACH, THE 9/11 EFFECT, supra note 19, at 164.
110. JACK GOLDSMITH, THE TERROR PRESIDENCY: LAW AND JUDGMENT INSIDE THE
BUSH ADMINISTRATION 129-34 (2007).
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deprive American courts of jurisdiction,"' and this was followed by
a post 9/11 decision in the same case dismissing a civil action
against the irregular rendition." Another form of extra-legalism is
the pretextual use of existing legal powers for preventive ends.
Pretextual law enforcement uses existing laws, but in unintended
ways. In the aftermath of 9/11, American officials revived
pretextual, or "Al Capone," strategies to hold noncitizens under
existing immigration laws and hold citizens under material witness
warrants for reasons of preventive detention related to suspicion of
terrorism." Here, as in other contexts, there is at best technical
and cynical observance of the law as the law is used for other ends.
Canadian and European perceptions" 4 of the United States as
a lawless cowboy in counter-terrorism need to be balanced with a
better understanding of how judicial review of many national
security activities in the United States is fettered by political
questions, state secrets, and limited standing and remedial
doctrines." What may appear to be extra-legal conduct may
frequently be a more complex matter in the United States that is
supported either by determinations in courts, or in the executive
branch, that the action is legal and/or claims that the legality of
the national security activity cannot be reviewed or remedied by the
courts.
There are erroneous perceptions that extra-legalism only
applies to conduct involving non-American citizens. These
perceptions stem from the fact that only non-American citizens are
detained at Guantanamo and subject to trial by military
commission. Nevertheless, extra-legalism is a feature of the
American legal system that does affect its citizens, at least in the
111. United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 504 U.S. 655, 660-62 (1992) (issuing a
holding consistent with Ker v. Illinois, 119 U.S. 436 (1886) and Frisbie v. Collins,
342 U.S. 519 (1952), that irregular renditions would not deprive American courts
of jurisdiction). On the role of these cases in laying the foundations for post 9/11
extraordinary renditions see Alan W. Clarke, Rendition to Torture: A Critical Legal
History, 62 RUTGERS L. REV. 1, 12-19 (2009).
112. Sosav. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692 (2004).
113. See Daniel C. Richman & WilliamJ. Stuntz, Al Capone's Revenge: An Essay on
the Political Economy ofPretextual Prosecution, 105 COLUM. L. REv. 583, 618-20 (2005).
114. For a good example of continued European criticism of American
counter-terrorism even under President Obama, see Manfred Nowak, et al., The
Obama Administration and Obligations Under the Convention Against Torture, 20
TRANSNAT'L L. & CoNTEMP. PROBS. 33 (2011).
115. For arguments that the American legal system supports what many in
other parts of the world see as extra-legal conduct, see ROACH, THE 9/11 EFFEcT,
supra note 19, at 161-237.
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national security context. A recent example of extra-legalism that
has deprived an American citizen of remedies is the refusal to allow
Jose Padilla's civil claim for his military detention to proceed on
the basis of special factors counseling hesitation in extending a
Bivens"' cause of action for violating constitutional rights in the
absence of specific Congressional authorization." In that case, the
courts denied a remedy to an American citizen on essentially the
same basis as they deprived a remedy to Maher Arar, a Canadian
citizen. Another similar example is the decision of a D.C. District
Court that Anwar al-Aulaqi's father did not have standing to
challenge his inclusion on a targeted kill list, which also hinted that
the political question and state secrets doctrines might preclude
the judicial challenge to the targeted killing of an American citizen
in any event. Extra-legalism should not be confused with openly
admitted extra-legal conduct. Indeed, the targeted killing of Anwar
al-Aulaqi was supported by the Obama administration's internal
legal interpretations about the legality of his targeted killing."'
Extra-legalism and executive dominance are established features of
the American national security tradition that intensified after 9/11.
4. Summary
The national security traditions of both Canada and the
United States have influenced the countries' responses to 9/11.
The domestic responses of both countries were restrained in part
by constitutional rights. For example, neither country followed the
British example of criminalizing membership in a terrorist group,
though Canada was more willing to experiment with new criminal
justice mechanisms such as preventive arrests and investigative
hearings. Canada did not want to over-react, as it did in the
October Crisis, but it also had to respond to real concerns about
116. Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403
U.S. 388 (1971).
117. Lebron v. Rumsfeld, 670 F.3d 540, 548 (4th Cir. 2012).
118. Al-Aulaqi v. Obama, 727 F. Supp. 2d 1 (D.D.C. 2010).
119. The memo, which has not yet been released, is said to conclude that the
killing was authorized by the 2001 AUMF, that statutes prohibiting the murder of
American citizens did not apply, and that the killing would neither be a war crime,
nor violate the Fourth or Fifth Amendments of the Bill of Rights. It also
reportedly notes that prosecution under Yemeni laws was possible, but not likely.
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harboring terrorists raised by the Ressam case as well as its troubled
pre-9/11 history of terrorism investigations and prosecutions. The
United States faced the challenges of real and perceived domestic
restraints, particularly with respect to criminal justice responses and
domestic invasions of privacy, coupled with much less restraint in
using the military or foreign intelligence agencies to respond to
terrorism. Although the Bush administration would receive much
international criticism, extra-legal conduct was part of the
American national security tradition long before 9/11. Similarly,
the American response to 9/11 drew on prior histories of using the
military to respond to terrorism and pretextual administration of
laws. The stage was already set before 9/11 for post-9/11
confrontations between aggressive American executive power
verging on the extra-legal, and more cautious Canadian restraint
that would be especially frustrating for the United States given
Canada's difficulties in conducting effective terrorism
investigations and prosecutions.
IV. MAHER ARAR: CONTRASTING CANADIAN AND AMERICAN
APPROACHES
Counter-terrorism, perhaps more so than other forms of
government policy, can be shaped by individual events and cases.
The phenomenon of counter-terrorism laws being enacted in
response to specific acts is well known, but the post-9/11 era has
seen a small number of cases shape general policies. For example,
there were real concerns that disclosure by the British courts in
Binyam Mohammed2 1 would adversely affect the sharing of
intelligence between the United Kingdom and the United States.
These concerns eventually motivated the British decision to settle
the civil claims made by Mohammed and other Guantanamo
detainees, to appoint a public inquiry to examine whether there
was British complicity with respect to torture in Guantanamo, and
to propose methods to use closed material to defend itself in civil
litigation. The Maher Arar case examined below similarly has had
a very large impact on Canadian national security policy. Although
the case in which a Canadian citizen transiting through the United
States was rendered to Syria would hopefully not be repeated today,
it reveals many of the challenges facing closer Canadian-American
120. Mohamed v. Sec'y of State for Foreign & Commonwealth Affairs, [2010]
EWCA (Civ) 65 (Eng.).
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security cooperation and the sharing of intelligence.
A. The Canadian Experience
1. Problematic Canadian Cooperation with American Post-9/11
Security Efforts
In the immediate aftermath of 9/11, there was much concern
about a second attack and Canadian security officials cooperated
with the United States in ways that have subsequently been found
to be improper in various Canadian reviews. The extent to which
Canadian officials were trying to make up for the Ressam case and
erroneous American impressions that some of the 9/11 terrorists
had entered the United States from Canada, or whether they were
simply motivated by post-9/11 security concerns, is not known.
Although the Maher Arar case is the best known, there are
other examples of extra-legal forms of Canadian-American
cooperation. The day after 9/11, Benamar Benatta, an asylum
seeker from Algeria suspected of involvement with terrorism, was
summarily transferred from Canadian custody to American
custody. He was held in the United States for five years. His
detention was part of pretextual post-9/11 uses of immigration laws
that led to the detention of thousands in the United States, uses
that were defended by Attorney General John Ashcroft who
warned, "Let the terrorists among us be warned: If you overstay
your visa-even by one day-we will arrest you."' This approach
harkens back to a long tradition of pretextual use of laws including
Al Capone's prosecution under income tax laws and Attorney
General Robert Kennedy's fight against organized crime.
Benatta was kept in solitary confinement in an immigration
detention facility in Brooklyn, New York and his detention
continued even after the FBI cleared him in November 2001 of any
involvement in terrorism. He was subsequently indicted on
carrying false identification papers before those charges were
dropped.1 Canada and the United States negotiated a deal that
allowed Benatta to return to Canada and he was granted refugee
121. John Ashcroft, U.S. Attorney General, Prepared Remarks for the U.S.
Mayors Conference (Oct. 25, 2001), available at http://www.justice.gov/archive/ag
/speeches/2001 /agcrisisremarks 1025.htm.
122. See Richman & Stuntz, supra note 113, at 584 n.3.
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status in Canada in 2007. He is now suing Canadian authorities for
transferring him to the United States without proper legal
process. As in the Arar case, the United States was most directly
responsible for Benatta's treatment, but he is seeking redress in
Canadian courts, in part because of perceptions that such redress
would not be available in American courts. American extra-
legalism can inspire litigants to litigate in other jurisdictions.
In April 2002, the CSIS transferred a Canadian citizen and
admitted al Qaeda member, Mohammed Mansour Jabarah, to the
United States after it was advised that Jabarah could not be
prosecuted in Canada because his crimes predated the 2001 Anti-
Terrorism Act, which was enacted in response to 9/11, and Security
Council Resolution 1373 and created new terrorist crimes in
Canada. Like Benatta, Jabarah was simply handed over to
American officials at the Niagara Falls border crossing without any
legal process. A review agency subsequently concluded that CSIS
had breached Jabarah's Charter right not to be arbitrarily detained,
his right to counsel, and his right to remain in Canada unless
subject to lawful extradition. Jabarah cooperated with American
officials and was sentenced to life imprisonment for plotting to
bomb U.S. embassies in Singapore and Malaysia.12 1
Maher Arar was a person of interest in a Canadian
investigation that focused on two suspects, Abdullah Almalki and
Ahmad El-Maati, both of whom are Canadian citizens. Both
Almalki and El-Maati voluntarily left Canada by November 2001,
but were subsequently detained and tortured in Syria before being
124. Benatta v. The Attorney Gen. of Canada, 2009 CarswellOnt 7946 (Can.
Ont. Sup. Ct.) (WL); Anushka Asthana, Domestic Detainee from 9/11 Released, WASH.
PosT,July 21, 2006, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article
/2006/07/20/AR2006072002007.html; Man, Claiming 'Illegally Transported' to U.S.
by Canada, Granted Refugee Status, CBC NEWS, Nov. 29, 2007, http://www.cbc.ca
/news/canada/toronto/story/2007/11/29/benemar-benatta.html.
125. Anti-terrorism Act, S.C. 2001, c. 41 (Can.). The new crimes include those
of terrorism financing and participating in a terrorist group for the purpose of
facilitating a terrorist activity. See Criminal Code of Canada, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46 §§
83.03, 83.18 (Can.) (as amended).
126. SEC. INTELLIGENCE REVIEW COMM., SIRC ANNUAL REPORT 2006-2007 18-23,
available at http://www.sirc-csars.gc.ca/pdfs/ar_2006-2007-eng.pdf.
127. United States v. Jabarah, 292 F. App'x 140 (2d Cir. 2008); Josh White &
Keith B. Richburg, Terror Informant for FBI Allegedly Targeted Agents, WASH. POST,
Jan. 19, 2008, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/01
/18/AR2008011803766_pf.html; see also STEWART BELL, THE MARTYR'S OATH: THE
APPRENTICESHIP OF A HOMEGROWN TERRORIST (2005); Terence McKenna, Passport to
Terror, CBC NEWS (Oct. 2004), http://www.cbc.ca/news/background/jabarah.
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released and allowed to return to Canada. By the end of
September 2001, the RCMP had sent foreign authorities
information identifying both men as associated with al Qaeda and
an "imminent threat" to the safety and security of Canada. An
inquiry headed by Frank lacobucci, a retired Justice of the
Supreme Court of Canada who was appointed to follow up from
the Arar inquiry, found that this and other information
subsequently played a role in the detention and torture of Almalki
and El-Maati in Syria. He also commented that even if the
suspicions that the men were associated with al Qaeda were correct,
the reference to an "imminent threat" was "inflammatory,
inaccurate and lacking investigative foundation.""" He stressed
that the description was sent to the United States:
Less than one month after the events of September 11,
2001, when governments around the world were under
intense pressure to cooperate and collaborate in the U.S.
'war on terror'. Several witnesses told the Inquiry that
U.S. agencies were exerting pressure on intelligence and
law enforcement agencies everywhere to detain and
question individuals who might in some way be implicated
in or supportive of another round of attacks. At this time,
being labeled a member or associate of al-Qaeda
potentially entailed serious 129 consequences for an
individual's rights and liberties.
Both Almalki and El-Maati have returned to Canada since their
release from Syria. They have never been charged with any
terrorism offense and they are presently suing the Canadian
130
government for their treatment.
2. "Caveats are down: "Post 9/11 Information Sharing
Maher Arar became a person of interest in the Almalki and El-
Maati investigation when he was observed in October 2001 having
128. HON. FRANK IACOBUCCI, INTERNAL INQUIRY INTO THE AcTiONS OF CANADIAN
OFFICIALS IN RELATION TO ABDULLAH ALMALKI, AHMAD ABou-ELMAATI AND MUYAYYED
NUREDDIN 400, para. 12 (2010).
129. Id. at 400-01, para.13; see also id. at 112, 349-51, 400-02; KERRY PITHER,
DARK DAYs: THE STORY OF FOUR CANADIANS TORTURED IN THE NAME OF FIGHTING
TERROR (2008).
130. The litigation is ongoing and a security cleared amicus has been
appointed to assist with state secrecy claims. See Canada (Att'y Gen.) v. Almalki,
[2011] F.C. 199 (Can.) (holding that the judge erred in granting disclosure of
documents covered by the Third Party Rule); Canada (Att'y Gen.) v. Almalki,
[2011] F.C. 54 (Can.) (relating to the appointment of amicus curiae).
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lunch and walking in the rain with Almalki. Although Arar was
never a target of the investigation, by the end of October 2001, the
RCMP had requested that both Canadian and American customs
officials impose terrorism border lookouts for both Arar and his
wife. From October 2001 to the summer of 2002, the RCMP freely
shared information with American officials in an environment that
was described by some RCMP officers as "caveats are down."
Caveats are restrictions that intelligence and law enforcement
generally place on information shared in an attempt to maintain
control over the information and ensure that it is not shared
further or used for other purposes without the consent of the
agency that originally distributed the information. The height of
this information sharing occurred in April 2002 when the RCMP
transferred to American agencies three CD's containing entire
investigative files, including the fruits of Canadian searches and
customs inspections, without attaching caveats to the materials or
reviewing the material for relevance or reliability.
The shared material included a copy of a previous request by
the RCMP to U.S. Customs requesting a lookout for Arar and his
wife and identifying them both as "Islamic Extremist individuals
suspected of being linked to the al Qaeda terrorist movement."3
The Canadian public inquiry that subsequently examined the
holdings of all Canadian officials on Arar concluded that there was
no evidence to support this characterization of Arar. It noted:
Everyone who testified accepts that this description
["Islamic Extremist individuals suspected of being linked
to the Al Qaeda terrorist movement"] was wrong and
should not have been given to the Americans. There was
no basis for such an assertion. The request was sent to
U.S. Customs in late October 2001, but it was also given
directly to the American agencies five months later, in
April 2002. The potential consequences of labeling
someone an Islamic Extremist in post-9/11 America are
134enormous.
131. 1 CoMMIssIoN OF INQUIRY INTO THE ACTIONS OF CANADIAN OFFICIALS IN
RELATION TO MAHER ARAR REPORT 38 (2006).
132. Id. at 93-94. The report also contained material that CSIS had shared
with the RCMP but subject to caveats and without obtaining CSIS' consent for the
disclosure of the information to American agencies. Id. at 95, 97. The FBI also
supplied the RCMP with information that it had previously shared with CSIS but
that CSIS had not shared with the RCMP. Id. at 90-91.
133. Id. at 95.
134. COMMIssIoN OF INQUIRY ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 4, at
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The Canadian inquiry could not determine the exact role that
the Canadian information played in Arar's detention in New York
City in September 2002 and his subsequent transfer to Syria by way
of Jordan, because the U.S. government declined an invitation to
participate in the inquiry. It nevertheless concluded it was "very
likely" that "American authorities relied on information provided
by the RCMP." 13 5
From the start of the Canadian investigation, American
officials asked Canadian officials to charge and detain various
suspects. At a September 22, 2001, meeting, the RCMP indicated
that it was not prepared to detain the named individuals at that
time. 3 A RCMP officer told the FBI, during a phone call on the
weekend before Arar's removal to Syria in October 2002, that there
was not enough evidence either to charge Arar criminally if he was
returned to Canada or to prevent his entry to Canada. ' This
information may well have influenced the United States' decision
that Arar would be a threat to the United States if allowed to return
to Canada and that consequently he should be sent to Syria.
Although he admits that it is only speculation, Fred Hitz, a former
CIA officer and the first Inspector General for the CIA, has stated:
I can only conclude that, when the RCMP stated it would
have no basis on which to hold Arar if he were returned to
Canada, the United States assumed that Canada would be
obliged to object to his transfer to Syria. Perhaps the U.S.
authorities assumed that the Canadians were strapped in
what they could do and, since they appeared to believe
that Arar was tied to Al Qaeda, they decided it was best to
remove him to Syria for further questioning without
involving the RCMP in what for them would have been an
impossible decision.'3
The Canadian officials were justified in their decision not to
24-25.
135. Id. at 14, 157. The inquiry noted that "on many occasions after the event,
several American officials, including then Secretary of State Colin Powell, said that
the American authorities had relied on information provided by Canada in
making the decision to send Mr. Arar to Syria." Id. at 30.
136. COMMIsSION OF INQUIRY REPORT, VOL. 1, supra note 52, at 14.
137. COMMIssIoN OF INQUIRY ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 4, at
29; COMMISSION OF INQUIRY REPORT, VOL. 1, supra note 52, at 168-69.
138. Frederick P. Hitz, Tighten Up the Terms of Cooperation-Don't End It!, in ONE
ISSUE TWo VOICES: INTELLIGENCE SHARING BETWEEN CANADA AND THE UNITED STATES:
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detain or charge Arar because they had no evidence that would
support such a charge. As mentioned above, Canada did not have
the same tradition of pretextual uses of the criminal law and did
not follow American practices of using immigration law and
material witness warrants pretextually after 9/11 as a means to
detain terrorist suspects and associates of terrorist suspects." It is
possible that Canadian rectitude in this respect may have
influenced American decisions that Canada could not be trusted to
detain Arar and that Syria was a better option. 40
3. The Public Inquiry
The Arar story attracted widespread attention in both Canada
and the United States. This attention increased after Arar was
freed by Syria in October 2003 and returned to Canada. Separate
complaints were made on his behalf to the public complaints
commissions for the RCMP and the review body for the Canadian
Security Intelligence Service. However, these were pre-empted by a
decision made by the Canadian government in late January 2004 to
appoint a public inquiry run by a respected sitting appellate court
judge, Dennis O'Connor, to examine the actions of all Canadian
officials in relation to Arar. The decision to appoint the inquiry in
this case (commonly called either the Arar inquiry after its subject
or the O'Connor inquiry after the presiding judge) came only after
the RCMP searched the home and office of an Ottawa newspaper
reporter as part of an investigation about leaked information about
Arar.14' The spectacle of the search of a reporter's home seemed to
139. Immigration law was used as anti-terrorism law in Canada but generally in
a more focused manner than the post-9/11 U.S. round-ups. In August 2003,
twenty-one non-citizens in Canada from Pakistan were initially detained under
Canadian immigration law on security grounds with allegations that they
constituted an al Qaeda cell, but none were found to be a security threat though
some were found to be in Canada illegally. See Kent Roach, Canada's Response to
Terrorism, supra note 79, at 523-24. One recent attempt in Canada to bring child
pornography charges against a person repeatedly interviewed by CSIS failed when
the court excluded the evidence after finding that CSIS had conducted an
unconstitutional search of his computer to obtain the pornography. R. v. Mejid,
2010 ONSC 5532 (Can.).
140. For arguments that the U.S. decision to send Arar to detention in Syria
rather than surveillance in Canada was part of a "preventive paradigm," see Jules
Lobel, Extraordinary Rendition and the Constitution: The Case of Maher Arar, 28 REv.
LITIG. 479, 487-89 (2008).
141. The Arar commission was strongly critical of these leaks which contained
information about what Arar was supposed to have told his Syrian interrogators,
and concluded that the leaks were a "deliberate act" and "purposefully misleading
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have motivated the federal Cabinet to make a discretionary
decision to appoint the inquiry.142
Public inquiries in Canada are generally high profile events,
typically lasting two years or more, involving public hearings and
media coverage, research, and multi-million dollar budgets. They
are called at the discretion of either the federal or provincial
governments and they are prohibited from making findings of
criminal or civil liability. Their recommendations are only advisory
for the government and are frequently not followed. Nevertheless,
public inquiries serve as important vehicles for organizational and
social accountability for various forms of misconduct and
disasters. 4 1 Public inquiries have played an important role in
national security matters, in part, because legislative committees in
Canada do not have access to secret information and are not
particularly well staffed. Canadian public inquiries are often called
'judicial inquiries" because they are generally headed by a sitting or
retired judge, even though they are technically part of the
executive and what has been called the "watchdog" or quasi-judicial
arm of the executive.144
The Arar inquiry provided accountability for government
in a way that was intended to do him harm" and "[i] t is disappointing that, to date,
no one has been held accountable." COMMISSION OF INQUIRY ANALYSIS AND
RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 4, at 263. The investigation of the leaks was
conducted under official secrets legislation that extended to possession of leaked
information. See O'Neill v. Canada (Att'y Gen.) (2006), 82 O.R. 3d 241, para. 1
(Can. Ont. Sup. Ct. J.). The offense of possessing leaked information was held to
be unconstitutionally vague and an unjustified restriction on freedom of
expression in a case brought by the Ottawa reporter who had her home searched.
Id. at para. 109. The investigation into the leaks has now been closed without any
arrests or charges. Jim Bronskill, RCMP Lays No Charges in Maher Arar 'Terrorist'
Leaks, Declares Case Closed, STATISMWATCH.CA (Sept. 3, 2008), http://statismwatch.ca
/2008/09/03/rcmp-lays-no-charges-in-maher-arar-terrorist-leaks-declares-case-
closed.
142. See Audrey Macklin, From Cooperation, to Complicity, to Compensation: The
War on Terr, Extraordinary Rendition, and the Cost of Torture, 10 EUR.J. MIGRATION &
L. 11, 14 (2008) (noting that "[a]s media attention and public pressure on the
government mounted" the inquiry was appointed).
143. Kent Roach, Canadian Public Inquiries and Accountability, in
ACCOUNTABILITY FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE 268, 269 (Philip C. Stenning ed., 1995)
(discussing "the distinctive ability of inquiries to hold organizations and society
accountable" in the context of "three recent Canadian public inquiries appointed
in response to concerns about the behavior of actors in the criminal process").
144. See Kent Roach, Review and Oversight of National Security Activities and Some
Reflections on Canada's Arar Inquiry, 29 CARDOZO L. REv. 53, 62 (2007) (noting that
public inquiries "are generally conducted by sitting or retired judges, which gives
public inquiries quasi-judicial qualities").
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responses to national security by examining the actions of various
police, intelligence, customs, and consular officials. It lasted two
years and featured subsequent litigation between the inquiry and
the Canadian government over the extent to which details in its
three volume report on the actions of Canadian officials in relation
to Maher Arar could be made public. 146  The Arar inquiry had
stronger powers to press for the release of classified information
than a subsequent internal inquiry on related questions,4 4 and
much more than the British inquiry into complicity with torture in
respect to Guantanamo detainees, which made the Cabinet of
elected ministers, and not the independent courts, the ultimate
arbitrator of what could be publicly disclosed. 1 It also had
stronger powers than the American Inspector General to insist on
access to classified information and, if necessary, to seek judicial
review in an attempt to disclose classified information.
The Arar inquiry made a number of recommendations
relating to the training and information sharing practices of
Canadian officials and also recommended policies and training to
prevent racial, religious, or ethnic profiling. It did not find
discriminatory profiling in Arar's case, but its recommendations on
this issue speak to sensitivity about such issues in Canada given its
multicultural population. The inquiry found that Canadian
agencies had sent mixed messages about whether they wanted Arar
145. See id. at 67 (noting that the inquiry "had jurisdiction to inquire into the
activities of all Canadian officials in relation to Maher Arar").
146. Canada (Att'y Gen.) v. Canada (Comm'n of Inquiry into the Activities of
Canadian Officials in Relation to Maher Arar), [2008] 3 F.C.R 248 (Can.)
(allowing publication of previously secret information in commission's report).
147. See FRANK IACOBUCCI, INTERNAL INQUIRY INTO THE ACTIONS OF CANADIAN
OFFIciALs IN RELATION To ABDULLAH ALMALKi, AHMAD ABou-ELMAATI AND MUAYYED
NUREDDIN 44 (2010) (subsequent inquiry "was required to be internal and
presumptively private").
148. See generally About the Inquiry, THE DETAINEE INQUIRY,
http://www.detaineeinquiry.org.uk/about/ (last visited Apr. 15, 2012) (describing
inquiry's purpose to determine "whether Britain was implicated in the improper
treatment of detainees, held by other countries, that may have occurred in the
aftermath of 9/11"). This inquiry will be aborted in light of ongoing criminal
investigations into whether British officials were complicit in torture. Peter
Gibson, Statement by the Chairman of the Detainee Inquiry, THE DETAINEE INQUIRY (Jan.
18, 2012), http://www.detaineeinquiry.org.uk/2012/01/statement-by-the-
chairman-of-the-detainee-inquiry/. On the role of public inquiries in the United
States, the United Kingdom, Canada, and Australia in filling accountability gaps
created by integrated government responses to terrorism see ROACH, THE 9/11
EFFECT, supra note 19, at 455-65.
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returned to Canada. It also recommended that the government
should have a unified and coordinated approach when Canadians
were held in countries with poor human rights records where they
may be tortured.149 It also recommended that Canada register a
formal objection with the United States and Syria about Arar's
treatment, including what it determined was a breach of the
Vienna Convention by an initial delay in granting Arar's request to
see a Canadian consular official when he was detained in New
York.1 The Canadian government agreed to all these
recommendations, and Prime Minister Harper made an official
objection to President Bush in 2006.151
It is significant that Mr. Harper, who, as the leader of the
Conservative opposition, had criticized the Canadian government
for not participating in the invasion of Iraq, followed the
recommendation of the inquiry that Canada lodge an official
protest with the United States. The treatment of Arar had a
widespread political salience in Canada that it might not have had
in the United States. As discussed in the first part of this article,
Canada has considerably more foreign-born citizens than the
United States, and its 1982 constitutional bill of rights instructs
judges to interpret rights in a manner consistent with Canada's
multicultural heritage. Arar is far from a shunned figure in Canada
and has won a number of awards. The government also quickly
settled Arar's civil claim for $10.5 million dollars in the wake of the
Arar report. The Arar case has become an important part of
Canada's national security tradition. It focused Canadian concerns
about the need to respect both human rights and multiculturalism
while countering terrorism. Both Canadian governments and the
public will, for the foreseeable future, view much security
cooperation with the United States through the lens of the Arar
case.
4. The 2003 Monterrey Protocol
In January 2003, President Bush and Prime Minister Martin
agreed to the Monterrey Protocol which provides that the United
149. COMMIssION OF INQUIRY ANALYSIS AND REcOMMENDATIONS, supra note 4, at
349.
150. Id. at 361. Arar was detained on September 26, 2002 and his one consular
visit occurred on October 3, 2002.
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States will notify the Canadian Director of Consular Affairs about
any proposed removal of a Canadian to a third country.12  The
Protocol allows either country to request the other to consult about
a proposed removal. The Arar inquiry heard testimony from
Canadian officials that the Protocol stopped short of preventing
the removal of Canadian citizens to third countries because
"'[t]here is never a guarantee of these things .. . the President
himself made it clear that the U.S. is going to do what is right for
their [sic] citizens. The Protocol is more in the nature of
diplomatic assurances, and it is not a treaty that would require
Senate approval in the United States. Canadians need to
understand that American counter-terrorism will often be based on
an executive-based approach both because of policy preferences for
flexibility and secrecy, and because of the practical difficulties of
winning Congressional support for executive initiatives. It will
often be unrealistic to expect legislative guarantees or indeed even
extensive legislative regulation of executive American counter-
terrorism.
B. The American Experience
1. Continued Watch-listing ofArar
The Prime Minister of Canada and several of his Ministers
asked for Maher Arar to be removed from American watch-lists in
the wake of the Canadian ublic inquiry that found no evidence
linking Arar to terrorism. The American government, however,
consistently refused to remove Arar from watch-lists, with State
department officials citing Arar's associations and travel history as
justification for keeping him on the watch-list. American
officials, in an attempt to explain their reasons for watch-listing
Arar, shared information about him with Canadian Public Safety
152. Standing Committee on Public Safety and National Security, 39th Parliament,
1st Session, No. 22 (2006) (statement of Alan Kessel, Legal Advisor, Dep't Foreign
Affairs), available at http://www.parl.gc.ca/HousePublications/Publication.aspx
?Docld=2529912&Language=E&Mode=1.
153. COMMISSION OF INQUIRY REPORT, VOL. 1, supra note 52, at 529 (quoting
Wright testimony from April 6, 2005).
154. Wilkins Slams Day for Questioning US. on Arar, CBC NEWS, Jan. 24. 2007,
http://www.cbc.ca/news/world/story/2007/01/24/us-arar.html?ref=rss.
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Minister Stockwell Day in January 2007.151 Mr. Day, a conservative
minister in a Conservative government, announced that nothing he
had seen had changed his mind about the need to remove Arar
from the watch-list. After some testy exchanges involving the U.S.
Ambassador to Canada and the Canadian Prime Minister, the two
countries agreed to disagree over the matter. The transition from
the Bush to the Obama Administration has not changed the
matter.m U.S. Homeland Security Secretary, Janet Napolitano,
affirmed in April 2009 that Maher Arar would remain on American
watch-lists, barring admission to the United States. Although she
had not personally reviewed his case, she noted "there has been
a[n] unanimity among all the people who have reviewed it that his
status should not now be changed." 59
The nature of secret intelligence, and the particularly non-
transparent and multiple nature of American watch-lists, make it
difficult to evaluate the reasons why the U.S. government continues
to flag Arar as a security risk. 6 o Some information has surfaced but
must be considered with caution because it has not been subject to
independent review or adversarial challenge. An FBI agent who
testified at Omar Khadr's military commission said that Omar
Khadr had identified Maher Arar as a person he saw at al Qaeda
sites in Afghanistan though he later admitted that Khadr had not
initially recognized Arar. There are reasons to doubt the reliability
of this intelligence which was obtained from Omar Khadr in
Afghanistan in September and October 2001, a time when Arar is
known to have been in Canada and when the fifteen-year-old Omar
Khadr was severely injured and mistreated when detained at
156. 'We Agree to Disagree' with U.S. on Arar MacKay, CBC NEWS (Feb. 23, 2007),
http://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/story/2007/02/23/trilateral-talks-070223.html.
157. Id.
158. U.S. Refuses to Reverse its Ban on Arar, CBC NEWS (Apr. 16, 2009),
http://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/story/2009/04/16/arar-us-banO16.html.
159. Interview with U.S. Homeland Security Secretary Janet Napolitano, CBC NEWS
(Apr. 20, 2009), http://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/story/2009/04/20/f-transcript-
napolitano-macdonald-interview.html; see also U.S. Refuses to Reverse its Ban on Arar,
CBC NEWs (Apr. 16, 2009), http://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/story/2009/04/16
/arar-us-ban016.html.
160. Norberto E. Luongo, Watchlists in United States and Canada: An Intricate
Web, 35 AIR & SPACE L. 157 (2010); Daniel J. Steinbock, Designating the Dangerous:
From Blacklists to Watch Lists, 30 SEATrLE U. L. REV. 65, 78 (2006) ("Currently, there
are twelve federal antiterrorism watch lists for individuals."); Justin Florence, Note,
Making the No Fly List Fly: A Due Process Model for Terrorist Watchlists, 115 YALE L.J.
2148, 2170 (2006) ("The watchlists are overwhelmingly based on secret
information gathered by confidential sources. . . .").
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Bagram.16 1 If this is the basis for Arar's watch-listing, it is surely
wrong. Another report suggests that a person convicted of
immigration fraud told U.S. authorities that he saw Arar in
Afghanistan. Here again, there are reasons to doubt the reliability
of such information. '' In general, the lessons from wrongful
convictions relating to mistaken eyewitness identification,
informers with incentives to lie, and false confessions need to be
applied to counter-terrorism activities, especially those informed by
intelligence. 6 3  When questioned by video link in U.S.
Congressional hearings, Arar stated that he had never been to
Afghanistan, but that he had made a false confession to that effect
164
when he was tortured in Syrian custody.
In September 2008, the Terrorist Screening Database in the
United States included over 400,000 individual identities, but over
a million records because of name variants and aliases. Only three
percent of those on these vast watch-lists were U.S. persons.'"6 The
American watch-lists that include Arar are an example of American
extra-legalism because they provide little in the way of tangible
remedies for possible wrongful listings. Someone such as Maher
Arar who does not have a substantial connection to the United
States and cannot demonstrate a risk of harm might be denied
standing in American courts to challenge his watch-listing. Even if
granted standing, the state secrets doctrine protects much of the
information used to place a person on a watch-list. American
courts have rejected class actions designed to challenge watch-lists.
In one case, Chief Justice Easterbrook of the Seventh Circuit
refused to certify a class action challenging terrorist watch-lists
concluding that: "Presidents, Cabinet officers and members of
161. Khadr Saw Arar at Al-Qaeda Sites in Afghanistan: FBI Agent, CBC NEWS (Jan.
20, 2009), http://www.cbc.ca/news/world/story/2009/01/19/khadr-hearing
.html; Khadr Couldn't Pick Out Arar Immediately, FBI Agent Admits, CBC NEWS (Jan.
20, 2009), http://www.cbc.ca/news/world/story/2009/01/20/khadr-hearing
.html.
162. Colin Freeze, Why the US Won't Remove Arar From No-Fly List, GLOBE & MAIL,
Oct. 20, 2007.
163. Kent Roach & Gary Trotter, Miscarriages oflustice in the War Against Terror,
109 PENN ST. L. REv. 967 (2005).
164. Rendition to Torture: The Case of Maher Arar, joint Hearing before the S. Comm.
on Int'l Orgs., Human Rights, and Oversight of the Comm. on Foreign Affairs and the S.
Comm. on the Const., Civil Rights, and Civil Liberties of the Comm. on theJudiciary H. of
Rep., 110th Cong. 27-28 (2007) (statement of Maher Arar).
165. WILLIAM J. KROUSE & BART ELIAS, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERV.,
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Congress can be dismissed by the people if they strike an unwise
balance between false positives and false negatives, between
inconvenience today and mayhem tomorrow. . . In other
words, American courts have, consistent with extra-legalism,
deferred to the executive and the legislature on many matters
relating to watch-lists.
Canada has its own watch-list, a component of the Passenger
Protect Program, but it is much more modest, having reportedly
only 2,000 names. The Canadian list is subject to both judicial
review and review by an independent Privacy Commissioner.
Indeed, the Canadian list was challenged under the Charter by the
first person denied boarding. 6 1 It was also reviewed by the Privacy
Commissioner who found no evidence that it was based on
information that was inaccurate.' 9 These independent reviews are
not limited to Canadian citizens. In part because of the Charter
and the Arar experience, Canada has built more safeguards into its
watch-lists than the United States. These safeguards, however, will
not apply if Canada shares information from its watchlist with the
United States.
2. The Homeland Security Inspector General's Report
The United States did not have a comparable process to the
Canadian public inquiry into the Arar matter. As seen above, the
Canadian inquiry was extraordinary and might not have been
appointed except for various events, but the contrast between the
review done in the United States and Canada is striking. A
redacted report by the Inspector General of the U.S. Department
of Homeland Security was not released until March 2008. The IG
report concluded that Arar was appropriately determined
inadmissible on the basis of being suspected of affiliations with a
166. Rahman v. Cherthoff, 530 F.3d 622, 628 (7th Cir. 2008). Other courts
have, however, found that persons with a substantial connection with the United
States, but not tourists, business travelers, or those on student visas, would have
standing to challenge inclusion on no-fly lists. Ibrahim v. Dep't of Homeland Sec.,
538 F.3d 1250 (9th Cir. 2012).
167. Kenneth C. Werbin, Fear and No-Fly Listing in Canada: The Biopolitics of the
"War on Terror, "34 CAN.J. CoMM. 613, 614 (2009).
168. See Canada (Att'y Gen.) v. Al Telbani, 2011 CarswellNat 3695 (Can.
Fed.Ct.) (WL) (denying advance costs to a permanent resident of Canada to
litigate the issue under section 7 of the Charter).
169. OFFICE OF THE PRIVACY COMM'R OF CAN., AUDIT OF THE PASSENGER PROTECT
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terrorist organization. It noted, however, that the INS could
neither dismiss nor independently verify "the derogatory
information" provided about Arar.1o In this way, the IG accepted
bureaucratic limits on jurisdiction and did not attempt, as the
Canadian inquiry did, to determine whether the intelligence claims
made against Arar were justified.
The IG noted that the expedited nature of Arar's removal
process under section 235(c) of the Immigration and Nationality
Act was used to prevent the disclosure of classified information.
This meant that Arar "was not entitled to a complete statement of
the facts about him, a hearing before an immigration judge, or any
appeal."" 2  This summary approach is consistent with American
extra-legalism because even though it is specifically authorized in
law, it avoids the most rudimentary measures of fairness. Despite
this, the only IG recommendation was that more time should be
allowed for a detainee to defend himself under this expedited
process. The INS accepted that fifteen days should generally be
173
allowed for a detainee to provide written representations. It is
difficult to see this as a meaningful reform because it simply gives
detainees more time to respond to allegations based on secret
intelligence that they will not have seen.
The IG report is heavily redacted, but does reveal that at least
one of the reasons why the acting Attorney General, Larry
Thompson, designated Arar to be transported to Syria and not
Canada was that "the porous nature of the United States-Canadian
border would enable Arar to easily return to the United States." 4
This supports the speculation above that Canadian statements that
Arar would not be detained or charged if he were returned to
Canada played an important role in the United States' decision to
send him to Syria. American perceptions of the northern border as
porous and unguarded, combined with Canadian refusal to use
pretextual or unjustified charges, played important roles in the
decision not to return a Canadian citizen to Canada.
The parts of the IG's report dealing with determinations of
whether Arar faced a risk of torture in Syria, and any
170. DEP'T OF HOMELAND SECURITY OFF. OF INSPECTOR GENERAL, THE REMOVAL
OF A CANADIAN TO SYRIA, OIG-08-18 (2008).
171. Id. at 9.
172. Id. at 4.
173. Id. at 19, 35.
174. Id. at 12, 21.
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determinations or assurances received by the United States from
Syria are almost completely redacted in the report, including most
of the recommendations in this regard. One recommendation that
was not redacted was that immigration officials should consult with
Department of State officials before accepting assurances. 7 5 This
suggests that the Department of State may not have been included
in the high-level decisions in Washington that resulted in Arar's
rendition to Syria. It also suggests that Syria may have provided
assurances that it would not torture Arar. If so, this again fits a
pattern of cynical extra-legalism in the form of non-credible
assurances by a state widely known for its use of torture. This part
of the report also indicates that even within the executive branch,
there are important rivalries and divisions between the law
enforcement, intelligence, and foreign affairs departments. The
Inspector General for Homeland Security, unlike the Canadian
inquiry, did not have subpoena powers or powers to contest
governmental claims of privilege and secrecy. Moreover, his
jurisdiction was limited and could not extend to all governmental
officials involved in the case, and a number refused to cooperate
with the report. The resulting IG report is both more heavily
redacted and much less hard-hitting than the three-volume
Canadian inquiry report.
3. Maher Arar's Failed Attempt at Civil Redress
Arar's claim for declaratory relief that his detention and
rendition violated the Fifth Amendment was dismissed on the
grounds that he did not have standing because the relief would not
address any ongoing injury relating to his inadmissibility in the
United States. 78 This decision demonstrates how narrow standing
rules, combined with political question and state secrets doctrines,
contributes to "extra-legalism"-a process in which the American
legal system itself provides barriers to accountability for arguably
extra-legal state conduct in the national security realm.
The majority of the en banc Second Circuit in Arar v. Ashcroft"
held that it would not, in the absence of legislative action, extend a
175. Id. at 26-30, 36.
176. Inspector General Act of 1978, 5 U.S.C. app. 3 §§ 1-13 (2006); Homeland
Security Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-296, § 811(b), 116 Stat. 2135, 2221 (2002).
177. See supra text accompanying notes 141-51.
178. Arar v. Ashcroft, 414 F. Supp. 2d 250, 259 (E.D.N.Y. 2006).
179. Arar v. Ashcroft, 585 F.3d 559 (2d Cir. 2009).
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Bivens tort claim to renditions. In a recognition and acceptance of
an executive model of national security, Chief Judge Jacobs stated
that "[a]dministrations past and present have reserved the right to
employ rendition ... and not withstanding prolonged public
debate, Congress has not prohibited the practice, imposed limits
on its use, or created a cause of action for those who allege they
have suffered constitutional injury as a consequence.,,"s
Recognizing a cause of action against officials "would have the
natural tendency to affect diplomacy, foreign policy, and the
security of the nation" all factors said to support not recognizing
the claim. 18 Chief Judge Jacobs also noted the difficulties of
litigating matters involving secrecy in open court. Citing Canada's
settlement of Arar's claim, he stressed the danger of "graymail"5 2
that would force governments to settle in order to avoid disclosing
secrets. The majority's judgment did not preclude Arar's claim
simply because he was not an American citizen. The judgment was
heavily influenced by concerns about state secrets, separation of
powers, political questions, and narrow standing that would also
counsel *udicial deference in cases involving claims by American
citizens.
Chief Justice Jacobs' judgment seemed to take the undisclosed
intelligence used to render Arar to Syria at face value. It deferred
not only to the American executive but to the Canadian executive's
identification of Arar as a security threat, ignoring that a quasi-
judicial institution in Canada-a public inquiry conducted by an
appellate judge-had determined that the RCMP's identification of
Arar as a terrorist was not supported by any evidence.184 Chief
Judge Jacobs even suggested that allowing Arar to return to Canada
was not an option because of the danger of allowing Arar to board
a plane and the danger that once in Canada he could return to the
United States "at will.,,"1 5 In this way, the judgment appears to
180. Id. at 565.
181. Id. at 574.
182. Id. at 580. The actual likelihood of "graymail" was significantly
diminished by the many public disclosures made by the Arar Commission of
Inquiry report, but Chief justice Jacobs ignored both the report and its effect on
potential "graymail."
183. See Munaf v. Geren, 553 U.S. 674 (2008) (deferring to military transfer of
American citizens to Iraqi authorities); Al-Aulaqi v. Obama, 727 F. Supp. 2d 1
(D.D.C. 2010) (narrow standing, states secrets, and political questions concerns
preclude judicial review of the targeted killing of an American citizen).
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provide a judicial seal of approval to the executive's decision that it
was not safe to allow Arar to return to Canada.
A number of strong dissents were entered. Judge Sack stressed
that the concern about state secrets could be addressed more
directly rather than by precluding the Bivens remedy in its
entirety. 186 At the same time, he recognized that it would be
"extremely unlikely" that the litigation would have been
determined on its merits given that similar cases have been
effectively shut down by the government's successful invocation of
the broad American state secrets doctrine. It is a significant sign
of the hold of extra-legalism in the United States that even the
dissenting judges did not seem to hold up much hope that Arar's
case could ever be litigated on the merits given the restrictive
American state secrets doctrine. To be sure, litigation in Canada
and other democracies would also be made more difficult because
of the state secrets doctrine, but both Canadian and British
doctrines accept the need for judges, perhaps assisted by security
cleared special advocates to provide adversarial challenge, to
inspect documents and balance the competin public interests in
disclosure and non-disclosure of the material. By contrast, the
American state secrets doctrine has acted as a complete bar that
can preclude even judicial inspection of material, even when, as in
the Arar case, much of that material has been placed in the public
domain. This broad state secrets bar would apply regardless of
whether a claim was made by an American citizen or a foreign
national such as Maher Arar.
Judge Sack also resisted the legalism of the majority's
approach by arguing that high pleading standards should not
require "a plaintiff to obtain his abusers' business cards in order to
state a civil rights claim." 90 Again, the picture that emerges is of a
legal system that is unwilling and unable to consider complicity in
torture claims. Judge Pooler would not have dismissed the Alien
Torture claim on the basis that American officials may have acted
186. Id. at 583 (Sack, J., dissenting).
187. Id.; see El Masri v. Tenet, 479 F.3d 297 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 552 U.S. 947
(2007); Erin E. Langley, The Loss of American Values in the Case of Erroneous Irregular
Rendition, 98 GEO. L.J. 1441 (2010).
188. Sudha Setty, Litigating Secrets: Comparative Perspectives on the State Secrets
Doctrine, 75 BROOK. L. REv. 201, 236 (2009).
189. The hyper-legalism of the majority's approach can also be seen as a form
of extra-legalism. See POSNER, supra note 103.
190. Arar, 585 F.3d at 592 (citing Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009)).
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jointly and under cover of Syrian law if they, like the Canadian
officials, had sent questions for Syrian authorities to ask."' Judge
Calabresi stressed that the majority's ruling held that there could
be no constitutional remedies, even if Arar's allegations were true,
when it was possible for the litigation to proceed without such a
broad ruling and for Congress to act if it wished to clearly preclude
remedies or provide alternative remedies. This approach
recognized, however, that Congress could preclude redress if it was
prepared to make a clear statement to that effect.' Only Judge
Parker among the dissenters directly confronted the majority's
separation of powers anxieties. He concluded that Arar was not
asking the courts to usurp any executive functions, but simply to




The different treatment of Maher Arar in Canada and the
United States cannot be attributed solely to the fact that Arar is a
Canadian citizen but a foreign national in the United States. There
has been considerably more accountability for executive conduct in
Canada than in the United States. In Canada, an independent
public inquiry spent two years and many millions examining the
actions of Canadian officials and issued a three volume report in
2006. The Arar inquiry report offers a much fuller account than
the heavily redacted report that was released in 2008 by the
Inspector General of the Homeland Security Department. The
Canadian government settled Arar's civil claim for $10.5 million,
while the Second Circuit held that his claim against the U.S.
government was precluded because specific congressional
authorization was required to allow lawsuits in such a sensitive area.
Even if allowed to proceed, the civil litigation would have likely
been impossible because of the state secrets doctrine that would
have precluded litigation even if Arar was an American citizen.
Arar remains on American watch-lists under both the Bush and
191. Id. at 629 (Pooler,J., dissenting).
192. Id. at 630 (CalabresiJ., dissenting).
193. In Canada, the legislature could not preclude such litigation to the extent
that it was based on the right under section 24(1) of the Charter to seek an
appropriate and just remedy for a constitutional violation. Mills v. The Queen,
[1986] 1 S.C.R. 863 (Can.).
194. Arar, 585 F.3d. at 613.
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Obama Administrations, and is unable to travel to the United States
without any apparent means of redress. Such redress would be
difficult to obtain even if Arar was an American citizen or
substantially connected to the United States. The American
response to Maher Arar stands as a reminder of the enduring
importance of executive action, secrecy, entrenched attitudes, and
the subjectivity of intelligence in identifying security threats. The
Arar affair suggests that extra-legalism in the United States can
prevent effective review and accountability even for complicity in
torture.
Although it may be tempting for both the United States and
Canada to close the book on the Maher Arar incident, it will be
difficult to do so. The exchange of security information between
Canada and the United States continues, as it must, given the
shared border and security threats. The Arar Commission
recognized that information sharing must continue and was vital to
security, but it also recommended enhanced and coordinated
review of information sharing.9 5 Unfortunately, the Canadian
government has refused to implement these recommendations.
The United States has entered into various security agreements
with Canada but these agreements stop short of committing the
United States not to return Canadians with dual nationality to
other countries. Although it is unlikely that the United States
would render a Canadian dual-citizen to Syria,'96 the Obama
Administration's policy on irregular renditions remains unclear.'97
The Arar affair has become part of Canada's national security
memory and culture because it touches on both human rights and
multiculturalism. In part because of the Arar case, Canada has
been much more cautious about compiling watch-lists and no-fly
lists than the United States, and these lists have been subject to
Charter challenge and independent review by the Privacy
Commissioner. The American government continues to disagree
with Canada over whether Arar is a security risk and this suggests
195. COMMISSION OF INQUIRY INTO THE AcTIONs OF CANADIAN OFFICIALS IN
RELATION TO MAHER ARAR, A NEw REVIEW MECHANISM FOR THE RCMP's NATIONAL
SECURITY ACTIVITIES 499-609 (2006).
196. Even in 2007, one knowledgeable commentator argued that a repeat of
the Arar rendition was extremely unlikely. See Hitz, supra note 138.
197. For a disturbing argument made by Assistant General Counsel for the CIA
that there are effectively no legal impediments to extraordinary rendition see
Daniel L. Pines, Rendition Operations: Does U.S. Law inpose Any Restrictions?, 42 Loy.
U. CHI. L.J 523 (2011).
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that some within the American government at least must believe
that Canada has made a serious mistake in exonerating Arar. Such
fundamental disagreements over such a high profile case will
continue to make many uneasy about increased American-
Canadian information sharing under the 2011 perimeter security
action plan.
V. THE KHADR FAMILY AND CANADIAN-AMERICAN RELATIONS
If the Maher Arar case confirms Canadian suspicions about the
harshness of American counter-terrorism and the lack of
accountability for complicity in torture, then the story of the Khadr
family confirms American concerns that Canada is a source of a
real terrorist threat and that its legal system prioritizes respect for
rights over security.
The Khadr family was headed by Ahmed Khadr, who was born
in Egypt but subsequently obtained Canadian citizenship. He was
detained on terrorism charges in Pakistan in 1996, but was released
after Prime Minister Chretien intervened on his behalf. Ahmed
Khadr became a close associate with bin Laden before he was
eventually killed on the Pakistan-Afghanistan border in 2003."' His
four sons, who were all born in Canada, have all been involved in
activities with their father. The youngest son, Abdul, was paralyzed
from the waist down in the same shootout that killed his father.
Another son, Abduraham, was captured in Afghanistan in
November 2001 and spent some time in 2003 at Guantanamo Bay,
Cuba before being released and eventually returning to Canada.
He claims to have cooperated and worked for the CIA both in
Afghanistan and Guantanamo. 99 Another brother, Abdullah, was
captured and detained in Pakistan in 2004 before being released
and allowed to return to Canada.200 As will be discussed below, he
was the subject of a failed attempt by the United States to extradite
him on material support of terrorism charges. The most well-
known of the Khadr brothers is Omar Khadr, who at fifteen years of
age was captured by American forces in Afghanistan in 2002. He
was detained at Guantanamo and pled guilty in 2010 before a
military commission to the murder of an American soldier,
198. See BELL, supra note 74, at 156.
199. CIA Paid Me to Spy: Abdurahman Khadr, CBC NEWS, Mar. 5, 2004,
http://wvw.cbc.ca/news/canada/story/2004/03/04/khadr-reaxO4O304.html.
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Sergeant Christopher Speer, and other offenses.
A. Guantanamo and Canadian Alternatives to the Criminal Law
Compared
Much has been written about the use of military detention and
trials of suspected terrorists at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba.
Guantanamo, both as originally planned and conceived in the first
Bush administration and sustained by more recent Congressional
restrictions on transfers from it, represents a continuation of the
American military tradition in counter-terrorism and a lack of
confidence in the criminal law. Canada does not have the same
military tradition, but it also demonstrated a lack of confidence in
the criminal law in the wake of 9/11. As discussed above, it relied
on immigration law as anti-terrorism law with respect to alleged
members of the Ressam cells and others alleged to be associated
with al Qaeda. Instead of military detention, Canada issued five
immigration law security certificates between 2001 and 2003 that
allowed it to detain five non-citizens suspected of involvement with
202
al Qaeda. This enabled the Canadian government to use secret
evidence/intelligence and indeterminate detention in a manner
that the criminal law would not allow.m The first criminal charge
of an alleged al Qaeda terrorist was not laid in Canada until March
2004, and, in that case, immigration law was not an alternative
because the accused was a Canadian citizen. The scale and
militarization of administrative detention at Guantanamo was
unique, but the flight from the criminal law was not.
In both Canada and the United States, the use of less
restrained alternatives to the criminal law resulted in extensive and
frequently successful litigation on behalf of detainees. Through
204
three Supreme Court victories, the Guantanamo detainees
gained access to habeas corpus relief and more regularized military
trials that would not use secret evidence. Somewhat similarly,
security certificate detainees in Canada won important Supreme
201. See Roach, Canada's Response to Terrorism, supra note 79, at 511.
202. See id.
203. Id.
204. Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723 (2008); Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S.
557 (2006); Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466 (2004). These cases may seem at odds
with the extra-legalism thesis to the extent that they rejected President Bush's
initial determination to avoid all judicial review of detention and trial at
Guantanamo. At the same time, however, these cases proceeded in a cautious and
minimal manner avoiding constitutional issues until they could not be avoided.
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Court victories that produced a system of security-cleared special
advocates who could, as in the UK, examine and challenge secret
2105
evidence. The Supreme Court also required CSIS to retain more
raw intelligence so that both the secret evidence and the unused
intelligence could be challenged.206  The actual gains from these
legal victories are a matter of controversy in both countries.
Habeas corpus review has not been particularly effective for the
Guantanamo detainees. There have been other substitution effects
such as detention at other sites not subject to habeas review. The
transfers of Guantanamo detainees to other countries have also
been controversial with concerns raised about possible transfer to
207torture.
A similar story on a much smaller scale could be told about
Canadian security certificates. The special advocates have won
some victories in challenging secret evidence with one security
certificate being quashed by the courts and another abandoned
when the government refused to allow the disclosure of more
information.20 The three remaining detainees have all been
released on a form of house arrest, but there are also concerns that
they might be deported to countries where they might be
tortured. 20 As with Guantanamo, there have also been substitution
effects with the use of less visible forms of immigration proceedings
than security certificates to remove or deny entry to suspected
terrorists. There was also a safe third country agreement with the
United States, which has led to decreased numbers of refugees
being accepted in Canada.
Torture has tainted these less-restrained alternatives to the
criminal law in both countries. In the United States, torture
occurred through executive interpretations of the relevant legal
210
restrictions as symbolized through the torture memos. Congress
did not enter the field until the 2005 enactment of the Detainee
211
Treatment Act in response to the Abu Ghraib scandal. The
205. Charkaoui v. Canada, [2007] 1 S.C.R. 350 (Can.).
206. Charkaoui v. Canada, [2008] 2 S.C.R. 326 (Can.).
207. Manfred Nowak, Moritz Birk & Tiphanie Crittin, The Obama Administration
and Obligations Under the Convention Against Torture, 20 TRANSNAT'L L. & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 33, 64 (2011) (discussing cases of Guantanamo detainees returned to
Algeria against their will).
208. See Roach, Canada's Response to Terrorism, supra note 79, at 528.
209. Suresh v. Canada, [2002] 1 S.C.R. 3 para. 78 (Can.).
210. ANTHONY LEwiS, INTRODUCTION TO THE TORTURE PAPERS: THE ROAD TO
ABU GHRAIB Xiii-xvi (KarenJ. Greenberg &Joshua L. Dratel eds., 2005).
211. Detainee Treatment Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-148, 119 Stat. 2680, §
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legislature intervened, but the executive continued to authorize
waterboarding by the CIA. 12 In Canada, the flirtation with torture
came from a much more surprising source: the judiciary. In a case
decided in early 2002, the Supreme Court of Canada held that
while deportation to face a substantial risk of torture would violate
international law and require heightened procedural review, it
would not rule out the possibility that in undefined "exceptional
circumstances" courts might find deportation to face torture
213
justified under the Charter. Although the exception has not
subsequently been applied,m it demonstrates that the United States
was not alone in revisiting the absolute prohibition against torture.
It is probably not accidental that the two countries that were closest
to the 9/11 attacks were the ones that each, in their own different
ways, loosened the absolute prohibition on torture. Because the
Canadian exception is contained in a Supreme Court of Canada
decision and not in a withdrawn executive interpretation of the law,
however, the Canadian government has "a loaded weapon"215 that it
threatens to use in the remaining security certificate cases.
Canadian security certificates and detention at Guantanamo both
1003 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000dd (2006)). In Canada, 2008
legislation likewise condemned torture by providing that evidence obtained
through torture or cruel and degrading treatment should not be used as secret
evidence in immigration security certificates. Immigration and Refugee
Protection Act, S.C. 2001, c. 27 s. 83 (1.1) amended by S.C 2008, c. 3 s. 4 (Can.).
212. Stuart Taylor, Jr. & Benjamin Wittes, Looking Forward, Not Backward:
Refining U.S. Interrogation Law, in LEGISLATING THE WAR ON TERROR: AN AGENDA FOR
REFORM 289, 306-08 (Benjamin Wittes ed., 2009).
213. Suresh v. Canada, [2002] 1 S.C.R. 3, para. 78 (Can.).
214. The Suresh exception, however, allowed the government to continue to
detain non-citizens on security certificates who could not be deported to countries
such as Syria on the fiction that they were being detained with a view to
deportation. See Kent Roach, Charkaoui and Bill C-3: Some Implications for Anti-
Terrorism Policy and Dialogue between Courts and Legislatures, 42 Sup. CT. REV. 281, 287
(2008). Parliament subsequently renounced the use of evidence obtained by
torture or degrading treatment in security certificates, though not the possibility
of deporting non-citizens to face the possibility of torture. See Immigration and
Refugee Protection Act, S.C. 2001, c. 27 s. 83(1.1) (Can.). The Court in Suresh also
held that courts should deferentially review governmental decisions whether a
person faces a substantial risk of torture if deported and, in at least one case, the
Committee Against Torture found that Canada violated the Convention against
Torture in a case where courts deferred to governmental determinations that a
suspected Sikh terrorist would not be tortured if returned to India. COMMITEE
AGAINST TORTURE, BACHAN SINGH SOGI V. CANADA DECISION, para. 10.10 (2007),
available at http://www.worldcourts.com/cat/eng/decisions/2007.11.16_Bachan
.SinghSogi vCanada.htm.
215. Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 246 (1944).
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continue despite all the legal and political controversy they have
caused.
B. Canadian Litigation with Respect to Omar Khadr
President Bush's original military order with respect to
Guantanamo provided that the detainees could not seek remedies
not only in any U.S. court, but also in "an court of any foreign
nation" or in "any international tribunal.",2  The experience with
prolonged litigation in Canada on behalf of Omar Khadr
demonstrates that it was not possible for the United States to
restrain foreign litigation over Guantanamo. One response to
American extra-legalism 2 was litigation in foreign courts by people
like Omar Khadr and Australian and British Guantanamo detainees
who indirectly attempted to challenge their detentions in their
"home" courts.2" The Omar Khadr litigation, however, also
underlines the limited powers that foreign courts will have over
American military detention.
In 2005, a Canadian judge issued a temporary injunction that
prevented Canadian intelligence officials from continuing to go to
Guantanamo to question Khadr. The judge stressed that he was
not reviewing the conduct of American officials,2" but that
continued Canadian intelligence gathering at Guantanamo risked
causing irreparable harm to Omar Khadr, especially because the
information obtained might be used against him in military
proceedings at Guantanamo.2o Although there was a public
interest in gaining intelligence about terrorism, the "balance of
convenience" favored granting the injunction because the possible
harms to Khadr outweighed the diminishing intelligence and law
enforcement benefits of continuing to interrogate him after three
years in captivity.2 Canadian intelligence officials complied with
216. Military Order of Nov. 13, 2001, 66 Fed. Reg. 57,833, 57,835-36 (Nov. 16,
2001).
217. For an example of litigation brought by Guantanamo detainees in the
United States not being litigated on the merits see Rasul v. Myers, 563 F.3d 527
(D.C. Cir. 2009), cert. denied, 130 S. Ct. 1013 (2009) (holding that Bivens action
does not extend to detention at Guantanamo and that even if it did, qualified
immunity would apply).
218. Hicks v. Ruddock, (2007) 156 FCR 574 (Austl.); Abassi v. Sec'y of State for
Foreign & Commonwealth Affairs, [2002] EWCA (Civ) 1598 (Eng.).
219. Khadr v. Canada, [2005] F.C. 1076, para. 12 (Can.).
220. Id. at paras. 23-24.
221. Id. at para. 44.
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this injunction, but as will be seen, their 2003 and 2004 visits to
Guantanamo became the subject of much continued litigation.
The Supreme Court of Canada twice held that Canadian
interrogations of Omar Khadr at Guantanamo in 2003 and 2004
222
violated both the Charter and international law. The relevant
Charter right in both cases was section 7 of the Charter which gives
everyone and not just Canadian citizens the right not to be
deprived of life, liberty, and the security of person except in
accordance with the principles of fundamental justice. In general,
claims under section 7 do not depend on Canadian citizenship.
In both cases, the court had to find a violation of international law
in order to apply the Charter extra-territorially.2' This approach to
extra-territorial application of the Charter raised the possibility of
the Canadian court potentially embarrassing the United States by
concluding that conditions at Guantanamo violated international
law. A 2002 decision of the Court of Appeal for England and Wales
,,225
had denounced Guantanamo as a "legal black-hole. The
Supreme Court of Canada took a less aggressive and more
diplomatic approach in both its Khadr cases. In its 2008 decision,
after briefly reviewing the U.S. Supreme Court's decisions in Rasul
226 227
v. Bush and Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, the court held that it was not
222. Canada v. Khadr, [2010] 1 S.C.R. 44, paras. 16, 26 (Can.); Canada v.
Khadr, [2008] 2 S.C.R. 125, para. 24 (Can.).
223. There are, however, some ambiguous references to Omar Khadr's
Canadian citizenship in Canada v. Khadr, [2008] 2 S.C.R. 125 at paras. 32, 35
(Can.) and the Federal Court of Appeal has refused to apply the Charter extra-
territorially in two cases on the basis that the applicants were not Canadian
citizens. See Amnesty Int'l v. Canada (Minister of Def.), [2008] F.C.A. 401
(refusing to apply Charter to benefit Afghan detainees who were not Canadian
citizens); Slahi v. Canada [2009] F.C.A. 259, para. 7 (Can.) (refusing to apply
Charter to benefit non-Canadian citizens interrogated at Guantanamo by
Canadian officials). For criticisms of these decisions as contrary to the language of
section 7 of the Charter and the idea that the Charter should be applied to extra-
territorial violations of Canada's international rights obligations see Roach, The
Supreme Court at the Bar of Politics: The Afghan Detainee and Omar Khadr Cases, supra
note 39, at 128-30, 139.
224. R. v. Hape, [2007] 2 S.C.R. 292 (Can.).
225. Abbasi v. Sec'y of State for Foreign & Commonwealth Affairs, [2002]
EWCA (Civ) 1598, [64] (Eng.); see also Al Rawi v. Sec'y of State for Foreign &
Commonwealth Affairs, [2006] EWHC (Admin) 972, [92] (Eng.). For a more
recent decision where the English courts demonstrated that they were prepared to
issue habeas corpus with respect to a person transferred by British forces to
American officials for detention in Afghanistan, see Rahmatullah v. Sec'y of State
for Foreign & Commonwealth Affairs, [2011] EWCA (Civ) 1540 (Eng.).
226. 542 U.S. 466 (2004).
227. 548 U.S. 557 (2006).
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necessary to pronounce on the legality of Guantanamo because
"[w]ith the benefit of a full factual record, the United States
Supreme Court held that the detainees had illegally been denied
access to habeas corpus and that the procedures under which they
were to be prosecuted violated the Geneva Conventions."22 1
The Supreme Court of Canada in both its 2008 and 2010
decisions focused on the 2003 and 2004 interrogations and did not
attempt to opine on the dynamic and complex nature of the
Guantanamo legal regime. Having found that the Canadian
interrogation violated both the Charter and international law in
the 2008 case, the court ordered as a remedy that Canada disclose
to Khadr the information that it had obtained and had shared with
American officials. Consistent with Canada's concerns about
secrecy and its status as a net importer of intelligence, 20 however,
the Supreme Court of Canada did not order immediate or full
disclosure, but rather remanded the case to a federal court judge to
rule on how much of the classified information could be disclosed
to Khadr.2' These proceedings were subsequently carried out with
the presiding judge concluding that while disclosure of some of the
information
may cause some harm to Canada-US relations, that effect
will be minimized by the fact that the use of such
interrogation techniques by the US military at
Guantanamo is now a matter of public record and debate.
In any event, I am satisfied that the public interest in
disclosure of this information outweighs the public
interest in non-disclosure.
A synopsis of an interview conducted in February 2003 was
disclosed. It included statements by Omar Khadr claiming he was
tortured at Bagram when first captured, and depicted him pleading
with Canadian officials to "promise you'll protect me from
Americans." The disclosures also revealed that Canadian officials
228. Canada v. Khadr, [2008] 2 S.C.R. 125, para. 21 (Can.).
229. Id. at para. 34.
230. Ruby v. Canada (Solicitor Gen.), [2002] 4 S.C.R. 3, para. 44 (Can.).
231. Canada v. Khadr, [2008] 2 S.C.R. 125, para. 37 (Can.).
232. Khadr v. Canada, [2008] F.C. 807, para. 89 (Can.). Other parts of the
judgment balanced the public interests for and against disclosure by, for example,
allowing Khadr to obtain videotapes made of the Canadian interrogations but with
the faces of the intelligence officers and other sensitive material edited out. Id. at
para. 82.
233. Air Force Office of Special Investigations, Report of Investigative Activity, 1
(Feb. 24, 2003), http://graphics8.nytimes.com/packages/pdf/world
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were aware that Omar Khadr had been placed on a so-called
"frequent flyer program" of sleep deprivation in which for three
weeks he was not permitted to remain more than three hours in
any single location before the 2004 interviews.23 4
In subsequent litigation, Omar Khadr claimed that Canada's
decision not to request his repatriation from Guantanamo violated
the Charter. After reviewing both the Canadian interviews at
Guantanamo and Khadr's claims to protection, not only as a
Canadian citizen, but also as a person who was fifteen years of age
when captured, a trial judge ordered that the only appropriate
remedy was to require Canada to request his repatriation.m' The
judge stressed that there was no evidence that a repatriation
request would cause harm to Canadian-American relations. He
also concluded that any doubts about whether Khadr could be
prosecuted in Canada only "reinforces the case for repatriation."
The Supreme Court of Canada upheld most of this decision and
stressed that the questioning of Khadr when he was sixteen years of
age with no access either to counsel or courts, "offends the most
basic Canadian standards about the treatment of detained youth
suspects. , The court relied on its 2008 decision to hold that the
interrogations also violated international law. It focused on
conditions at Guantanamo in 2003, while noting that "the regime
under which Khadr is currently detained has changed significantly
,,238in recent years.
Although it held that the 2003 and 2004 interviews violated
both international law and the Charter, the Supreme Court of
Canada reversed the trial judge's order that required Canada to
request Khadr's repatriation from the United States on the grounds
that the remedy interfered with the government's prerogatives over
diplomacy.2" The court stressed that the situation was dynamic,
and it was hesitant to interfere with Canadian-American relations
by requiring the Canadian government to request Omar Khadr's
repatriation. Although consistent with other decisions that have
/20080711 Khadr.pdf.
234. Memorandum from R. Scott Heatherington, Dir., Foreign Intelligence
Div., to MJW, Umar Khadr: a meeting with, 2 (Apr. 20, 2004),
http://graphics8.nytimes.com/packages/pdf/world/20080711 Khadr.pdf.
235. Khadr v. Canada, [2009] F.C. 405, paras. 76-89 (Can.).
236. Id. at para. 87.
237. Canada v. Khadr, [2010] 1 S.C.R. 44, para. 25 (Can.).
238. Id. at para. 17.
239. Id. at paras. 27-47.
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stopped short of requiring governments to make diplomatic
240representations on behalf of citizens, the court's approach
discounted the trial judge's focus on Khadr's youth and his
conclusion that there was no alternative remedy, except for a
repatriation request. The court's deference on the remedial
question was in conflict with its prior rejection of non-justiciable
241political questions. It also created the risk that the Canadian
242
government might, as initially appeared to be the case,~ do
nothing in response to the court's declaration that Omar Khadr
had still not received an effective remedy for the violation of his
Charter rights in 2003 and 2004.
The Canadian government continued to refuse to request
Omar Khadr's repatriation. In 2008, government backbenchers
had dissented from a Parliamentary committee report that called
on the government to request Khadr's repatriation on the basis
that "Mr. Khadr could become a litmus test on Canada's
commitment to impeding global terrorism and the results of our
actions today could result in consequences that are not in the long-
term interests of the country." 243 The Canadian government saw its
refusal to request Omar Khadr's repatriation as a demonstration of
its willingness to be tough on terrorism. It did, however, after some
initial hesitation, respond to the Supreme Court of Canada's 2010
decision with a diplomatic note that requested that the United
States not use evidence obtained by Canadian officials.
Even though Canada's request that the evidence not be used
stopped well short of a repatriation request, the United States
issued a non-responsive diplomatic note in reply, which simply
stated that the military commission would decide under the
Military Commission Act what evidence would be admissible. It
appears that some use was made of the videotaped interrogation
conducted by Canadian security officials in Khadr's pre-trial
240. Abbasi v. Sec'y of State, [2002] EWCA (Civ) 1598; Kaunda v. President of
South Africa, 2004 (1) SA 1 (CC) at 4, para. 5 (S. Afr.).
241. Operation Dismantle v. The Queen, [1985] 1 S.C.R. 441 (Can.).
242. Khadr v. Canada, [2010] F.C. 715, paras. 36-39 (Can.); see also Roach, The
Supreme Court at the Bar of Politics: The Afghan Detainee and Omar Khadr Cases, supra
note 39, at 147 n.135.
243. KEVIN SORENSON, M.P., REPORT OF THE STANDING COMM. ON FOREIGN
AFFAIRS AND INT'L DEv., 39TH PARLIAMENT, 2D SESSION (June 2008), available at
http://www.parl.gc.ca/HousePublications/Publication.aspx?Docld=3572352&Lan
guage=E&Mode=1&Parl=39&Ses=2.
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245military commission proceedings. In subsequent Canadian
litigation, a lower court concluded that Khadr had still not received
an effective remedy. The judge indicated that he could, if
necessary, order the government to request Khadr's repatriation if
that was the only effective remedy.m The Canadian government
successfully sought a stay of that judgment pending appeal. The
appeal court judge who issued the stay expressed doubts whether a
court could order the government to request Khadr's repatriation
in light of the Supreme Court of Canada's 2010 decision
overturning that remedy as not respectful enough of the
government's prerogative with respect to diplomacy. If accepted,
this restriction on remedies would represent a partial acceptance of
an American style political question doctrine that would preclude
judicial remedies that require the government to make diplomatic
representations. 24" This appeal has now been declared moot given
Khadr's subsequent plea agreement in the military commission.4
At one level, the failure of Khadr's litigation to secure his
release reveals how Canada has capitulated to the United States'
insistence, even under President Obama, on using military
commissions and not closing Guantanamo. The Canadian
government only asked for Khadr's return when asked to do so by
the United States as part of a plea agreement that saved the Obama
administration the embarrassment of placing Omar Khadr on trial
for acts he committed as a fifteen-year-old.2o The Canadian
government was likely motivated by the immense unpopularity of
the Khadr clan, a self-professed "al Qaeda family" and a desire not
245. Id. at paras. 85-87.
246. Id.
247. Canada (Prime Minister) v. Khadr, [2010] F.C. 199, paras. 31-32 (Can.).
248. See generally Roach, The Supreme Court at the Bar of Politics: The Afghan
Detainee and Omar Khadr Cases, supra note 39, at 142ff. For other criticisms of the
Supreme Court of Canada's deference on the remedial question see David
Rangaviz, Dangerous Deference: The Supreme Court of Canada in Canada v. Khadr, 46
HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 253 (2011).
249. Khadr v. Canada, [2011] F.C.A. 92 (Can.).
250. On October 23, 2010, the United States proposed, in a diplomatic note,
that Khadr could serve the remainder of his sentence in Canada and that he would
be eligible for parole under Canadian law after having served one third of his
sentence. Canada replied in a diplomatic note of the same day that it wished "to
convey that, as requested by the United States, the Government of Canada is
inclined to favourably consider Mr. Khadr's application" to serve the remainder of
his sentence in Canada. See Memorandum for Michael L. Bruhn, Executive Sec'y
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to spend its limited political capital with Washington on security
matters over Omar Khadr.
C. American Proceedings with Respect to Omar Khadr
Omar Khadr brought multiple legal challenges to his
detention and trial at Guantanamo, both in federal court and in
military proceedings. Unlike in Canada, however, his claims were
generally rejected. Moreover, the nature ofjudicial reasoning both
in federal court and by military judges fits into a pattern of extra-
legalism in which legal doctrine is used to defer to military and
Congressional authority and to resist merits-based review and
tangible remedies.
1. Federal Court Proceedings
Omar Khadr's various attempts to obtain habeas corpus relief
in American federal court all failed. In 2004, attempts on his
behalf to obtain emergency relief relating to his mental
competence were rejected with Judge Bates ruling that Khadr had
failed to submit evidence calling into question his mental
competence, that habeas corpus did not include remedies relating
to mental competency, and that mental competence would only be
251relevant if he were facing a criminal trial.
In 2005, requests for a preliminary injunction preventing the
use of torture or degrading treatment against Khadr or his transfer
to another country, such as Afghanistan where he had been
threatened with sexual assault, were also denied. Judge Bates
stressed that preliminary injunctions should be used sparingly and
reacted very negatively to a request that Khadr not be interrogated.
He stated:
Petitioners do not cite any law for the extraordinary
notion that a court may forbid the interrogation of
individuals captured in the course of ongoing military
hostilities. Even supposing that the Court has the
constitutional authority to intrude so dramatically on the
prerogative of the Executive in the performance of the
war power, petitioners do not offer a plausible legal or
evidentiary basis for the exercise of that authority in this
case.
... [P]etitioners have no answer to the declaration of a
251. OK.v. Bush, 344 F. Supp. 2d44, 54-60 (D.C. Cir. 2004).
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high-level military intelligence official detailing the critical
role that the interrogation of Guantanamo detainees has
played in the war on terror and the danger that an
injunction against further questioning of detainees could
pose to our nation's security. Petitioners' request for an
injunction against interrogation has no likelihood of
success on the merits and would present a grave risk to
the public interest, and therefore will be denied.
This ruling is a striking contrast with a decision of a Canadian court
in the same year that issued a similar interlocutory injunction
preventing Canadian officials from continuing to interrogate Omar
'253
Khadr at Guantanamo.
Judge Bates refused to enjoin torture on the basis that even
accepting "the most serious of petitioner's allegations-short-
shackling in stress positions for extended periods, use of petitioner
as a 'human mop,' abusive physical treatment by guards, and
threats of sexual abuse," there was no evidence that such
allegations dating to October 2003 would "suddenly materialize
again in the near future.,,254 This 2005 decision demonstrates how
narrow standing and restrictive pleading combined with judicial
deference to executive and military action contributed to a
process of extra-legalism in which American courts refused to
intervene on Omar Khadr's behalf, even to the extent of issuing a
relatively non-intrusive order that he not be tortured or subject to
degrading treatment.
In 2008, Judge Bates again denied Omar Khadr habeas corpus
relief. Judge Bates decided that he should abstain from granting
relief while military commission proceedings were pending. He
relied on doctrines of comity and deference to ongoing military
proceedings as endorsed by the U.S. Supreme Court in Schlesinger v.
252. O.K. v. Bush, 377 F. Supp. 2d 102, 111 (D.C. Cir. 2005).
253. Khadr v. Canada, [2005] F.C. 1076 (Can.).
254. O.K., 377 F. Supp. 2d at 113.
255. The judge stressed that "[t]his Court is not equipped or authorized to
assume the broader roles of a congressional oversight committee or a
superintendent of the operations of a military base." Id. at 114. He also refused to
enjoin Khadr's transfer to a third country, relying on "the well-settled canon of
statutory interpretation providing that a court should not construe a statute to
interfere with the province of the Executive over military affairs in the absence of a
clear manifestation of Congressional intent to do so." Id. at 117 (citing Dep't of
Navy v. Egan, 484 U.S. 518, 527 (1988) ("Unless Congress specifically has provided
otherwise, courts traditionally have been reluctant to intrude upon the authority
of the Executive in military and national security affairs.")).
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Councilman. ,6 He also restrictively interpreted Boumediene v. Bush
as only granting Guantanamo detainees the ability to use habeas
corpus to challenge the legality of their detention and not their
conditions of confinement. On this narrow basis, he held that
Boumediene had not invalidated previous statutory restrictions on
the use of habeas corpus to challenge conditions of confinement at
Guantanamo.2 Again, there is a striking contrast with more
generous Canadian jurisprudence, which has long recognized that
habeas corpus could be used to challenge conditions of
detention. Judge Bates's approach to this issue illustrates how
narrow rulings promoted by a case-by-case constitutional
2601minimalism supported extra-legalism. A narrow parsing of legal
authority maximized executive and military authority and allowed
Omar Khadr to continue to be detained with adults.
In 2010, Judge Bates allowed Khadr to amend his habeas
petition, but again denied it on grounds that the federal courts
should defer to ongoing military commission proceedings. Judge
Bates stated, "[T]he Constitution does not require that every
protection available in criminal trials must apply in military
,261
commission proceedings for Guantanamo detainees." He
stressed that Khadr could eventually appeal his military commission
proceedings to the federal courts, and, as such, that the court
would "assume that the military court system created by the Military
Commissions Act of 2009 will vindicate Khadr's rights."a This
256. Khadr v. Bush, 587 F. Supp. 2d. 225, 230-34 (D.D.C. 2008) (citing
Schlesinger v. Councilman, 420 U.S. 738, 740 (1975) ("Although the District Court
may have had subject-matter jurisdiction, we think that the balance of factors
governing exercise of equitable jurisdiction by federal courts normally weighs
against intervention, by injunction or otherwise, in pending court-martial
proceedings.")).
257. 553 U.S. 723 (2008).
258. Khadr, 587 F. Supp. 2d at 235-37.
259. Cardinal v. Dir. of Kent Inst., [1985] 2 S.C.R. 643 (Can.).
260. CASs R. SUNSTEIN, ONE CASE AT A TIME: JUDICIAL MINIMALISM ON THE
SUPREME COURT iX-xiii (1999). The approach of constitutional minimalism can be
contrasted with the more robust approach to judicial review advocated by
President Aharon Barak of the Israel Supreme Court in Foreword: A judge on
judging: The Role of a Supreme Court in a Democracy, 116 HARv. L. REv. 16, 97-162
(2002).
261. Khadrv. Obama, 727 F. Supp. 2d. 61,67 (D.D.C. 2010).
262. Id. at 68. The Court of Appeals had previously refused to hear an
interlocutory appeal, concluding that, as in other cases, appeals could be heard
after verdict. Khadr v. United States, 529 F.3d 1112, 1119 (D.C. Cir. 2008). Chief
Judge Sentelle concluded, "Khadr has pointed solely to the interest that the public
has in ensuring that all criminal proceedings are just. That interest does not
17612012]
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approach used the promise of future and delayed legalism as a
reason not to examine whether Khadr's rights would be violated by
trial by military commission. As will be seen, Khadr enjoyed little
success in multiple rounds of litigation before military courts.
Instead of waiting for the remote prospect of possible appellate
relief, he gave up and eventually pled guilty before his military
commission. The American process held out promises of legality
and justice but did not provide Omar Khadr any tangible relief.
2. Militaiy Proceedings
The public files made available by the Department of National
Defense on the Omar Khadr case are voluminous,m and, in that
sense, they contradict the idea that Guantanamo was ever a lawless
black-hole. As Jack Goldsmith has argued, many of the infamous
tactics used after 9/11, including the torture memos, were the
result of a legalistic approach to counter-terrorism. The heavily
lawyered approach, however, often verged on extra-legalism in the
sense that it represented a form of rule by law in which legalistic
claims were made in support of actions that were unfair and would
be viewed by many as contrary to the rule of law. The first entry in
Khadr's public case file is revealing; it is President Bush's memo of
February 7, 2002, noting that he accepted the Department of
Justice's opinion that the Geneva Conventions would not apply to
either al Qaeda or Taliban detainees, and that the actions of
terrorists had ushered in "a new paradigm" that "requires new
thinking in the law of war."2
Although there were many changes to Guantanamo during
Omar Khadr's detention, Khadr's case continued to represent a
"new paradigm" that fell outside the traditional laws of war and
crime. This new paradigm, as represented by the Military
warrant our interruption of this criminal proceeding just because it is a military
commission." Id. at 1118-19.
263. See Public Files of Omar Ahmed Khadr, MILITARY COMMISSIONS,
http://www.mc.mil/CASES/MilitaryCommissions.aspx (click "Omar Ahmed
Khadr Completed"; follow hyperlink and click "Category" to choose which file to
access) (last visited Apr. 17, 2012).
264. JACK GOLDSMITH, THE TERROR PRESIDENCY 141-76 (2007).
265. Presidential Memorandum Regarding Detainees (Feb. 7, 2002), available
at http://www.mc.mil/CASES/MilitaryCommissions.aspx (follow "Omar Ahmed
Khadr" hyperlink; under "Category" tab, select "Docket"; at the bottom of the
page, follow ". . ." hyperlink; at the bottom of the page, follow "16" hyperlink;
follow "Presidential Memo-Subject: Humane Treatment of al Qaeda and Taliban
Detainees" hyperlink) (last visited Apr. 17, 2012).
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Commission Act, combines crimes such as murder, conspiracy, and
material support of terrorism, which have traditionally been the
preserve of criminal law, with other crimes that have been better
recognized under the laws of war. The result is a process that
remains controversial because it allows the state to allege crimes
while depriving the accused of some of the benefits of the criminal
trial process, most notably trial before a civilian jury. Conversely, it
allows the state to use trial by military commission, while depriving
the accused of some combatant privileges that would normally be
available under the laws of war.
Guantanamo involved both a process of reviewing military
detention through the combatant status review tribunals and trials
before military commissions. The combatant status review
tribunals were inspired by Justice O'Connor's opinion in Hamdi v.
Rumsfeld, indicating that due process in the context of military
detention did not require all the protections of the criminal trial
process.2 This approach, at least as it could be applied to
American citizens, was criticized by Justice Scalia (in a dissent
joined by Justice Stevens) as an "unheard-of system in which the
citizen rather the Government bears the burden of proof,
testimony is by hearsay rather than live witnesses, and the presiding
officer may well be a 'neutral' military officer rather than judge and
jury. The combatant status review tribunals allowed the use of
secret evidence. Omar Khadr refused to participate in such a
process, and his status as an enemy combatant was upheld on the
basis of classified or secret evidence in September 2004.2
The Military Commissions Act of 2006 did not authorize the
use of secret evidence, but it did include a number of crimes that
were not traditionally recognized in the law of war. Khadr was
charged with murder and attempted murder in violation of the law
of war, even though his actions in throwing a grenade during a
battle arguably were within the laws of war, since they did not
266. 542 U.S. 507 (2004).
267. See id. at 533.
268. Id. at 575 (Scalia, J., dissenting). For criticism of justice O'Connor's
opinion, see Kent Roach & Gary Trotter, Miscarriages ofJustice in the War Against
Terror, 109 PENN ST. L. REv. 967, 1014-32 (2005).
269. Omar Khadr Combatant Status Review Tribunal Determination (Sept. 10,
2004), available at http://www.mc.mil/CASES/MilitaryCommissions.aspx (click
"Omar Ahmed Khadr" hyperlink; under "Category" tab, select "Docket"; at the
bottom of the page, click ". . ." hyperlink; at the bottom of the page, click "16"
hyperlink; follow "Combatant Status Review Tribunal Determination" hyperlink)
(last visited Apr. 17, 2012).
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constitute killing by treachery or perfidy or killing with weapons
prohibited by the laws of war. 1 Khadr was also charged with
conspiracy, even though four Supreme Court Justices in Hamdan
concluded that conspiracy was not part of the laws of war.1 He
was also charged with material support of terrorism, a charge
clearly available under American criminal law, where Khadr could
be tried by a federal court exercising extra-territorial jurisdiction,
but not one recognized under the laws of war. Finally, he was
charged with spying, which is an offense in the law of war, but one
that does not apply to someone like Khadr, who was not behind
.272
enemy lines.
Khadr's lawyers before the military commission brought a
large number of challenges to these charges. They argued that the
commission did not have jurisdiction over crimes such as murder
and conspiracy. They also argued that the military commission did
not have jurisdiction because Khadr was a child solider. In a
number of generally terse decisions, these motions were all
rejected. In one ruling, Military Judge Brownback asserted that
Congress had a reasonable basis for acting and that it simply
recognized crimes that existed in 2002 when Khadr was alleged to
273
have committed them. He also denied the child solider motion
on the basis that there was no age limit placed on the definition of
unlawful enemy combatants in the Military Commissions Act. He
reasoned that these provisions would prevail even if treaties
prohibited trials of a person for acts committed when he was fifteen
years of age. Even though treaties technically have the status of law
in the United States, consistent with extra-legalism, they are
270. See David Glazier, A Court Without Jurisdiction: A Critical Assessment of the
Militay Commission Charges Against Omar Khadr, SSRN, 11 (Sept. 1, 2010),
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=1669946 (explaining ways
an enemy-combatant may also be prosecuted for war crimes).
271. Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 598-612 (2006). Justice Kennedy
held that it was unnecessary to decide this question. Id. at 655 (Kennedy, J.,
concurring).
272. Glazier, supra note 270, at 28.
273. United States v. Khadr, Ruling on Def. Mot. to Dismiss Charge Three for
Lack of Subject Matter Jurisdiction 4, (Apr. 21, 2008), available at
http://www.mc.mil/CASES/MilitaryCommissions.aspx (follow "Omar Ahmed
Khadr" hyperlink; under "Category" tab, select "Docket"; at the bottom of the
page, follow ". . ." hyperlink; at the bottom of the page, follow "12" hyperlink;
follow "Military Judge's Order Denying Defense Motion to Dismiss Charge Three
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generally not directly enforceable.2 74 In another decision, the
military court judge similarly held that even if the Optional
Protocol to the Convention on the Involvement of Children in
Armed Conflict prohibited the use of statements, the Military
Commissions Act would take precedence with respect to the
admissibility of statements taken from Khadr. One feature of
American extra-legalism is a narrow positivism in which literal
interpretations of domestic statutes generally trump claims based
on international law or appeals to justice or equity.
Khadr was denied several rights that would have been available
to him if tried in criminal courts as a juvenile. The military court
judge held that provisions for trials of juveniles in federal court
would not apply because military commissions fell outside of the
definition of federal courts.2 76 Khadr also did not have speedy trial
rights because of his lack of connection to the United States and
because he did not face a criminal prosecution under the Sixth
977
Amendment. In August 2010, Military Judge Parrish ruled on a
critical suppression motion in a nine-page judgment. He decided
that while there was evidence of an interrogator telling Khadr a
fictional story about an Afghan prisoner being raped in an
American prison, the threat did not amount to torture. He also
found that the threat was not related to Khadr's subsequent
incriminating statements. The judgment found that Khadr's
274. Oona A. Hathaway, Sabria McElroy & Sara Aronchick Solow, International
Law at Home: Enforcing Treaties in U.S. Courts, 37 YALEJ. INT'L L. 51 (2012).
275. United States v. Khadr, Ruling on Def. Mot. to Suppress Evidence of
Statements (Violation of Child Solider Protocol), (Aug. 15, 2008), available at
http://www.mc.mil/CASES/MilitaryCommissions.aspx (follow "Omar Ahmed
Khadr" hyperlink; under "Category" tab, select "Docket"; at the bottom of the
page, follow "9" hyperlink; follow "MilitaryJudge's Order Denying Defense Motion
to Suppress Evidence of Statements (Violation of Child Solider Protocol) (D-062)"
hyperlink) (last visited Apr. 17, 2012).
276. See United States v. Khadr, Ruling on Def. Mot. for Dismissal Due to Lack
of Jurisdiction Under the MCA in Regard to Juvenile Crimes of a Child Soldier
(Apr. 30, 2008), available at http://www.defense.gov/news/d20080430Motion.pdf.
277. United States v. Khadr, Ruling of Def. Mot. To Dismiss (for Violation of
the Sixth Amendment Right to a Speedy Trial), (Sept. 15, 2008), available at
http://www.mc.mil/CASES/MilitaryCommissions.aspx (follow "Omar Ahmed
Khadr" hyperlink; under "Category" tab, select "Docket"; at the bottom of the
page, follow "8" hyperlink; follow "Military judge's Order Denying Defense Motion
to Dismiss for Violation of the Sixth Amendment Right to a Speedy Trial (D-068)"
hyperlink) (last visited Mar. 10, 2012).
278. United States v. Khadr, Ruling on Suppression Motions D-097 and D- 111,
at 9, (Aug. 17, 2010) available at http://www.mc.mil/CASES/MilitaryCommissions
.aspx (follow "Omar Ahmed Khadr" hyperlink; under "Category" tab, select
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statements were voluntary, not the product of mistreatment, and
that the incriminating videotape was not "'fruit of the poisonous
tree' as there is no 'poisonous tree." " The rhetoric of a due
process exclusionary rule widely but perhaps erroneously perceived
as stacked in favor of the accused was used as a means to dismiss
relief. Omar Khadr was denied many of the benefits of a criminal
trial while at the same time subject to military prosecution for acts
that have traditionally not been recognized as war crimes. Law was
used, but systemically to the advantage of the state and to the
disadvantage of Omar Khadr.
Shortly after the August 2010 ruling refusing to exclude
incriminating statements, as well as the October 2010 exchange of
diplomatic notes between Canada and the United States that
contemplated that Khadr could serve much of his sentence in
prison in Canada,2m Khadr pled guilty to the charges of murder,
attempted murder, conspiracy, material support of terrorism, and
spying. Consistent with extra-legalism, in which law is used to
preclude legal claims, his plea agreement includes an agreement
that he will not bring claims relating to his capture, detention, or
trial "in any forum in any Nation."81  In this way, Khadr's plea
agreement echoed President Bush's initial military order that
attempted to preclude any judicial review of the detentions
282
whether in American or foreign courts.
According to the terms of his plea agreement, Omar Khadr
received an eight-year sentence. The result for Khadr was far better
than the forty-year sentence that the 'jury" of military officers
would have imposed on Khadr after hearing testimony from
"Docket"; at the bottom of the page, follow "2" hyperlink; follow "Military Judge's
Order Denying Defense Motions to Suppress the Accused Statements (D-097) and
Video Tape (D-111)" hyperlink) (last visited Apr. 17, 2012).
279. Id.
280. United States v. Khadr, U.S. and Canadian Diplomatic Notes Dated
10/23/2010 (Oct. 24, 2010), available at http://www.mc.mil/CASES/Military
Commissions.aspx (follow "Omar Ahmed Khadr" hyperlink; under "Category" tab,
select "Docket"; follow "U.S. and Canadian Diplomatic Notes Dated 10/23/2010"
hyperlink) (last visited Apr. 17, 2012).
281. United States v. Khadr, Khadr Military Commission Approved Offer for
Pre-trial Agreement (Oct. 13, 2010), available at
http://www.mc.mil/CASES/MilitaryCommissions.aspx (follow "Omar Ahmed
Khadr" hyperlink; under "Category" tab, select "Docket"; at the bottom of the
page, follow "2" hyperlink; follow "Khadr Military Commission Approved Pretrial
Agreement" hyperlink) (last visited Apr. 17, 2012).
282. Exec. Order No. 13235, National Emergency Construction Authority, 66
Fed. Reg. 58,343 (Nov. 20, 2001).
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Tabitha Speer, the widow of Sergeant Speer, who Khadr admitted
to killing with a grenade."' Mrs. Speer testified that " [e]veryone
wants to talk about how he's the victim, he's the child. I don't see
that. The victims, the children, are my children" who were eleven
and eight-years old at the time of the sentencing.284 Her moving
victim impact statement was consistent with populist and victim
rights strains in the American criminal process. The Speer family
also obtained a default judgment for $94.5 million against the
Khadr family in the U.S. District Court for the District of Utah, with
Judge Cassell holding that Khadr's actions were not "acts of war"
for the purposes of civil suit even though they were treated as war
crimes for purposes of Omar Khadr's military detention and trial.86
Consistent with the new paradigm represented by the Military
Commissions Act, Khadr and his family were deprived of the
benefits that would accrue both to soldiers and civilians.
Concerns linger about the legitimacy of the guilty plea, both in
relation to the military commission's purported jurisdiction over
the offenses and the pre-trial ruling that Khadr's incriminatory
statements were not tainted by threats that he would be raped in an
American prison.' As discussed above, Khadr's attempts to
challenge the jurisdiction of the military commission in federal
court were thwarted by multiple rulings by Judge Bates, who held
that he should defer to the ongoing military proceedings and
would assume that Khadr's rights would be vindicated either in the
military commission or on appeal to the civilian courts. Former
Guantanamo detainee David Hicks has argued that Khadr, like
himself, only pled guilty in order to leave Guantanamo and because
he was convinced that no military commission would render an
283. Omar Khadr Sentenced to Symbolic 40 Years, CBC NEWS (Oct. 31, 2010),
http://www.cbc.ca/news/world/story/2010/10/31/guantanamo-khadr-
sentencing.html.
284. Jennifer Turner, The Victims, ACLU (Oct. 29, 2010),
http://www.aclu.org/blog/human-rights-national-security/victims.
285. See, e.g., Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808 (1991) (allowing victim impact
statements in capital sentencing proceedings); DAVID GARLAND, THE CULTURE OF
CONTROL: CRIME AND SOCIAL ORDER IN CONTEMPORARY SOCIETY (2002); DAVID
GARLAND, PECULIAR INSTITUTION: AMERICA'S DEATH PENALTY IN AN AGE OF ABOLITION
(2011); Kenji Yoshino, The City and the Poet, 114 YALE L.J. 1835 (2005).
286. Morris v. Khadr, 415 F. Supp. 2d 1323, 1333-34 ("The court refuses to be
al Qaeda's advocate and force plaintiffs to prove that, in fact, al Qaeda's members
are not 'military forces of any origin' that would be entitled to immunity under [§
2336(a)].").
287. Suppression Motion Ruling by Military CourtJudge Colonel Parish D-094,
D-1 11, (17 Aug. 2010), available at http://www.defense.gov/news/D94-DI 11 .pdf.
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acquittal."
What will happen to Omar Khadr? He remains in
Guantanamo as of mid-March 2012, and arguments have surfaced
in Canada that the Canadian government should reject his transfer
to Canada on the basis that he constitutes a threat to national
security. The plea agreement recognizes that, if transferred to
Canada, Omar Khadr will be eligible for release under controls by
the Canadian parole board after having served a third of his eight-
year sentence. Once his eight-year sentence expires, Omar Khadr
will not be subject to controls. However, under a provision added
to the Canadian Criminal Code after 9/11,"o he could potentially
be subject to restrictions through a peace bond if a judge
concludes that there is a reasonable fear that he will commit a
terrorism offense. American legislative restrictions on transfer of
Guantanamo detainees to foreign countries specifically do not
apply to plea agreements like Khadr's that were reached before the
291
passage of the National Defense Authorization Act for 2012.
It is an interesting, but probably academic question whether
these strict certification requirements would be satisfied by the
release of Omar Khadr in Canada. They would require Canada to
agree to take actions that would satisfy the U.S. Secretary of
Defense that Omar Khadr would not engage in any terrorist activity
and to share information with the United States about Khadr and
288. David Hicks, Pressure to Plead Guilty, 29(4) Human Rights Defender, 14
(2010), available at http://www.amnesty.ca/files/David%2OHicks%200pinion
%20re%200mar%20Khadr%20Pressure%20to%20Plead%2Guilty%2ONov%202
010.pdf.
289. Under section 10 of the International Transfers of Offenders Act, S.C.
2004, c. 21 (Can.), the Canadian Minister of Public Safety has discretion whether
to accept Canadian citizens to serve prison sentences in Canada. The Minister can
consider factors including whether the offender's return would constitute a threat
to the security of Canada, whether the offender after transfer will commit a
terrorism offense, and whether the foreign confinement threatens an offender's
security or human rights. The diplomatic notes exchanged by Canada with the
United States surrounding Khadr's agreement, however, provides in part that
" [t]he Government of Canada therefore wishes to convey that, as requested by the
United States, the government is inclined to favourably consider Mr. Khadr's
application to be transferred to Canada to serve the remainder of his sentence . ..
Memorandum for Michael L. Bruhn Executive Secretary Dep't of Defense,
(2010), available at http://www.cbc.ca/news/pdf/khadr-papers.pdf.
290. Criminal Code of Canada, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46, s. 810.01, amended by S.C.
2001, c. 41 s. 22 (Can.).
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his associates that could affect the security of the United States.292
As will be seen in the next section, however, Omar Khadr's older
brother, Abdullah Khadr, who has confirmed his admiration for
the 9/11 terrorists, has been free in Canada since August 2010, and
is not subject to any restrictions or charges. There is also a
possibility that once Omar Khadr is returned to Canada, he might,
despite the terms of his plea agreement, attempt directly or
indirectly to challenge his treatment or guilty plea at Guantanamo
given that Canadian courts have already indirectly reviewed his
detention at Guantanamo. Canadian litigation over Omar Khadr
and, as will be seen below, over Abdullah Khadr, indicates how
American counter-terrorism can be subject to indirect challenge in
the courts of other countries.
D. Canadian Rejection of the Attempt to Extradite Abdullah Khadr to the
United States
Although Canada and the United States eventually reached
agreements in the Omar Khadr case that encouraged him to plead
guilty and contemplate his return to Canada, there has been much
more conflict between Canada and the United States over the
treatment of Omar's older brother Abdullah. Abdullah Khadr was
captured by the Inter-Services Intelligence Directorate (ISI) in
Pakistan in October 2004 after the United States posted a $500,000
bounty for his capture.9  The fact that the United States paid such
a bounty was a secret until it was revealed by a Canadian judge in
state secrets proceedings related to an American extradition
request to Canada. The judge stressed that, while the United
States had not agreed to the release of information about the
bounty, "[i]t is now more than three years since the information
was received by Canadian officials, the general practice is in the
public domain, no human source would appear to be at risk and
the circumstances in Pakistan have changed since these events took
place."
Abdullah Khadr alleged he was tortured by Pakistani officials,
but a Canadian extradition judge found these allegations of torture
296
were not established because of inconsistencies in Khadr's story.
292. Id. s.1028 (2) (b) (1), (d)-(f).
293. United States v. Khadr, 2011 ONCA 358, para. 7 (Can.).
294. Khadr v. Canada, 2008 F.C. 549, para. 107 (Can.).
295. Id. at para. 111.
296. United States v. Khadr, 2010, ONSC 4338, para. 61 (Can.).
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Khadr also did not complain of abuse during the consular visits he
eventually received from Canadian officials, though he was also not
asked by consular officials if he had been abused.9' The
extradition judge found that Khadr was physically abused by
Pakistani officials but not by an unnamed American intelligence
298
agency when they extensively interviewed him in Pakistan.
Abdullah Khadr was held for fourteen months in a secret
detention center in Pakistan without access to counsel or courts.
He was denied consular access to Canadian officials until January
2005. 29 The Canadian extradition judge found that Pakistan and
the United States acted "in concert" to deny access in order to
facilitate interrogation by U.S. intelligence.300 Thereafter, however,
Khadr received consular visits and Canadian officials consistently
and eventually successfully lobbied Pakistani officials for his return
to Canada. In this way, the officials responded to some of the
lessons from the Arar affair. The Arar inquiry criticized the
Canadian government for sending "mixed si nals" about whether it
wanted Maher Arar returned to Canada.'0  Although Canadian
officials acted properly in requesting Khadr's return to Canada, it is
ironic that such action assisted Abdullah Khadr, who had publicly
admitted his support for al Qaeda, and not Maher Arar.
In June 2005, the Pakistani authorities were prepared to
release Khadr, concluding that they had gained all the intelligence
from him that was possible. As in the Arar case, however, American
officials were alarmed at the prospect that Khadr might return to
Canada. In June 2005, a Canadian CSIS officer "received a phone
call from his American intelligence counterpart telling him the
U.S. agency disagreed with and was concerned about plans to
repatriate Khadr to Canada. The United States believed Khadr still
posed a threat and that releasing him at this point was not a wise
course of action. As in the Arar case, Canada was the last place
that U.S. officials wanted Khadr sent because of the porous border
it shares with the United States. U.S. officials supported plans to
transfer Khadr to the Pakistani court system, but the ISI vetoed this
idea for fear that it might result in disclosure of their agents,
297. Id. at paras. 46, 55.
298. Id. at paras. 105-06.
299. Id. at paras. 57.
300. Id. at paras. 116,120.
301. COMMISSION OF INQUIRY ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 4, at
206-19.
302. United States v. Khadr, 2010 ONSC 4338, para. 69 (Can.).
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sources, and methods.0 Thereafter, U.S. officials devoted their
efforts to preparing a criminal case against Khadr in the United
States. They requested that Pakistan render or extradite Khadr
directly to the United States, despite the objections of Canadian
officials.304 Even if Khadr had been irregularly rendered to the
United States at that time, the process used to bring him to the
United States and his mistreatment in Pakistan would not have
been relevant under the Ker/Fisbie1 doctrine with respect to any
terrorism trial in the United States. As will be seen, the
mistreatment of Khadr in Pakistan was much more relevant to
Canadian courts in deciding whether to extradite him to the
United States.
Why did U.S. officials not want Abdullah Khadr returned to
Canada? They likely would have known that Khadr would not be
charged and detained if returned to Canada, given that an RCMP
officer, who went to Pakistan in April 2005 to interview Khadr,
refused to conduct an interview for law enforcement purposes,
when Pakistani officials would not allow Khadr to contact his
Canadian lawyer or allow the RCMP to videotape the interview. 06
As discussed above, Canada does not have a tradition of pretextual
charges as a means of detaining those suspected of other crimes.
The admissibility of any statements that Khadr made in Pakistan
could also be challenged under the Charter, given that his
conditions of confinement violated international law because of the
lack of access to courts and counsel. 07  In any event, Canadian
courts would reject involuntary statements in part because of
concerns that they might be false confessions. Canada's concerns
about due process made it difficult to prosecute Abdullah Khadr in
Canada. In 2005, American officials would have been troubled by
Canada's inability to gain convictions in terrorism prosecutions. In
303. Id. at para. 65.
304. Id. at para. 75.
305. See United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 504 U.S. 655 (1992); Frisbie v.
Collins, 342 U.S. 519 (1952); Ker v. Illinois, 119 U.S. 436 (1886).
306. United States v. Khadr, 2010 ONSC 4338, at paras. 62-63 (Can.).
307. See R. v. Hape [2007] 2 S.C.R. 292, para. 91 (Can.) (stating that "ex post
facto scrutiny of the investigation by a Canadian court in a Canadian trial ... might
result in the exclusion of evidence gathered in breach of the Charter" outside of
Canada) (italics in the original); Khadr v. Canada [2010] 1 S.C.R. 44 (Can.).
308. See R. v. Oickle [2000] 2 S.C.R. 3, para. 68 (Can.) ("[B]ecause of the
criminal justice system's overriding concern not to convict the innocent, a
confession will not be admissible if it is made under circumstances that raise a
reasonable doubt as to voluntariness.").
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that year, two men accused of the 1985 Air India bombings were
acquitted after a long and difficult trial, and no convictions had
yet been registered under the 2001 Anti-Terrorism Act. After the
RCMP refused to interview Khadr for law enforcement purposes,
the United States sent the FBI to Pakistan to interview him for law
enforcement purposes. The United States also attempted without
success to persuade the Pakistanis to allow him to be brought to the
311United States for trial. Although the secrecy of both events
prevents a definitive conclusion, it is likely that the unwillingness of
Canadian officials to charge and detain both Maher Arar in 2002
and Abdullah Khadr in 2005 prompted American officials to seek
alternatives to returning a Canadian citizen to Canada.
In July 2005, FBI agents interviewed Khadr in Pakistan for law-
enforcement purposes. American officials in August 2005
subsequently attempted, without success, to have Khadr "sent
directly to the United States. In November 2005, "a senior
United States official" asked Canada to consent to further delay in
Khadr's release and return to Canada so that the U.S. officials
could "'get their act together' with respect to extradition plans.""'
The Canadian officials, perhaps mindful of the controversies
caused by delays in agreeing to Maher Arar's return,1  refused.
Khadr was released to Canadian consular officials and flown back
to Canada at the end of November 2005. Unlike Mohammed
MansourJabarah, Abdullah Khadr was not transferred to American
custody by Canadian officials, with no legal process, and in
violation of his Charter rights, including his right as a Canadian
citizen to remain in Canada. The Canadian officials in the
Abdullah Khadr case respected his consular rights and were
successful in convincing Pakistan to return Khadr to Canada and
not the United States. At the same time, however, Canadian
officials were not prepared to charge Khadr. Unlike the FBI,
Canadian officials concluded that they could not gather evidence
309. R. v. Malik, 2005 BCSC 350, para. 1345 (Can.).
310. See R. v. Khawaja, 2010 ONCA 862, para. 189 (Can.) (noting that the
sentencing of Khawaja in 2006 was "the first sentencing under Canada's Part 11.1
Terrorism provisions").
311. United States v. Khadr, 2010 ONSC 4338, paras. 73-75 (Can.).
312. Id. at para. 75.
313. Id. at para. 76.
314. See COMMISSION OF INQUIRY ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 4,
at 206-29.
315. See SEC. INTELLIGENCE REVIEW COMM., supra note 126, at 1160 (providing a
review of the case of Mohammed MansourJabarah).
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for law enforcement purposes from Abdullah Khadr while he was
detained in Pakistan. 6
The FBI maintained their interest in Khadr after he returned
to Canada and was not prepared to cede any criminal investigation
to Canadian officials. They sent the same two agents who had
interviewed Khadr in Pakistan to interview him in Toronto with
317
representatives of the RCMP present. A Canadian extradition
judge would have excluded the results of the Toronto FBI interview
because he found that they were derived from the interviews in
Pakistan. In those interviews, Khadr admitted to supplying al
Qaeda with machine gun rounds, grenades, rockets, and explosive
material to be used against American and coalition forces. The
Canadian extradition judge found that the statements obtained
from the Pakistan interview should be excluded in extradition
proceedings as manifestly unreliable because they were conducted
in a "hostile and oppressive environment" in which Khadr was
denied access to counsel and the courts."1 9 The contrast between
this ruling and the military commission ruling refusing to exclude
statements taken from Omar Khadr when, as a younger person, he
was also detained without access to counsel and courts is striking."'
American courts also are unwilling to exclude evidence in
extradition proceedings that may have been obtained throu h
torture or mistreatment under general rules of non-inquiry.
Canadian extradition courts now require higher standards of
adjudicative fairness than American military commissions or
American extradition courts.
Another contrast between the Omar and Abdullah Khadr cases
is the different remedial posture taken by the Canadian courts. As
discussed above, the Supreme Court of Canada reversed a
mandatory order that Canada request Omar Khadr's return from
316. See Canada (Att'y Gen.) v. Khadr, 2010 ONSC 4338, para. 62 (Can. Ont.
Sup. Ct.J.).
317. Id. at paras. 86-94.
318. United States v. Khadr, [2008] 234 C.C.C. 3d 129, para. 8 (Can.).
319. Id. at para. 161.
320. See Defense Motion to Suppress Evidence of Statements (in Violation of
Child Soldier Protocol), United States v. Khadr, (May 29, 2008), available at
http://www.defense.gov/news/khadr%20-%20d%20-%20062%20child%20soldier
%20protocol.pdf.
321. Atuar v. United States, 156 Fed. App'x 555, 563 (4th Cir. 2005) (refusing
to exclude evidence in extradition proceedings claimed to be derived from torture
in Turkey). See generally Mathew Murchison, Extradition's Paradox: Duty, Discretion
and Rights in the World ofNon-Inquiry, 43 STAN.J. INT'L. L. 295 (2007).
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the United States on the basis that it did not give adequate weight
to governmental prerogatives in conducting Canadian-American
diplomacy." In the Abdullah Khadr case, the extradition judge
found that a stay of proceedings of the extradition case was
warranted given American conduct in this case. Justice Speyer
concluded:
Although Khadr may have possessed information of
intelligence value, he is still entitled to the safeguards and
benefit of the law, and not to arbitrary and illegal
detention in a secret detention centre where he was
subjected to physical abuse. The United States was the
driving force behind Khadr's fourteen month detention
in Pakistan, paying a $500,000 bounty for his
apprehension. The United States intelligence agency
acted in concert with the ISI to delay consular access by
DFAIT to Khadr for three months, contrary to the
provisions of the Vienna Convention. The United States,
contrary to Canada's wishes, pressured the ISI to delay
Khadr's repatriation because of its dissatisfaction with
Khadr being released without charge, even though there
was no admissible evidence upon which to base charges at
that time. In my view, given this gross misconduct, there
cannot be a clearer case that warrants a stay.
In reaching this conclusion, the extradition judge relied on a
2001 Supreme Court of Canada judgment that stayed extradition
proceedings after an American prosecutor had threatened a
fugitive with a maximum sentence and hinted at the possibility of
rape in an American prison if the fugitive contested extradition to
the United States.m The contrast between the Canadian approach,
which held that the extradition was tainted by mistreatment, and
the approach taken by the military judge in the Omar Khadr case,
who concluded that a threat of rape in American prison did not
taint any of Omar Khadr's subsequent statements, is also striking.m
It is also significant that the Canadian courts did not base their
decisions to stay Abdullah Khadr's extradition to the United States
on the basis that he is a Canadian citizen. The courts applied
322. Canada v. Khadr, [2010] 1 S.C.R. 44, para. 2 (Can.).
323. See Canada (Att'y Gen.) v. Khadr, 2010 ONSC 4338, para. 150 (Can.)
(italics in original).
324. See id. at para. 127 (citing United States v. Cobb, 2001 SCC 19, para. 9
(Can.)).
325. See Ruling on Suppression Motion, United States v. Khadr, (Aug. 17,
2010), available at http://wvw.defense.gov/news/D94-D111.pdf.
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standards of fairness taken from section 7 of the Canadian Charter,
which applies to all persons and not just Canadian citizens. The
increasing due process orientation of Canadian extradition
proceedings could potentially frustrate American-Canadian
cooperation on extradition matters. For example, the Canadian
courts will likely not allow anyone to be extradited from Canada to
the United States without assurances that the United States will not
apply the death penalty. 2 6 In addition, an Iraqi national held in
Canada is currently resisting extradition to the United States on
terrorism charges related in suicide bombings in Iraq in part on
the basis that as a foreign national in the United States he will be
liable to military detention and trial in the United States under the
327
National Defense Appropriation Act.
The decision to stay extradition proceedings against Abdullah
Khadr led to his release after four-and-a-half years of pre-
extradition custody.:2 Canadian judges had denied Khadr bail first
in 2006 and later in 2009 because of concerns that he might flee
the jurisdiction given his and his family's history.329 The judges also
found that granting Khadr bail would adversely affect public
confidence in the justice system.3s0 The judge who denied bail in
2006 noted that Abdullah Khadr attended al Qaeda training camps
at the bin Laden compound. The judge also noted that Abdullah
326. United States v. Burns, [2001] 1 S.C.R. 283 (Can).
327. The case involves an attempt to extradite Sayfidin Tahir-Sharif, also
known as Faruq Khalil Muhammad 'Isa, on charges related to a suicide bombing
in Iraq that killed five American soldiers. Hearing Delayed for Canadian Facing
Terrorism Charges, GLOBE & MAIL, Jan. 30, 2012. For details of the indictment see
Press Release, Alleged Terrorist Indicted in New York for the Murder of Five American
Soldiers, FBI (Dec. 9, 2011), http://www.fbi.gov/newyork/press-releases/2011
/alleged-terrorist-indicted-in-new-york-for-the-murder-of-five-american-soldiers.
Presidential waivers of military custody under s.1022 of the National Defence
Appropriations Act can be granted in cases where a foreign country indicates that
it will not extradite or transfer terrorist suspects to the United States if that option
is available.
328. See Abdullah Khadr Released After Court Ruling, CBC NEWs, Aug. 4, 2010,
http://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/stoiy/2010/08/04/abdullah-khadr-extradition
.html.
329. See United States v. Khadr, [2006] 262 D.L.R. (4th) 652, paras. 44-65
(Can. Ont. Sup. Ct. J.); United States v. Khadr, [2008] 234 C.C.C. (3d) 129, para.
16 (Can. On. Sup. Ct.J.).
330. Bail can be denied in Canada because of concerns that (1) the accused
will not appear for trial or (2) that the accused will commit an offense if released
and (3) that the denial of bail will undermine public confidence in the
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Khadr had told an interviewer in February 2004 that "he dreams
himself [sic] of becoming a martyr for Islam, expressed his
admiration for the terrorists who crashed into the World Trade
Buildings on September 11, 2001 and referred to Osama Bin Laden
as a 'saint.' 33 ' During the same 2004 interview both Abdullah
Khadr's mother and sister expressed approval of the 9/11 attacks
332
and the prospects of family members dying as martyrs for Islam.
The Crown appealed the stay of proceedings to the Ontario
Court of Appeal. The appeal was dismissed and the stay was upheld
in a unanimous judgment by the three-judge panel. Justice Sharpe
relied in part on British authority that had stayed proceedings in a
case of an irregular extradition, 1 a result quite different than that
reached by the U.S. Supreme Court under the Ker/Frisbie
doctrine. The Canadian courts were not as prepared as the
American courts would be to wash their hands of mistreatment in
bringing a person before the court. The Ontario Court of Appeal
held that the alternative remedies of excluding the statements
taken by the FBI in Pakistan and Toronto would fail to disassociate
the court from the "'gross misconduct' that could not be remedied
by anything short of a stay of proceedings." ,3  The court of appeal
stressed that "the rule of law must prevail even in the face of the
dreadful threat of terrorism" and even when it "serves in the short
term to benefit those who oppose and seek to destroy" such
values.8 The judgment eloquently reaffirms the importance of
protecting rights and judicial integrity even in a case involving
331. United States v. Khadr, [2006] 262 D.L.R. 4th 652, para. 48 (Can. Ont.
Sup. Ct. J.). Another judge at a subsequent bail review held that the latter
comment contained in the U.S. record of the case may have been taken out of
context because "[tjhe statement concerns Mr. Khadr's observations, as a younger
person, when his family lived in bin Laden's compound. They seem to capture
Mr. Khadr's impressions of the way bin Laden interacted with others, and not his
political and terrorist activities." United States v. Khadr, [2008] 234 C.C.C. 3d 129,
para. 16 (Can. Ont. Sup. Ct.J.).
332. United States v. Khadr, [2008] 234 C.C.C. 3d 129, para. 20 (Can. Ont.
Sup. Ct.J.).
333. United States v. Khadr, 2011 ONCA 358, para. 48 (Can.) (citing R. v.
Horseferry Road Magistrates Court, Ex Parte Bennett, [1994] 1 A.C. 42, 65-66
(H.L.) where Lord Bridge in particular expressed a preference forjustice Stevens'
dissenting opinion in United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 504 U.S. 655 (1992)).
334. See Frisbie v. Collins, 342 U.S. 519 (1952) (followed in the terrorist cases
of United States v. Yunis, 924 F.2d 1086 (D.C. Cir. 1991) and United States v.
Yousef, 927 F. Supp. 673 (S.D.N.Y. 1996)); Ker v. Illinois, 119 U.S. 436 (1886); see
also United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 504 U.S. 655 (1992).
335. United States v. Khadr, 2011 ONCA 358, para. 66 (Can.).
336. Id. at para. 76.
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The Ontario Court of Appeal determined that it was not
necessary "to balance the protection and vindication of the court's
integrity with the societal interest in responding positively to the
extradition request," because the clearest possible case for a stay of
proceedings had been established. This approach demonstrates
the considerable weight that Canadian courts give to due process
under the Charter and their willingness to impose these concepts
even in situations that involve international cooperation against
terrorism. Pre-Charterjudicial deference to the state was a thing of
the past even though it was not until 1985 that the Supreme Court
of Canada finally recognized that' courts could stay proceedings as a
response to pre-trial abuses by the state. 13 The Ontario Court of
Appeal did add, however, that if balancing the competing interests
was warranted, the Canadian government's "emotive argument that
because of what the extradition judge did, an admitted terrorist
collaborator is allowed to walk free is unfounded," because Khadr
could be prosecuted in Canada under the 2001 Anti-Terrorism Act
339
for acts of terrorism that were committed outside of Canada.
Abdullah Khadr could be charged with making property
available, knowing that it would be used to benefit a terrorist
group, under section 83.03(b) of the Criminal Code of Canada34 0
and with participatinF in a terrorist group under section 83.18 of
the Criminal Code for his alleged acts of supplying terrorist
groups in Pakistan with firearms and explosives. He could also be
charged with the commission of weapons or explosive offenses for
the benefit of a terrorist group under section 83.2 of the Code. 4 2
All of these offenses can be prosecuted if committed outside
Canada by a Canadian citizen by virtue of section 7(3.74) of the
337. Id. at para. 69.
338. R. v. Jewitt, [1985] 2 S.C.R. 128 (Can.).
339. United States v. Khadr, 2011 ONCA 358, para. 77 (Can.).
340. R.S.C. 1985, c. C-34, s.83.03 amended b S.C. 2001, c. 41. The "financing
offence" requires proof of knowledge that the property will be used by or benefit a
terrorist group and is subject to a maximum of ten years imprisonment.
341. Id. s.83.18. The "participation offence" requires both knowledge of a
terrorist group and the purpose of enhancing its ability to carry out a terrorist
activity and is subject to a maximum of ten years imprisonment. Id.
342. Id. s.83.2. This offense carries a maximum of life imprisonment and
requires proof of the fault for the underlying offense and that the offense was
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Criminal Code.1 Although a six-month sentence in Canada was
upheld for a person who pled guilty to giving between $2,000 and
$3,000 to the Tamil Tigers,344 Abdullah Khadr would, if convicted,
face much greater sentences under a series of Ontario Court of
Appeal decisions which raised the sentences for those convicted in
the first successful prosecutions of new terrorism offenses created
in the wake of 9/11.115
Abdullah Khadr has, however, not been charged in Canada
since his release in August 2010. The extradition judge ruled that
the FBI interviews of Khadr in both Pakistan and Toronto, which
obtained incriminating statements from him, are inadmissible
because the former was obtained-in oppressive circumstances and
the latter was derived from the first. This demonstrates that the
"fruit of the poisonous tree" exclusionary doctrine disparaged by
the military court judge in the Omar Khadr case 34 is alive and well
348
in Canada and applies in extradition proceedings. The
extradition judge did, however, find that Khadr's initial interview
with the RCMP upon his return to Toronto was admissible 1 even
though the RCMP officer who conducted the interview had
interviewed Khadr in Pakistan, albeit not for law enforcement
purposes. It is not clear from the reported judgments, however,
whether Khadr made any incriminating statements in the
admissible Toronto interview. In any event, he has not been
charged with any offense more than eighteen months after being
343. Id. s.7(3.74).
344. R. v. Thambaithurai, 2011 BCCA 137, paras. 2, 8 (Can. Ont. C.A.).
345. R. v. Khawaja, 2010 ONCA 862, para. 5 (Can.); R. v. Gaya, 2010 ONCA
860, para. 6 (Can.); R. v. Khalid, 2010 ONCA 861, para. 8 (Can.); R. v. Amara,
2010 ONCA 858, paras. 16-17 (Can.).
346. Canada (Atty' Gen.) v. Khadr, 2010 ONSC 4338, paras. 161, 171-75
(Can.).
347. United States v. Khadr, Ruling on Suppression Motions D-097 and D-1 11,
at 9, (Aug. 17, 2010) available at http://www.mc.mil/CASES/MilitaryCommissions
.aspx (follow "Omar Ahmed Khadr" hyperlink; under "Category" tab, select
"Docket"; at the bottom of the page, follow "2" hyperlink; follow "Military Judge's
Order Denying Defense Motions to Suppress the Accused Statements (D-097) and
Video Tape (D-111)" hyperlink) (last visited Apr. 17, 2012).
348. Canada's domestic exclusionary rule is constitutionally entrenched in
s.24(2) of the Charter and the Supreme Court has recognized that extradition
judges have discretion to exclude evidence gathered in an abusive manner by
foreign authorities in order to protect the fairness of extradition proceedings.
United States v. Schulman, [2001] 1 S.C.R. 616, para. 56 (Can.). For recent
restrictions on the American exclusionary rule see Davis v. United States, 131 S. Ct.
2419 (2011); Herring v. United States, 555 U.S. 135 (2009).
349. United States v. Schulman, [2001] 1 S.C.R. 616, para. 170 (Can.).
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released by the extradition judge. As will be seen in the next
section, even if Abdullah Khadr is eventually charged, his
prosecution in Canada would face a number of challenges.
E. The Distinct Challenges of Canadian Terrorism Prosecutions
The most pressing concern about terrorism prosecutions in
Canada is not the adequacy of offenses and penalties, but the
process of prosecutions. Until 1982, Canada maintained a system
where the Attorney General of Canada could make absolute and
non-reviewable claims to the courts that would prevent judicial
inspection or disclosure of information on the basis that disclosure
would harm national security, national defense, or international
relations. 1o This approach lagged behind developments elsewhere
in the common-law world and reflected Canadian anxieties about
being a net importer of intelligence. Indeed, as discussed in the
second part of this article, Canada overreacted by holding a secret
public inquiry that held suspected spies incommunicado and
without access to counsel immediately after World War II, in part
because of fears that Canada may have allowed nuclear secrets,
most notably American and British secrets, to fall into the hands of
the Russians. 15 Canadian concerns about secrecy were reaffirmed
with the 1984 creation of the CSIS as a domestic and civilian
security intelligence agency. This agency was born during the Cold
War and, until 2008, it interpreted its intelligence mandate as
justifying the destruction of raw intelligence in order to maximize
secrecy. CSIS's destruction of wiretaps it obtained in relation to
the Air India bombing was found to violate the Charter rights of
the accused, and its destruction of wiretaps in the Ahmed Ressam
case frustrated American officials, though it did not prevent
Ressam's subsequent conviction in the United States.3 The
combined forces of CSIS' Cold War mentality about the primary
importance of secrecy, its lack of concern about the evidentiary
350. See Commission des droits de la personne v. Canada (Att'y Gen.), [1982]
1 S.C.R. 215 (Can.).
351. See supra Part II.
352. Charkaoui v. Minister of Citizenship and Immigration, [2008] 2 S.C.R.
326, para. 2 (Can.).
353. R. v. Malik, 2004 BCSC 554, para. 22 (Can.).
354. KERRY PITHER, DARK DAYs: THE STORY OF FOUR CANADIANS TORTURED IN THE
NAME OF FIGHTING TERROR 33-34 (2008). In accordance with its standard policies,
CSIS destroyed 400 hours of electronic surveillance on Ressam after making
summaries. Id. at 33.
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implications of intelligence, and Canada's traditional anxieties
about disclosing the secrets of its allies meant that secrecy claims
have been an imposing obstacle to Canadian terrorism
prosecutions.
Absolute and unreviewable claims of secrecy by the executive
were no longer tenable in Canada after the enactment of the
Charter as a constitutional bill of rights in 1982. In that year,
Canada moved cautiously to allow judicial review of secrecy claims.
It did not follow the model of the 1980 American Classified
Information Procedures Act (CIPA) 5 or British public interest
immunity models in giving trial judges access to secret information
for the purposes of determining whether it had to be disclosed to
the accused. Instead, this power was only given to specially
designated judges of the Federal Court of Canada. Unlike in the
United States, the federal courts in Canada have only limited
jurisdiction that does not extend to criminal prosecutions."'
Canada continues to use a two-court system for terrorism
prosecutions involving public interest immunity or CIPA-like
claims. This two-court approach meant that when access to secret
intelligence held by CSIS was sought by the accused in a case
involving Armenian terrorism in the 1980s, the accused could only
seek disclosure from the specially designated federal court judge
and not from the trialjudge.3 5' The trial judge did not have access
to the secret undisclosed material, and the Federal Court judge,
who decided that the information should not be disclosed to the
accused, did not have the option of revisiting or revising initial
non-disclosure orders as the criminal trial unfolded. In the end,
the Federal Court judge in the Armenian case followed pre-1982
precedents and ordered that the intelligence should not be
disclosed to the accused without even inspecting it.3 ' The trial
judge then upheld criminal convictions even though he was clearly
uncomfortable with the fact that he had not been able to inspect
the intelligence in order to determine whether it should be
359
disclosed to the accused.
The enactment of new terrorism offenses and the increased
emphasis on collecting intelligence about possible terrorist threats
355. Pub. L. No. 96-456, 94 Stat. 2025 (1980).
356. Federal Courts Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. F-7.
357. Kevork v. R.. [1984] 2 F.C. 753, 753 (Can. T.D.).
358. Id.
359. R. v. Kevork, [1986] 27 C.C.C.(3d) 523, 546 (Ont. H.C.J.).
1780 [Vol. 38:5
80
William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 38, Iss. 5 [2012], Art. 12
http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol38/iss5/12
UNEASY NEIGHBORS
means that secrecy issues surrounding the relationship between
intelligence and evidence became even more prominent after
9/11. The post-9/11 ATA amended section 38 of the Canada
Evidence Act to follow the CIPA model of encouraging pre-trial
resolution of secrecy matters and encouraging judges to devise
creative solutions to the dilemma of disclosing intelligence through
the use of substitutions, redactions, and adverse inferences. At
the same time, the post 9/11 reforms maintained the two-court
approach that only allowed specially designated federal court
judges, and not trial judges, to see the secret material and to decide
whether it should be disclosed to the accused. It also preserved the
ability to appeal a section 38 decision to the Federal Court of
Appeal, potentially in the middle of a criminal trial. 61
The two-court approach creates both' inefficiency and
potential unfairness in terrorism prosecutions. The 2010 report of
the Air India inquiry recommended that criminal trial judges be
given the power, as they would have in the United States, the
United Kingdom, and Australia, to make and revise non-disclosure
orders to protect national security information. It also
recommended that the ability to appeal a non-disclosure order
before the completion of a criminal trial be abolished. The
report raised concerns that
an accused might use the two-court approach--dealing
with the trial in one court and with section 38 issues in the
Federal Court-to sabotage a terrorism trial by trying to
call evidence that leads to s.38 litigation in Federal Court.
Once an accused seeks information and the Attorney
General of Canada refuses to disclose it, litigation in the
Federal Court is inevitable, with appeals likely to the
Federal Court of Appeal and the Supreme Court of
Canada. This litigation will delay and disrupt the main
trial and might result in its collapse. Particularly in a jury
trial, it is probable that a mistrial will be declared if there
is a serious delay.
Despite this strongly worded critique, the Canadian
government has not accepted the Air India inquiry's
recommendation that trial judges be given CIPA-like powers in
360. Canada Evidence Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-5, s. 38.06.
361. Id. s.38.09.
362. COMMissIoN OF INQUIRY REPORT, VOL. 3, supra note 71, at 167.
363. Id. at 154-55.
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criminal trials.5 6 Reform is even less likely given that in 2011 the
Supreme Court of Canada ruled that the two-court system does not
violate the Charter rights of the accused or the inherent powers of
provincial superior courts that conduct terrorism trials .
Is Canada's two-court system workable in terrorism
prosecutions? A mistrial was declared in one prosecution using
Canada's two-court system in 2003 because a trial judge was not
willing to keep a jury waiting while a non-disclosure order was
appealed to the Federal Court of Appeal. 16 A new trial and
conviction was, however, eventually obtained in this non-terrorist
case which involved a hostage-taking of a Canadian soldier during
the Bosnia conflict.6 The two-court system was also used in
Canada's first terrorism prosecution under the Anti-Terrorism Act
enacted in 2001. The prosecution eventually ended in a
conviction, but the trial process lasted four years and involved
multiple rounds of litigation in the Federal Court.36s The accused
agreed to a bench trial so there were no problems caused by a jury
being kept waiting by satellite litigation in a separate court.
The two-court system was avoided in the Air India trial, which
resulted in two acquittals in 2005, but only because defense counsel
agreed to undertakings that would allow them to inspect
364. RESPONSE TO THE COMMISSION OF INQUIRY, supra note 72.
365. R. v. Ahmad, [2011] 1 S.C.R. 110 (Can.). For a critical examination of
this decision see Kent Roach, 'Constitutional Chicken': National Security Confidentiality
and Terrorism Prosecutions after R. v. Ahmad, 54 SUP. CT. L. REv. (2d) 357 (2011).
366. R. v. Ribic, 2008 ONCA 790, para. 4 (Can.).
367. Id.
368. One round of litigation in Federal Court upheld the constitutionality of
the two-court scheme with the Federal Court of Appeal concluding that the ability
of trial judges to stay proceedings protected the constitutionality of the scheme.
Canada (Att'y Gen.) v. Khawaja, [2007] FCA 388 (Can.). Two rounds of Federal
Court litigation were necessary over the government's desire to prevent the
disclosure of less than two percent of 99,000 pages of disclosure in the case
including material subject to FBI restrictions or caveats on disclosure. Canada
(Att'y Gen.) v. Khawaja, [2007] F.C. 463, para. 10 (Can.). The Federal Court
judge approved an FBI substitution of unclassified material in one instance, but
also insisted that Canada request the FBI to amend the caveat to allow a plea
agreement made with a key witness in the Khawaja case to be disclosed. Canada
(Att'y Gen.) v. Khawaja, [2007] F.C. 490, para. 55-57, rev'd in part [2007] F.C. 342
(Can.). The Federal Court judge also attempted to provide a fuller description of
the non-disclosed material to assist the trial judge, but the Federal Court of Appeal
held that he erred by including some sensitive material. Canada (Att'y Gen.) v.
Khawaja, [2007] F.C. 342 (Can.). Another round of Federal Court litigation was
heard later in the process and caused the trial judge to articulate concerns about
the fate of the trial, but also resulted in a non-disclosure order. Canada (Att'y
Gen.) v. Khawaja, [2008] F.C. 560 (Can.).
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undisclosed intelligence to determine its possible relevance to the
369
trial without discussing what they found with their clients. Such
undertakings are widely used under CIPA, but can no longer be
used in Canada in light of its supreme court's pronouncements
that they are an unethical incursion on the relationship between
the accused and defense counsel. 0 The two-court system was also
avoided in the Toronto terrorism prosecutions, but only because
the trial judge ruled that his inability to make non-disclosure
decisions violated the Charter rights of the accused and the
constitutionally guaranteed powers of superior courts." This
meant that non-disclosure orders in that complex case were, as they
would be in the United States, made by the trial judge.
The Supreme Court of Canada, however, reversed the trial
judge's ruling about the unconstitutionality of the two-court
approach,3 ' albeit after convictions had been recorded in many of
the cases.3 The Supreme Court of Canada stressed that the two-
court system should be administered in a flexible manner and that
the Federal Court judge or the Attorney General of Canada could
allow the trial judge to have access to, or a detailed description of,
any material that the Federal Court ordered should not be
disclosed because of harms to national security, national defense,
or international relations. Even if trial judges are now allowed to
see the non-disclosed information, they will still be powerless to
amend or revise non-disclosure orders during the trial should
increased disclosure become necessary to preserve the accused's
right to a fair trial.
The Supreme Court of Canada concluded that the two-court
system did not violate the accused's right to a fair trial because
section 38.14 of the Canada Evidence Act gives trial judges the
power to stay proceedings if they conclude, as a result of the
Federal Court's non-disclosure order, that such a remedy is
required to protect the accused's right to a fair trial. The court
stressed that trial judges should not hesitate to stay trials and that it
was not necessary to apply the demanding "clearest of cases"
369. COMMIsSION OF INQUIRY REPORT, Vot. 3, supra note 71, at 270-73.
370. R . v. Basi, [2009] 3 S.C.R. 389, paras. 45-46 (Can.); R. v. Ahmad, [2011]
I S.C.R. 110, para. 49 (Can.).
371. R. v. Ahmad, [2009] 257 C.C.C. (3d) 135 (Can. Ont. C.A.), rev'd, [2011] 1
S.C.R. 110 (Can.).
372. Id.
373. See R. v. Gaya, 2010 ONCA 860 (Can.); R. v. Khalid, 2010 ONCA 861
(Can.); R. v. Amara, 2010 ONCA 858 (Can.).
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standard used to justify the stay in the Abdullah Khadr extradition
case. 374 This approach encourages trial judges to order a drastic
remedy of a stay of proceedings that will permanently end the
prosecution when a less drastic remedy, such as a revised non-
disclosure order, might also protect the accused's rights. Under
the two court system, the trial judge will not have the power to
revise the Federal Court's non-disclosure order. In turn, the
Federal Court's pre-trial non-disclosure judgment will have been
finalized to allow for what are in essence pre-trial or interlocutory
appeals, thus rendering the Federal Court judge unable to revise
the non-disclosure order should evolving circumstances at the trial
require such an amendment.7 In contrast, courts under CIPA or
British public interest immunity proceedings have the power to
revise an initial non-disclosure order if necessary to ensure trial
fairness without necessarily resorting to the drastic remedy of a
stay.3' The threat of a stay of proceedings will now hang over all
Canadian terrorism prosecutions that involve the non-disclosure of
domestic or foreign intelligence. Any future prosecution of
Abdullah Khadr in Canada would likely involve attempts to prevent
American, Canadian, and Pakistani intelligence from being
disclosed, and arguments by the accused that access to such
intelligence is essential to a fair trial and to the litigation of alleged
misconduct. Indeed, the difficulties of such litigation may help
explain why no prosecution of Abdullah Khadr has been
commenced since he was released by the extradition judge in
August 2010.
Canada's two-court system and the priority that it has
traditionally assigned to secrecy claims helps to explain why on a
per capita basis Canada has had far fewer terrorism prosecutions
than the United States since 9/11 despite the presence of similar
374. The Supreme Court of Canada stated that even in cases where a trial
judge does not have enough information about the non-disclosed information,
"[t]he trial judge must presume that the non-disclosure order has adversely
affected the fairness of the trial" and that it was not necessary to apply the
restrictive "clearest of cases." R. v. Ahmad, [2011] 1 S.C.R. 110, para. 35, 51-52
(Can.).
375. Kent Roach, The Unique Challenges of Terrorism Prosecutions: Towards a
Workable Relation between Intelligence and Evidence, SSRN, 241-42 (May 1, 2010),
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1629227.
376. Rowe and Davis v. The United Kingdom, 28901/95 Eur. Ct. H.R. 91, para.
65 (2000), available at http://www.bailii.org/eu/cases/ECHR/2000/91.html.
377. Roach, Constitutional Chicken, supra note 365, at 371.
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threats of home grown and al Qaeda-inspired terrorism. In cases
that have been reported in Canada since 2001, there have been:
the conviction and life imprisonment of Momin Khawaja. in a
British-based terrorist plot; convictions and guilty pleas of seven
of eighteen persons in a Toronto-based terrorist plot;380 the
conviction and life sentence of a Quebec man in a German- and
Austrian- based terrorist plot;38 a guilty plea and six-month
sentence of a man in British Columbia for terrorism financing in
supplying $2,000 to $3,000 to the Tamil Tigers;"1 probation and
time served sentence for conviction of a hoax about terrorist
activity; and acquittals of two men (and one guilty plea and
subsequent pejury conviction) in connection with the 1985 Air
384India bombing. In the United States, the exact number of
terrorism prosecutions is a matter of some controversy, in part
because of classification issues. Nevertheless, reports from
different sources conservatively suggest well in excess of 200
terrorism convictions since 9/11.385 The figure in the United
378. Exact comparisons of threat levels are difficult from open sources, but the
successful Toronto terrorism prosecutions which involved a controlled buy of
substances held out to be explosives suggests that the threat of home-grown
terrorism in Canada is not illusory. In 2012, the Canadian government articulated
a counter-terrorism plan that stated, "violent Islamist extremism is the leading
threat to Canada's national security. Several Islamist extremist groups have
identified Canada as a legitimate target or have directly threatened our interests.
In addition, violent 'homegrown' Sunni Islamist extremists are posing a threat of
violence." Gov'T OF CANADA, BUILDING RESILIENCE AGAINST TERRORISM: CANADA'S
COUNTER-TERRORISM STRATEGY 4 (2011), available at http://www.publicsafety.gc.ca
/prg/ns/_fl/2012-cts-eng.pdf. There are at least two terrorism prosecutions
pending in Canada: one involving a Toronto man alleged to have plotted to join a
Somali terrorist group; and another involving four accused alleged to be involved
in a transnational plot with explosives. See Megan O'Toole, Terrorist Suspect
Mohammed Hersi to Head Directly to Trial, NAT'L POST (Dec. 14, 2011),
http://news.nationalpost.com/2011/12/14/terror-suspect-mohamed-hersi-to-
head-directly-to-trial; Text of Charges Against Terror Suspects, THE STAR (Aug. 26,
2010), http://www.thestar.com/news/canada/article/852935.
379. R. v. Khawaja, 2010 ONCA 862 (Can.).
380. R. v. Gaya, 2010 ONCA 860 (Can.); R. v. Amara, 2010 ONCA 858 (Can.);
R. v. Khalid, 2010 ONCA 861 (Can.).
381. R. v. Namouh, 2010 QCCQ 943 (Can. Que.).
382. R. v. Thambaithurai, 2011 BCCA 137 (Can.).
383. R. v. Lapoleon, 2008 BCPC 80 (Can.).
384. R. v. Malik, 2005 BCSC 350 (Can.).
385. The New York University Law and Security Center reports 230 convictions
and an average 15.3 year sentence in terrorism and national security crimes since
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Kingdom has also been placed at over 200 convictions. Recent
media reports suggest that U.S. prisons are holding 269 people
with connections to international terrorism, while Canada at
present imprisons five such persons. Even accounting for
Canada's smaller population, the number of terrorism
prosecutions and convictions in Canada remains disproportionately
small."'
In a qualitative sense, the 2005 acquittal of two men of the Air
India bombings in Canada looms large. The trial took 217 trial
days, involved 1.5 million pages of disclosure, and cost $57
million . The length of this trial was related to historical
difficulties associated with that investigation, including CSIS'
destruction of relevant raw intelligence that could have potentially
resulted in a stay of proceedings had the trial judge not acquitted
the accused on the merits. Nevertheless, the Air India
Commission, in its 2010 report, cautioned that many of the same
challenges faced by the Air India prosecution, including the two-
court system and problems with voluminous disclosure and long
jury trials, persisted.o90  Canada has responded with legislation
providing for the appointment of a case management judge and
%20April%202011).pdf. Human Rights First reports 400 individuals have been
convicted on terrorism related charges. Trying Terrorist Suspects in Federal Court,
HUMAN RIGHTS FIRST, available at http://www.humanrightsfirst.org/wp-
content/uploads/pdf/USLS-Fact-Sheet-Courts.pdf (last visited Apr. 18, 2012).
The U.S. Department of Justice reported in 2010 that over 300 individuals are
imprisoned in the United States on terrorism charges. Tracy Russo, The Criminal
justice System as a Counter-Terrorism Tool Fact Sheet, U. S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE (Jan. 26,
2010), available at http://blogs.usdoj.gov/blog/archives/541.
386. Operation of Police Powers Under the Terrorism Act 2000 and Subsequent
Legislation: Arrests, Outcomes and Stops and Searches Great Britain 2010/11, HOME
OFFICE (Oct. 13, 2011), http://www.homeoffice.gov.uk/publications/science-
research-statistics/research-statistics/counter-terrorism-statistics/hosbl5l1/.
387. Colin Freeze, Who's Who in the SHU, THE GLOBE & MAIL, (Aug. 31. 2011),
http://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/national/in-pictures-whos-who-in-the-
shu/article2l49340/; Scott Shane, Beyond Guantanamo A Web of Prisons for Terrorist
Inmates, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 10, 2011, at Al.
388. This is not to suggest that all the American or British terrorism
prosecutions are not problematic. For arguments about the need for American
courts to be more robust in their application of entrapment doctrines to terrorist
stings see Kent Roach, Entrapment and Equality in Terrorism Prosecutions, 80 Miss. L.
J. 1455 (2011). For arguments that British terrorism laws are overbroad, see
Jacqueline Hodgson and Victor Tadros, How to Make a Terrorist Out of Nothing, 77
MOD. L. REv 984 (2009).
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the use of more alternative jurors.9 * At the same time, the two-
court system remains in place and may hinder Canada's efficient
conduct of terrorism prosecutions.
The ability to conduct terrorism prosecutions is not only a law
and order issue. Canadian reluctance to use the criminal process
against suspected terrorists in both the Maher Arar and Abdullah
Khadr cases led the United States to seek to have Canadian citizens
rendered to and/or tried in Syria, Pakistan, or the United States
respectively. Although Canadian officials may have been justified
in refusing to charge either man because they did not have
sufficient evidence to support a conviction, American officials were
not satisfied with such a response. In the Maher Arar case, they
were able to render him to Syria, and in the Abdullah Khadr case,
they unsuccessfully tried to have him rendered from Pakistan to the
United States for prosecution and to have him extradited from
Canada to the United States for prosecution.
F. Summary
The Khadr family, like Maher Arar, has had an important and
perhaps disproportionate impact on Canadian-American security
relations in the post-9/11 era. The Khadr family as a self-professed
'al Qaeda family' understandably raises fears in the United States
about terrorist threats from Canada even if the inaccurate labeling
of Maher Arar and his wife as associated with al Qaeda serves as a
cautionary tale. Perhaps because of these concerns, the Canadian
government did not request Omar Khadr's repatriation from
Guantanamo until it did so as part of an agreement with the U.S.
government. The Canadian government opposed U.S. attempts to
render Abdullah Khadr from Pakistan to the United States, but it
supported subsequent attempts to extradite him from Canada to
the United States on terrorism charges that have now ended with a
judicial stay of proceedings.
The U.S. approach to Omar Khadr's case demonstrates a
willingness in both the Bush and Obama administrations to pursue
new legal paradigms that combine the advantages for the state of
both criminal and war crimes prosecutions, while depriving the
accused of advantages such as combatant immunity under the laws
of war and the right to an impartial jury under criminal law. The
Guantanamo proceedings emerge not as a legal black hole, but one
391. Fair and Efficient Criminal Trials Act, S.C. 2011, c. 16 (Can.).
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characterized by extra-legalism in which legalistic claims were made
about the right of Congress under the Military Commissions Act to
enact and retroactively apply new war crimes, and to deprive Khadr
of many of the benefits of criminal trials for juveniles. Matters were
no better in the Federal District Court for the District of Columbia
where Omar Khadr's request for injunctive relief from
mistreatment was dismissed in 2005 on the basis of restrictive
pleading and standing rules. These rulings can be contrasted with
the willingness of a Canadian court in 2005 to enjoin Canadian
officials from continuing to interrogate Khadr at Guantanamo. In
2008 and 2010, multiple habeas petitions in the D.C. Circuit on
Omar Khadr's behalf were denied on the basis that the federal
courts should defer to ongoing military commission proceedings
and presume that Omar Khadr could obtain eventual relief and
justice through the military commission process. Both American
military and federal court proceedings in the Omar Khadr case
were characterized by extra-legalism or rule by law in which law was
used by judges to defer to the executive or legislature and to avoid
ruling on the justice of subjecting a young person to military
detention and trial.
Canadian governments spanning both Liberal and
Conservative administrations have been unwilling to spend political
capital with the United States on behalf of Omar Khadr. The
contrast with their efforts on behalf of Maher Arar is striking. In
both cases, however, the Canadian executive had to be prodded
into action by judicial, or in the case of the Arar inquiry, quasi-
judicial action. The Canadian government successfully appealed a
lower court order that would have required it to ask for Omar
Khadr's return from Guantanamo, and then successfully sought a
stay of another lower court judgment that might have required it to
make a repatriation request after the United States did not agree to
a Canadian request that Canadian interviews not be used in
Khadr's military commission proceedings. Although the courts
ultimately did not force the Canadian government to request Omar
Khadr's repatriation, they reviewed Canadian participation in
Guantanamo and found it to violate both the Charter and
international law. Canadian conduct in the Abdullah Khadr case
reflected some learning from both the Maher Arar and Mohamed
Jabour matters as Canadian officials objected to attempts by the
United States to have Abdullah Khadr irregularly rendered from
Pakistan to the United States. Canadian officials were able to
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ensure that Abdullah Khadr was returned to Canada and was
subject to the safeguards that surround formal extradition
proceedings, which eventually resulted in a stay of proceedings
preventing his extradition to the United States on terrorism
charges.
The Canadian judicial proceedings in both the Omar and
Abdullah Khadr cases underline the powers of Canadian courts
under the Charter and their commitment to protect the rights of
Canadian citizens even in the face of significant evidence of their
involvement with al Qaeda. They also serve as a reminder that U.S.
actions at Guantanamo and in Pakistan may have legal
repercussions in other states even if they remain somewhat
insulated from judicial review within the United States. Perhaps
reflecting the real politick of Omar Khadr's continued detention at
Guantanamo, Canadian judicial scrutiny of Guantanamo was fairly
gentle and stopped short of requiring Canada to ask the United
States for Omar Khadr's repatriation. Canadian judges were,
however, much more critical of American actions in Pakistan in
delaying Abdullah Khadr's access to consular services and,
subsequently, his release. The permanent stay of proceedings has
deprived the United States of an opportunity to try Abdullah Khadr
in the United States, and perhaps imprison him for a significant
term while he remains free in Canada despite having confessed in
Pakistan to supplying arms to al Qaeda. The Canadian courts did
not hesitate to grant the strong remedy of a stay of proceedings in
this case. In the future, they may be required to use the drastic
remedy of a stay of proceedings in Canadian terrorism
prosecutions under Canada's two-court approach to CIPA-like state
secrecy issues. The approach of the Canadian courts in these
matters can be contrasted with the much more passive approach of
American courts which, under the Ker/Frisbie doctrine, would have
accepted jurisdiction over Abdullah Khadr on terrorism charges
without regard to his capture and treatment in Pakistan or any
irregular rendition to the United States. Canadian courts may
demand assurances that the United States not seek the death
penalty or employ military detention and trials in future
extradition cases, even though American requests for extradition
may partially be a response to concerns about the capacity of
Canadian courts to conduct its own terrorism prosecutions.
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VI. NEIGHBORS STILL: POST-9/11 AMERICAN-CANADIAN SECURITY
AGREEMENTS
The Maher Arar and Omar and Abdullah Khadr case studies
reveal significant differences in American and Canadian counter-
terrorism and underline how Canadian public inquiries and courts
have made decisions and reports that have served as significant
irritants to American-Canadian security cooperation. The picture
that emerges from these case studies are of two neighbors who are
deeply uneasy about the other, with Canada being concerned
about American neglect of human rights, and the United States
being concerned about Canada's inability to prosecute suspected
terronsts.
At the same time, the irritants in these cases would not have
developed had it not been for judicial and quasi-judicial decisions
in Canada. Since 9/11, the Canadian government, under both
Liberal and Conservative administrations, has been determined to
cooperate with the United States in security matters. As has been
seen, some of the initial Canadian cooperation after 9/11 was quite
problematic from a human rights perspective.3 This cooperation
may have been intended to compensate for the Ressam case and
false reports that the 9/11 attackers had entered the United States
through Canada. Canadian governments also made it a priority to
keep the border as open as possible. As in the United States, it is
important to take account of the role of the courts when evaluating
Canadian counter-terrorism policy.
A. The 2001 Smart Border Agreement
In December 2001, the two countries signed a smart border
declaration that eventually included a safe third-country agreement
that generally prohibited non-citizens in either country from
seeking refugee status in the other country. This agreement
reflected American concerns about the perceived laxness of
Canada's immigration system, which relies on detention less than
the American system. The safe third-country agreement was more
controversial in Canada than in the United States. The agreement
was successfully challenged under the Charter on the basis that the
United States did not abide by restrictions on refoulement to
392. See supra notes 121-30 and accompanying text.
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torture before being upheld by an appellate court as consistent
with the Charter. In the years since 9/11, the entry of refugee
claimants into Canada has dramatically declined. In 2001, 44,360
refugee claimants entered Canada, including 3,159 from Pakistan;
39
while in 2010, 23,110 with only 529 from Pakistan. At the same
time, the detention of refugee applicants in Canada has increased,
albeit not to the same level as in the United States."" Canada's
reception of refugees has declined significantly in the post-9/11
era.
The smart border agreement stopped short of proposals from
the Canadian business community for full visa convergence. One
factor that prevented more integrated perimeter security
agreements was selective registration systems used after 9/11 in the
United States that targeted those born in predominantly Muslim
countries. A number of foreign-born and high-profile Canadians
spoke out against these policies, with Liberal member of
Parliament, Sarkis Assadourian, complaining that he was treated as
a "second class citizen" of Canada because he was subjected to
397
fingerprinting at the U.S. border because he was born in Syria.
Perhaps recognizing that Islam is the fastest growing religion in
393. Canadian Council for Refugees v. Canada, [2007] F.C. 1262, paras. 257-
62 (Can.) (noting the Arar case and raising concerns about U.S. practice). For
commentary critical of this decision but also suggesting that demonstrated
differences between generous Canadian and European approaches on the
obligations not to deport to torture as opposed to more textualist American
interpretations, see Patrick J. Glen, Is the United States Really Not a Safe Third
Country?: A Contextual Critique of the Federal Court of Canada's Decision in Canadian
Council for Refugees, et al. v. Her Majesty the Queen, 22 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 587
(2008) and Audrey Macklin, Disappearing Refugees: Reflections on the Canada-U.S. Safe
Third County Agreement, 36 COLUM. HUM. RTs. L. REV. 365 (2005) (discussing the
third-country agreement).
394. Canadian Council for Refugees v. Canada, [2008] F.C. 229 (Can.).
395. The only other predominantly Muslim country listed in the top sources of
refugee claimants is Nigeria with 732 entrants in 2001 and 875 entrants in 2010.
See Immigration Overview: Permanent and Temporary Residents, CITIZENSHIP AND
IMMIGRATION CANADA, (Aug. 30, 2010), http://www.cic.gc.ca/english/resources
/statistics/facts201 0/temporary/25.asp.
396. See CAN. BORDER SERVS AGENCY, CBSA DETENTIONS AND REMOVALS
PROGRAMS - EVALUATION STUDY (2011), available at http://www.cbsa-asfc.gc.ca
/agency-agence/reports-rapports/ae-ve/2010/dr-rd-eng.html#ftn ref_26. Most of
these detentions were for less than a week, but some are longer term and involve
detention in provincial jails. DELPHINE NAKACHE, U.N. HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR
REFUGEES, THE HUMAN AND FINANCIAL COST OF DETENTION OF AsYLUM-SEEKERS IN
CANADA, at 44 tbl.5, available at http://www.socialsciences.uottawa.ca/edim/eng
/documents/1.pdf.
397. KENT ROACH, SEPTEMBER 11: CONSEQUENCES FOR CANADA 72 (2003).
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Canada, a number of ministers of the Liberal party raised concerns
about selective American registration policies. These policies were
eventually abandoned by the United States as being
398
counterproductive and underinclusive." Nevertheless, Americans
need to understand the importance of multiculturalism to
.39 9
Canadians.
B. The 2011 Perimeter Security Agreement
In February 2011, Prime Minister Harper and President
Obama signed a joint declaration on a shared vision for perimeter
security and economic competitiveness. It started by noting that
bilateral trade between the two countries amounted to half a
trillion dollars a year, and 300,000 people crossed the border every
day. While recognizing the right of each country to act
independently and in accordance with its laws, the declaration
stressed increased information sharing as a means to further
strategic interests in identifying and addressing threats early, and to
provide for integrated cross-border law enforcement while also
providing for joint privacy protection principles.400 A more
detailed action plan was released in December 2011. It provided a
commitment to promote "increased informal sharing of law-
enforcement intelligence . . . consistent with the respective
domestic laws of each country.,
401
The above proposal, with its blurring of the distinction
between intelligence and evidence and its focus on informal
cooperation, is troubling. Although Canadian privacy laws provide
some restrictions on information sharing, there are broad
exemptions for sharing of information for law enforcement,
consistent use, pursuant to international agreements, and even
398. David Martin, Refining Immigration Law's Role in Counterterrorism, in
LEGISLATING THE WARAGAINST TERRORISM 180, 203 (Benjamin Wittes ed., 2009).
399. For recognition that American post 9/11 targeting of Muslim countries
hindered North American integration, see Kevin R. Johnson & Bernard Trujillo,
Immigration Reform, National Security after September 11, and the Future of North
American Integration, 91 MINN. L. REv. 1369, 1393-94 (2007).
400. Beyond the Border: A Shared Vision for Perimeter Security and Economic
Competitiveness, CANADA'S ECONoMIC AcTION PLAN (Feb. 4, 2011),
http://actionplan.gc.ca/eng/feature.asp?mode=preview&pageld=352.
401. PERIMETER SECURITY ACTION PLAN supra note 3. There are also provisions
for the sharing of entry and exit information on foreign nationals and permanent
residents at first, but by 2014 on all citizens. Id. at 10-11.
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when necessary in the "public interest.,,402 Privacy laws themselves
will not significantly restrain information sharing, and it is unclear
whether joint principles for Canadian-American information and
intelligence sharing will go beyond paying mere lip service to these
laws. The Arar case raises the question of whether information
sharing principles and practice will ensure the reliability, accuracy,
necessity, and relevance of shared information. It also raises the
issue of whether information shared between Canada and the
United States will find its way to third countries, as occurred in the
Arar and related cases. 0 The action plan suggests that these issues
will be left for agreement on subsequent principles, but also that
these concerns may be balanced with competing concerns about
protecting informants, victims, and ongoing investigations.
Information sharing will likely increase under the 2011
perimeter security arrangements, but there are reasons to be
uneasy about such practices. Wikileaks revealed continued
Canadian disclosure of the names of suspected terrorists and their
associates to the United States in 2008 and 2009. The names that
Canada passed on to American authorities included not only those
accused in the Toronto terrorism prosecutions, but also a person in
the Toronto Muslim community who acted as an informer for the
404
state in that prosecution. These revelations have raised concerns
402. Privacy Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. P-21 § 8(2)(a), (e), (f), (m) (Can.). See
generally STANLEY COHEN, PRIVACY, CRIME AND TERROR 93-153 (2005) (discussing
information sharing as it affects law enforcement under the Privacy Act).
403. The December 2011 action plan studiously ignores the Arar example
when it declares: "Our countries have a long history of sharing information
responsibly and respecting our separate constitutional and legal frameworks that
protect privacy." PERIMETER SECURflYAcTION PLAN, supra note 3, at 32. It commits
the two countries to developing joint privacy principles for information sharing
including issues of "data quality; necessity and minimization; access; record
ratification; purpose specification and use limitation; onward transfer to third
countries; retention; security safeguards; effective oversight; redress and
transparency; and appropriate exceptions to these principles, such as exceptions
intended to protect the privacy and identity of a victim and the identity of an
informant, as well as against disclosure of information that could jeopardize a law
enforcement investigation." Id.
404. WikiLeaks disclosures revealed that Canada passed on the names of the
eighteen people charged in the Toronto terrorism plot to the United States for
possible watch-listing in the visa viper program, but also the names of others
associated with the case who were not charged, including the name of one person
within the Toronto Muslim community who acted as an informer and testified for
the state in the Toronto case. Dave Seglins, CSIS Eyed Many Suspects in Terrorist
Cases: Wikileaks, CBC NEWS (May 18, 2011), http://wvww.cbc.ca/news/canada/story
/2011/05/17/wikileaks-csis-terrorism-suspects.html; Wesley Wark, No One Wants
Another Maher Arar Case, OrrAWA CITIZEN (May 21, 2011), http://www2.canada
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in Canada about a repeat of the Arar case. These concerns are far
from groundless given the refusal of the Canadian government to
implement the Arar inquiry's 2006 recommendation for enhanced
and integrated review of information sharing by Canadian security
agencies and in particular the RCMP, which is only subject to a
police complaints body with insufficient powers to audit and
405
monitor top secret and informal information sharing practices.
Concerns about an exact repeat of the Arar case may be
exaggerated given apparent changes in American rendition
policies. Nevertheless, the perimeter security framework, like the
earlier Monterrey Protocol, reserves the right of the United States
to remove dual citizens in accordance with its own laws and
.406
interests.
Canada and the United States will cooperate closely as
neighbors with many common economic and security interests, but
there are continued reasons for unease about human rights on the
Canadian side and about security on the American side. American
and Canadian governments alike may prioritize security over rights,
but the real difference has been in the willingness of Canadian
courts and quasijudicial institutions, such as public inquiries, to
highlight rights concerns on the Canadian side, as opposed to the
willingness of American courts to defer to the legislature, the
executive, and the military on security matters.
VII. CONCLUSION
In the eyes of much of the world, Canada and the United
States are so closely tied together that there is little to distinguish
them. There are, however, significant differences in American and
Canadian counter-terrorism that reflect each country's history and
legal systems. This article has attempted to contribute to a better
understanding of the different approaches and anxieties of the two
.com/ottawacitizen/news/archives/story.html?id=2eb71 e22-a361-4184-845b-
16e9d214cl1d&p=2. The Canadian media refused to publish the names of those
not charged in Canada with terrorism illustrating its concerns about the potential
unfairness of the information sharing that has not been disclosed to those affected
or subject to adversarial challenge.
405. See COMMIssIoN OF INQUIRY INTO THE ACTIONs OF CANADIAN OFFICIALS IN
RELATION TO MAHER ARAR, A NEW REVIEW MECHANISM FOR THE RCMP's NATIONAL
SECURITY ACTIVITIEs (2006); ROACH, THE 9/11 EFFECT, supra note 19, at 416-20.
406. "We recognize the sovereign right of each country to act independently in
its own interest and in accordance with its laws." PERIMETER SECURITY ACTION
PLAN, supra note 3.
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neighboring countries. It would be naive to think that such
insights would eliminate disagreements and irritants. Nevertheless,
it may provide a firmer and more sensitive foundation to guide
ongoing cooperation, including limits on cooperation, between the
two countries.
The Maher Arar and Khadr family case studies tend to confirm
cultural stereotypes of Canada as concerned about rights and
trusting to the point of being gullible about security while the
United States is prepared to bend or even break the law to protect
security. As is often the case, there is some basis in reality for the
stereotypes, but the reality is more complex. It is important in
Canada to distinguish between the conduct of courts and quasi-
judicial public inquiries, which have been very concerned with
human rights, and the conduct of Canadian governments, under
both Liberal and Conservative administrations, which have been
much more concerned with security cooperation and keeping the
border open. In the immediate aftermath of 9/11, Canadian
officials cooperated with American security officials in ways that
contributed to human rights violations, perhaps in an effort to
compensate for the Ahmed Ressam case and past failures of
Canadian counter-terrorism. The Canadian government under
both Liberal and Conservative administrations refused to request
that Omar Khadr be repatriated to Canada from Guantanamo
despite concerns that the fifteen-year-old had been conscripted by
his family as a child soldier. The government of Canada only
agreed to contemplate Omar Khadr's repatriation in 2010 when
the United States asked it to do so in order to facilitate a plea
agreement before an American military commission. There is an
important distinction between the actions of Canadian
governments, which have focused on security and economic
interests shared with the United States, and the actions of
independent Canadian courts and public inquiries, which have
been more concerned with human rights.
American courts have played a much less robust role in
scrutinizing counter-terrorism actions by the executive than
Canadian courts and quasi-judicial institutions such as public
inquiries. The en banc Second Circuit dismissed Maher Arar's civil
claim against American officials because of concerns about
deferring both to Congress and the executive, and general
concerns about state secrets, political questions, and narrow
standing that could apply even in cases brought by American
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citizens. Omar Khadr's legal claims were similarly dismissed by
both military judges at Guantanamo and federal courtjudges in the
D.C. Circuit in a manner that stressed deference to the military and
Congress and avoided engaging with the merits of Khadr's claims
that he had been mistreated and should not be subject to military
detention and trial for acts done as a fifteen-year-old. The result
was that the extensive American legal proceedings conducted on
Omar Khadr's behalf avoided dealing with the merits of his claim
that his military detention and trial were unjust. Abdullah Khadr
would likely have been unable to raise his mistreatment when he
was captured in Pakistan as a defense had American courts been
able to assume jurisdiction over him on the material support of
terrorism indictment issued against him. It has been suggested that
the concept of extra-legalism or rule by law helps explain why
American courts have been deferential to both legislatures and the
executive in the Arar and Khadr cases.
A complicating factor is that Maher Arar and Omar Khadr are
citizens in Canada, but aliens in the United States. At first glance,
this may suggest that the contrast between the receptiveness of
Canadian courts to their rights claims and the lack of comparable
American receptivity is simply a matter of comparing apples and
oranges. To be sure, Omar Khadr's detention at Guantanamo was
made possible by his lack of American citizenship, but his claims to
habeas corpus were based on concessions that the remedy should
apply to him as it would to American citizens. Even more
strikingly, the dismissal of Maher Arar's civil claim in American
courts did not hinge on his citizenship but on more general
concerns about judicial deference, narrow standing, and state
secrets that have been applied in lawsuits brought by American
citizens. In addition, the legal claims brought in Canada by Maher
Arar and the two Khadr brothers revolved around rights under the
Canadian Charter that are enjoyed equally by citizens and non-
citizens. Canadian courts were concerned about the treatment of
Omar Khadr and refused to extradite Abdullah Khadr to the
United States not so much because they are Canadian citizens, but
because of concerns about abuses of human rights, including those
recognized under international human rights law. Thus citizenship
does not emerge as a particularly strong explanation for the
different treatment received by these people in Canada and the
United States. The greater roles played by courts and quasi-judicial
institutions in Canada than in the United States emerges as a more
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robust explanation of the different treatment in these three case
studies.
It is important for Americans to understand that Canadian
responses to counter-terrorism are shaped by concerns of past
abuses and by the restraints of a constitutional bill of rights that in
the national security context places more restraints on state officials
than the American Bill of Rights. Canada's declaration of martial
law in October 1970 has had a lasting effect on Canadian security
efforts. Resulting changes include the establishment of CSIS, a
security intelligence agency without law enforcement powers that is
subject to extensive watchdog review, and the 1982 enactment of
the Charter as a constitutional bill of rights, including a 1985
decision by the Supreme Court of Canada rejecting the concept of
non-justiciable political questions under the Charter. In both the
Omar and Abdullah Khadr cases, the Charter required Canadian
courts to apply human rights and fairness standards at the risk of
impairing Canada's ongoing security cooperation with the United
States. Canadian law on the extra-territorial application of the
Charter now requires Canadian courts to determine whether
Canadian activity violates not only the Charter, but also
international human rights laws. In both 2008 and 2010, the
Supreme Court of Canada concluded that Omar Khadr's detention
at Guantanamo violated international human rights, though it
limited its decision to 2003 and 2004 when Canadian intelligence
agents interrogated Omar Khadr at Guantanamo. The Canadian
courts refused to extradite Abdullah Khadr to the United States
because of American abuses in detaining him in Pakistan in 2004
through 2005. The days when Canadian courts automatically
deferred to state authority ended with the Charter. The stereotype
of Canada as prioritizing rights over security has some support in
these cases and also helps explain some of the conflicts between
American and Canadian security efforts.
The Abdullah Khadr case has placed strains on Canadian-
American security relations, but it needs to be understood in the
context of the Maher Arar case, in which a high-profile public
inquiry criticized Canadian officials for not adequately protecting
Arar's interests as a Canadian citizen to be returned to Canada. In
part because Maher Arar remains on American watch lists,
Americans may have difficulty in understanding the social
significance of his case in Canada. Arar was exonerated by a high
profile public inquiry run by a respected judge. The inquiry led a
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Conservative Canadian government to settle Arar's civil claim for
$10.5 million. The same government also protested his treatment
to President Bush and unsuccessfully lobbied to have Arar removed
from U.S. watch-lists. The Arar case has made a lasting impact in a
Canadian society that prides itself on multiculturalism and in which
one-in-five Canadian citizens are foreign born. It also may explain
why Canadian officials refused to consent to U.S. efforts to have
Abdullah Khadr regularly or irregularly extradited from Pakistan to
face terrorism charges in the United States despite the fact that
Canada seems unwilling or unable to prosecute Abdullah Khadr
domestically. At the same time, the Arar case has not prevented
Canadian governments from refusing to implement the Arar
inquiry's recommendation for enhanced review of information
sharing by Canadian security agencies or to agreeing to increased
and informal information sharing with the United States as part of
the 2011 perimeter security action plan. Again, it is important to
distinguish between the security interests of the Canadian
governments and rights concerns that are forced upon them by the
decisions of courts and quasi-judicial public inquiries.
American concerns about Canada as a security threat are not
frivolous. The Ressam case and the existence of the Khadr family
as a self-professed "al Qaeda family" understandably make
Americans nervous about security threats from Canada. Canada's
historical track record on terrorism investigations and
prosecutions, particularly in relation to the Air India bombings,
does not inspire confidence. Fortunately, there have been some
post 9/11 improvements, including convictions in the Khawaja and
Toronto terrorism cases, but Canada stills lags well behind the
United States in conducting terrorism prosecutions. Canada needs
to demonstrate that it has the capacity and will to prosecute its own
terrorists. Both the Maher Arar and Abdullah Khadr cases suggest
that Canadian reluctance to use criminal prosecutions (whether
justified or not) may lead the United States to seek other less
restrained alternatives with respect to suspected Canadian
terrorists, including regular or irregular extradition to the United
States or other countries. An important factor in Canada's
approach in both cases is an unwillingness to use pretextual
criminal charges which are much more readily accepted in the
United States. Another factor in Canada's difficulties in
conducting terrorism prosecutions is its anxiety as a net importer of
intelligence about the possible disclosure of foreign intelligence.
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Although this anxiety does not excuse Canada's rigid approach to
the retention of intelligence as evidence, and its awkward two-court
approach to adjudicating state secrets claims, it does help to
explain it.
Constant exposure to American politics and culture can make
Canadians overconfident in their ability to understand the United
States, and this has frequently been the case since 9/11. There is a
danger that Canadians will fail to appreciate the profound and
lasting emotional impact of the 9/11 attacks and the subsequent
wars in Afghanistan and Iraq on the American psyche. The Maher
Arar and Khadr family case studies in this article need to be placed
in the context of the immediate American response to 9/11.
Although this does not excuse the abuses of human rights in each
case, it does help explain them. Arar's rendition to Syria would not
likely occur today not only because of the commitment to
consultation in the Monterrey Protocol, but also because of
apparent de-escalation of intelligence-based rendition programs.
The continued detention and trial by military commission of Omar
Khadr and the failed American attempt to render or extradite
Abdullah Khadr for trial in the United States can be explained in
part by the seriousness of the allegations against them. Although
the United States engaged in forceful unilateralism in the Arar and
both Khadr cases, it is likely that the accurate perceptions that
Canada lacked the ability or will to detain or prosecute people
rightly or wrongly suspected of terrorism played a significant role in
all three cases.
The cultural stereotype of the American response as one based
on military force and lawless cowboy approaches also needs to be
supplemented by an appreciation of the real restraints that the Bill
of Rights and the fragmented American political system place on
domestic innovations to prevent terrorism. The Patriot Act was
controversial in the United States, but it stopped short of
authorizing preventive arrests and warrantless spying that were
authorized in Canada's post-9/11 Anti-Terrorism Act. There may
be a symbiotic relationship between the restraints of American
domestic constitutionalism and its only partially successful attempts
to escape those restraints outside of the United States through
renditions, Guantanamo, CIA prisons, and targeted killings.
Moreover, the American response to terrorism is not quite as
lawless as the stereotype suggests. Canadians (and Europeans)
often fail to appreciate that the American legal system gives the
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executive a degree of freedom from judicial supervision that would
not be accepted in other constitutional democracies. In this
respect, the judicial refusal to allow Maher Arar to complete his
civil action, though contested in the United States, represents an
important strain in the American constitutional tradition that
reserves some sensitive issues to the elected branches of
government without judicial supervision. Similarly, American
courts have accepted military detention and trials of those, such as
Omar Khadr, who were captured in Afghanistan and have deferred
to both the military and Congress when taking such passive
positions. They also would not have reviewed improprieties and
violations of the law in Abdullah Khadr's capture in Pakistan had
they been able to assert jurisdiction to try him on material support
of terrorism charges. What in Canada and many other parts of the
world might appear to be American lawlessness may be supported
by complex, though not always persuasive, claims of legality or non-
reviewability from the American legal system.
Canadians often fail to appreciate that terrorism has been seen
in the United States, both before and after 9/11, as an external
threat calling for a military response. This tendency to engage the
military in an external war against terrorism is also related to the
difficulties of waging a legislative war on terrorism with the
fragmented American political system that accepts the Bill of Rights
as a fundamental restraint on domestic state activity. The
American military tradition in counter-terrorism may provide
impediments to international cooperation with the United States.
For example, Canadian security agents were enjoined by Canadian
courts from continuing to interrogate Omar Khadr at
Guantanamo, and if new attempts are made to extradite Abdullah
Khadr, or other terrorism suspects, from Canada to the United
States, then the United States might have to agree not only not to
seek the death penalty, but not to employ military detention and
trial against such foreign al Qaeda suspects as recently authorized
by the National Defense Appropriations Act. Distinctive American
approaches to counter-terrorism that employ the military and use a
war model may spark increased cycles of American unilateralism if
they inhibit international counter-terrorism cooperation. If
Canada resists cooperation despite its uniquely close ties and
shared interests with the United States, the reaction from Europe is
likely to be even stronger.
A comparative study of American and Canadian counter-
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terrorism has relevance to the overall study of counter-terrorism
laws and policies. Although there are some differences between
the two countries, both countries have been comparatively
reluctant to make radical innovations in their criminal justice
systems in order to accommodate terrorist prosecutions. Although
both the Patriot Act and Canada's Anti-Terrorism Act were
domestically controversial, they were restrained compared to
subsequent Australian and British responses. American use of
immigration and military detention, and the Canadian use of
immigration detention can be best understood in the context of
limited reforms in the criminal justice systems, including common
refusals to use secret evidence or status-based membership offenses.
Both the United States and Canada are also more reluctant than
European countries to regulate speech associated with terrorism.
American misconduct and insistence on retaining options such as
the death penalty, military detention, and military trial for foreign
terrorist suspects may be a barrier to international counter-
terrorism cooperation with possible negative consequences for
American security itself. At the same time, co-operation may
continue if the President waives military custody when it would
impede the transfer or extradition of a terrorist suspect to the
United States.
The American-Canadian post-9/11 story also underlines how
courts now play a greater role in supervising security efforts than at
any other time. Although much state activity, including targeted
killing and renditions, in the United States has escaped effective
judicial scrutiny, robust attempts have nevertheless been made to
impose such scrutiny. President Bush's initial attempts to render
detention at Guantanamo immune from judicial review failed, and
Omar Khadr, like other Guantanamo detainees, was able to bring
multiple, albeit unsuccessful, habeas corpus challenges to his
detention. The Canadian courts have been more active than the
American courts, and entertained indirect challenges to American
conduct in both the Omar and Abdullah Khadr cases. The
Abdullah Khadr case is especially noteworthy given that courts have
traditionally been quite deferential in reviewing extradition
requests. It is also possible that Omar Khadr's legal treatment at
Guantanamo may yet be subject to collateral attack in Canadian
courts. Conduct that is sheltered from judicial review in the United
States may be indirectly reviewed by courts in other jurisdictions.
In short, the globalized array of legal venues makes it difficult for
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any regime to sustain legal black holes, and it may encourage
indirect challenges to American practices that are tolerated under
the unique approach of American extra-legalism.
A comparative examination of American-Canadian counter-
terrorism also provides an important window into the sharing of
intelligence that has been encouraged globally and domestically
since 9/11. The Maher Arar saga reveals the dangers of shared
intelligence that is, as the Canadian inquiry concluded, unreliable.
The American government's continued watch-listing of Arar also
reveals the danger of using secret intelligence to impose sanctions
when the intelligence is not subject to independent review and
adversarial challenge. If Maher Arar cannot effectively challenge
his inclusion on American no-fly lists, the difficulties facing others
who are listed but whose cases have received much less scrutiny
must be even greater. Despite these dangers, intelligence sharing
between Canada and the United States must, as Canada's Arar
inquiry acknowledged, continue, and it will intensify under new
perimeter security arrangements. The Arar story underlines the
need for effective and integrated review and oversight of
information sharing practices. In many ways, the ideal mechanism
would be joint review by an independent body appointed by both
countries. Such a body could apply joint principles for information
sharing that have been promised as part of the December 2011
Perimeter Security Action Plan, but surprisingly and disturbingly
have not yet been developed despite day-to-day information sharing
between the two countries. If American and Canadian security
officials are going to work seamlessly side by side, so too should
their reviewers. Nevertheless, the continued disagreement over
whether Maher Arar is a security risk underlines the challenges of
such cooperation.
Despite their close ties and common security interests, there
have been a number of high profile irritants in post-9/11 Canadian
and American security cooperation. These disagreements have not
primarily been between American and Canadian governments who
share common security and economic interests, but between
independent judicial and quasi-judicial bodies in Canada that have
been concerned about infringement of the human rights of those
rendered by the United States to Syria, detained on the behest of
the United States in Pakistan, and held by the United States at
Guantanamo. We only know about this unease because of the
publicity of judicial and inquiry processes. Most security
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arrangements are much less transparent. This study then suggests
that independent courts have the potential to complicate but
perhaps not to frustrate security arrangements between
governments. Despite strong criticisms of American abuses by
Canada's Arar inquiry and by Canadian courts in both the Omar
and Abdullah Khadr cases, the Canadian and U.S. governments are
moving forward with perimeter security arrangements that will
intensify security cooperation, including information sharing. The
two countries may be uneasy neighbors, but they remain neighbors
nevertheless.
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